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Recently there has been increasing interest in the socialization theory in the academic 
world. Yet, many scholars claim that the socialization within international institutions remains 
underdeveloped1. 
Different international relations approaches treat this concept in a different way. 
Neorealism uses socialization to describe the homogenization of self-help balancing behavior 
among security-seeking states interacting under conditions of anarchy2.  
Contractual institutionalism generally does not focus on socialization pro- cesses in 
international relations per se. The notion that social interaction can change preferences and 
interests or fundamental security philosophies and ideologies is not a central concern. For this 
perspective social interaction inside institutions is assumed to have little or no effect on the 
"identities" or "interests" of actors, or at least institutionalists are divided as to whether there 
are any effects. The quality or quantity of prior social interaction among players should be 
irrelevant to the calculus of whether or not to defect3.  
For social constructivists, socialization is a central concept. According to Onuf, “social 
relations make or construct people-ourselves-into the kinds of beings we are”4. In their 
accounts of the creation and diffusion of international norms constructivists mostly focus on 
the "logics of appropriateness" – pro-norm behavior that is so deeply internalized as to be 
unquestioned, taken for granted. This naturally raises questions about which norms are 
internalized by agents, how and to what degree. Kratochwil and Ruggie imply that by treating 
institutions as social institutions "around which actor expectations converge" the interesting 
question becomes the processes by which this intersubjective convergence takes place5.  
                                                 
1
 Alastair Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 487-515. 
2
 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979) 
pp. 127-128. 
3
 Alastair Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”. 
4
 Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User's Manual," in International Relations in a 
Constructed World, edited by V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf, and P. Kowert, (Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1998), p. 59. 
5
 Alastair Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”. 
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On the one hand, most mainstream international relations theorists contend that there are 
two main ways in which involvement in international institutions changes state behavior in 
more cooperative directions.  
The first is through material rewards and punishments: in pursuit of a (mostly) constant 
set of interests or preferences a state responds to positive and negative sanctions provided 
exogenously by the institution (rules, membership requirements, etc.) or by certain actors 
within the institution. The second is through changes in the domestic distributions of power 
among social groups pursuing (mostly) a constant set of interests or preferences such that 
different distributions lead to different aggregated state preferences6.  
On the other hand, constructivists hold that the behavior of relevant actors changes due 
to endogenous change in their normative characteristics and identities. In other words, change 
in the behavior of the participants in a social interaction may have little to do with exogenous 
constraints on the individual and the group and a lot to do with socialization7. 
 The constructivist approach to international institutions proposes the following 
definition of the concept of socialization: “[I]t is defined as a process of inducting actors into 
the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the 
internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an 
agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this 
adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material 
incentives or sanctions”8. 
Unlike mainstream neorealist perspectives, sociological approaches would treat 
institutions as ‘environments’ of social interaction, rather than as ‘boxes’ of material 
constraints. This means the research focus shifts to the non-material (e.g. psychological, 
affective, ideological) effects on pro-group behavior that interaction with other human agents 
can generate9. 
                                                 
6
 Ibidem. 
7
 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American 
Political Science Review 88, p. 384. 
8
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and 
framework”, in Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., International institutions and socialization in Europe, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 17. 
9
 Alastair Iain Johnston, “The social effects of international institutions on domestic (foreign 
policy) actors” in Daniel Drezner, ed. Locating the proper authorities: the interaction of 
domestic and international institutions, (University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 145-185. 
 13 
Thus one of the most frequent research questions posed by them are “When do 
international institutions create senses of community and belonging? If and when this 
happens, what does it mean for individual and state allegiances, interests, and identities? What 
processes underlie such transformative dynamics?10  
For many scholars applying sociological approaches to the exploration of institutions the 
unit of analysis is the individual who interacts with the social environments inside 
international institutions. This differs from many of the sociologically oriented studies to date. 
For the most part, when IR specialists or sociological institutionalists have look for the effects 
of social interaction at the international level the unit of analysis has tended to be the state (or 
state elites in a fairly aggregated way)11. 
Johnston believes that this focus on the international level where the unit of analysis is 
the state presents obvious problems when examining particular institutions as social 
environments since states as unitary actors don't participate in institutions; rather, state agents 
do, e.g. diplomats, decisionmakers, analysts, policy specialists, non-governmental agents of 
state principals12. 
In reference specifically to constructivism, Cederman point out that its ontology can best 
be captured by the notion of complex adaptive systems whereby social structures and agent 
characteristics are mutually constitutive, or locked in tight feedback loops, where small 
perturbations in the characteristics of agents interacting with each other can have large, non-
linear effects on social structures13. This perceptive posits that it is relevant to explore how 
individual agents or small groups are socialized, because their impact on larger properties of 
the social environment can be significant. 
 
Another underdeveloped trend in academic scholarship is application of socialization 
approaches to the domain of peace studies and, in particular, international mediation.  Neither 
is there consensus about whether identity, nature and cognitive characteristics of a mediator 
are indispensable for effective mediation. If on the one hand, certain scholars have addressed 
the identity of a mediator as predictors of success (for example, Oran Young, Jacob 
                                                 
10
 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction 
and framework”. 
11
 Alastair Iain Johnston, “The social effects of international institutions on domestic (foreign 
policy) actors”. 
12
 Ibidem. 
13
 See Lars-Eric Cederman, Emergent actors in world politics: how states and nations develop 
and dissolve, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
 14 
Bercovitch). On the other hand, others would reduce it to a secondary position (for example, 
Marvin Ott) arguing that they are essentially irrelevant compared to other contextual 
variables.  
Mediation scholarship has undertaken a number of essential case studies about the 
context and condition of high-level third party involvement. For example, among these 
contributions are case-studies on President Carter’s role in Camp David negotiations14. 
Brian S. Mandell and Brian W. Tomlin have also carried on a case study of the 
mediation activities of Henry Kissinger in the Middle East during the period 1973-1976 to 
verify how his strategy altered the parameters of the dispute and brought about conditions 
necessary for the creation of new norms15. 
Yet these and other analyses of high-level actors taking part in mediation activities have 
not sufficiently treated the impact of international institutions on cognitive processes of 
mediators. We suggest that exploration of belief systems of high-level mediators prior to the 
entry into international institutions and the impact of the latter on their understanding of the 
issue would be of essential academic interest.  
For this reason, our doctoral analysis seeks to contribute to filling the above-mentioned 
gaps by combining these two perspectives: sociological and conflict resolution. The focus of 
our work is Tony Blair in the context of the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
We seek to investigate Tony Blair’s cognitive attitude towards the Middle East peace 
process within two institutional contexts: first, as British Prime Minister (1997-2007) and, 
subsequently, as the Middle East Quartet’s Envoy (2007 until nowadays). In general terms, 
we intend to undertake insight into Tony Blair’s conceptual understanding of the causes of the 
conflict, his perception about the intentions and capabilities of the parties, as well his strategic 
beliefs about the most optimal approaches to the peaceful settlement. 
We assume that the choice of Tony Blair as the unit of analysis both in the role of the 
British Prime Minister and now the Quartet Representative is quite relevant to the 
argumentative position of constructivists.  
                                                 
14
  Jacob Bercovitch, “A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict 
Resolution: The Camp David Experience”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(Jan., 1986), pp. 43-65. 
15
 Mandell, B. and Tomlin, B.  “Mediation in the Development of Norms to Manage Conflict: 
Kissinger in the Middle East”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, (Feb., 1991), pp. 
43-55. 
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First of all, based on Cederman’s above-mentioned point that social structures and agent 
characteristics are mutually constitutive, changes and stability of the belief system and policy 
position of the British Prime Minister will produce effects on the governmental behaviour. 
Second, it would be analytically interesting to trace whether and how international 
interactions affect the former leader and currently peace envoy’s perceptions of the issue and 
policy prescriptions.   
Drawing on the above-mentioned rationale for our analytic study we formulate our 
research question in the following way:  
How is Tony Blair’s strategic conception of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
evolving with the change of his institutional context? 
As was explicitly noted, in our research we observe Tony Blair’s cognitive processes in 
two institutional contexts. For this purpose, we divide our work into two constitutive parts, or 
two case studies. In the first case study we elaborate on Tony Blair’s strategic approach to the 
peace process between Israel and the Palestinians as British Prime Minister. In the second, we 
will explore his strategic conceptions as Quartet Representative.   
The first case-study is in its turn divided into two chapters. Chapter I deals with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s thinking process from September 11, 2001 to January 2006. Chapter II 
is concerned with his cognitive dynamics from January 2006 until his departure from 
Downing Street in June 2007. 
This specific division of Case-study I into two chronologically unequal chapters is 
justified by our analytic interest to trace cognitive processes under those events that are much 
likely to cause changes. Precisely, in January 2006 a Palestinian group – Hamas – gained 
victory at national elections. An official in the Blair government recalled: “No one had 
expected the result. The election had been intended as a way of neutralising Hamas and for it 
to suddenly turn around and bite us in that way was astonishing”16.   
From the analytic point of view the basic question is how Prime Minister Tony Blair has 
coped with this situation. The new situation may either induce changes in the content of his 
beliefs about optimal strategic approaches to the conflict. Or it may be interpreted in such a 
manner that his basic assumptions and cognition will be conserved unchanged. Since this 
event is likely to induce either change or stability in his conceptual approaches to the peace 
process, we decided to treat it in a separate chapter, even though this period is chronologically 
shorter than the previous chapter. 
                                                 
16
 Anthony Seldon, Blair Unbound, (Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 467. 
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SECTION 1. FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
AND THEORY TESTING 
 
The next step in our research strategy development is formulation of hypotheses and 
consideration of the elements (conditions, parameters, and variables) to be employed in the 
analysis of historical cases. Several basic decisions (also subject to change during the study) 
must be made concerning questions such as the following: 
- What exactly and precisely is the dependent (or outcome) variable to be explained or 
predicted? 
- What independent (and intervening) variables comprise the theoretical framework of 
the study? 
- Which of these variables will be held constant (serve as parameters and which will 
vary across cases included in the comparison)17  
 
CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS OF CASE STUDY I: 
 
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
In the first case-study we argue that Tony Blair has conserved his strategic approach to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First of all, we need to clarify what kind of strategic 
approaches to the investigated conflict have existed until nowadays. 
In the practice of Israeli-Palestinian conflict mediation there have been two basic 
strategic approaches, to which policy-makers commit themselves. The first is the so-called 
“top-down strategy”, or the Oslo process. The Oslo process tried to build a Palestinian state 
from the top down: create a Palestinian national authority, hand over territory to it, give it 
increasing power, arm it and finance it, hold elections, and a Palestinian state would emerge. 
                                                 
17
 See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences, (MIT Press, 2005), p. 79. 
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 RESEARCH DESIGN 
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In other words, political agreement on creation of an independent Palestinian state precedes 
changing the ground conditions.  
The opposite approach posits the central focus should be made on fostering 
improvements in day-to-day living conditions of the Palestinian people, and not on the 
parameters of the permanent status agreement. In other words, changes in social and 
economic lives of the Palestinian people should precede the political agreement.  
Our data show that Tony Blair during his Premiership has committed himself to the 
consistent support of the first approach, “top-down strategy”. Hence, our independent variable 
makes up the institutional context, i.e., the Premiership of Tony Blair. Our dependent variable 
is his foreign policy, i.e., support for the top-down strategy.   
The most widely understood definition of causation holds that a factor is a cause if its 
presence increases the likelihood of an outcome18. Yet as Roberts explains, “one event does 
not cause another”19.   
In other words, a cause-and-effect relationship is an emergent property of a set of 
interacting conditions20. The intermediate causal processes, or intervening variables, through 
which causal (explanatory) variables produce causal effects, are defined as called “causal 
mechanisms”21. 
For this reason, since our goal is explanation of probable changes and stability in the 
cognitive beliefs of Tony Blair from September 11, 2001 to June 27, 2007 as Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, and from June 27, 2007 until nowadays, as Quartet Representative, 
we will widely rely upon the exploration of causal mechanisms linking the institutional 
context with individual views.  
How do we operationally these theoretically informed intermediate causal mechanisms? 
The logic of our causal chain incorporates the presence of a third parameter, i.e., the 
intervening variable, which we qualify as “stability of beliefs”. This is the chief parameter 
which we tend to explain through theoretical methods in our work.  
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 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process tracing in case study research”, Paper 
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The central hypothesis of Case-study I is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS OF CASE II 
 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
Tony Blair’s prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy 
level.  
Our Case-study 2 comprises the chronological period from June 27, 2007 until October 
2010. On June 27, 2007, the day of departure from Downing Street, the former British Prime 
Minister was appointed the Middle East envoy.  
Our analytic goal in this case-study is to observe, explore and explain how his strategic 
beliefs about optimal ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are evolving with the 
change of his institutional context. 
Our data sources show that in the new institutional context Tony Blair has reassessed 
some of his perceptions of the perennial issue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. More 
specifically, in the current situation he has been advocating the “bottom-up strategy” which is 
in contrast with his key policy positions throughout his Premiership. He has not only 
reconsidered and modified some of his prior beliefs, but this belief change has also led to 
policy change.  
Hence, our independent variable is the new institutional context, i.e., the Middle East 
Quartet. The dependent variable is new Quartet policy. 
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The central hypothesis of Case-study II is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variance in the independent and dependent variables 
 
The mandate of our doctoral study (i.e., the impact of the institutional context on the 
individual actor) requires that we need to propose an explicit specification about what 
‘causes’ and what ‘effects’ we look for.  
In addition to that, we seek to satisfy an essential theoretical requirement of Andrew 
Bennett’s research design which posits that the researcher should consider how best to 
describe variance in the independent and dependent variables, considering not only individual 
variables but also types of cases, or combinations of variables, and the sequential pathways 
that characterize each type22.  
Our independent variable is Tony Blair’s involvement in the institutional context: in the 
first case, as British Prime Minister, and, in the second case, as Quartet Representative. Our 
dependent variable in both cases is Tony Blair’s political behaviour. 
In both case-studies, the target of our analytic enterprise is not a simple description of 
foreign policy outputs and decisions. Nor is the policy change our ultimate goal. We rather 
                                                 
22
 Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantage", in 
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds. Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for 
Studying International Relations, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 19-
55. 
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focus our attention on the analysis of changes and stability in the cognitive beliefs, identity 
and interests of Tony Blair that are attributable to interaction with the international institution.  
In other words, we seek to establish whether changes in the dependent variable were 
brought about by changes in the intervening variable.  
First, if changes in the policy are not caused by changes in beliefs, what is then the 
alternative explanation for this variance?  
Second, we cannot exclude the probability that changes in the intervening variable will 
not lead to changes in the dependent variable. If this is the case, how do we treat it? 
 
THEORY TESTING 
The research design tasks proposed by Andrew Bennett also suggests that when the 
researcher defines the research objective, he needs to specify the kind of theory building to be 
undertaken23.  
Arendt Lijphart distinguishes six ideal types of case studies noting that any particular 
study of a single case may fit more than one of the following catego- ries: (1) Atheoretical 
case studies; (2) Interpretative case studies; (3) Hypothesis-generating case studies; (4) 
Theory-confirming case studies; (5) Theory-infirming case studies; (6) Deviant case studies24. 
It should be noted that Lijpart’s “hypothesis-generating case studies” correspond to 
“heuristic case studies” in Bennett and George’s taxonomy. These heuristic case studies 
inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths25. 
They also contend claim that a single research design may be able to accomplish more 
than one purpose – such as heuristic and theory testing goals – as long as it is careful in using 
evidence and making inferences in ways appropriate to each research objective26.  
Accordingly, our case-study is an analytic enterprise to test the theoretical propositions, 
of which we speak below.  
As a rule, theory testing approach begins with a theory and uses theory to guide which 
observations to make: it moves from the general to the particular. The observations should 
provide a test of the worth of the theory. Using deductive reasoning to derive a set of 
                                                 
23
 Ibidem. 
24
 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 65 (September 1971), pp. 682–693. 
25
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the 
social sciences, (MIT Press, 2005), p. 75. 
26
 Ibidem. 
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propositions from the theory does this. We need to develop these propositions so that if the 
theory is true then certain things should follow in the real world. We then assess whether 
these predictions are correct. If they are correct the theory is supported. If they do not hold up 
then the theory needs to be either rejected or modified27.  
We remind that the central hypotheses of our first case-study: 
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
If we seek to explain the cognitive consistency of his beliefs, then we need a theoretical 
construct to deal with this argument. Tony Blair’s cognitive stability is most adequately 
explained by means of the cognitive dissonance theory.  
Hence, in our study we are reconstructing the sequence of events leading to an outcome 
based on predictions of the cognitive dissonance theory. Stephen Van Evera advises theory-
testers to test “as many of a theory’s hypotheses as possible. Testing only a subset of a 
theory’s hypotheses is bad practice because it leaves the theory partly tested”28. Further, he 
continues: “Infer and test as many predictions of each hypothesis as possible”29.  
 
The central hypothesis of Case-study II: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
Tony Blair’s prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy 
level.  
As is clear from our hypothesis, Case-study II focuses on the cognitive learning research 
program. First of all, we need to make some cautionary notes about analytic differences 
between two conceptions of learning – cognitive and neorealist. 
In a seminal study on conceptions of learning, Jack Levy defines experiential learning as 
a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience30.  
                                                 
27
 See D. De Vaus, Research design in social research, (SAGE, 2001), pp. 6-7. 
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 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to methods for students of political science, (Cornell University 
Press, 1997), p. 35. 
29
 Ibidem. 
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 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”, 
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312. 
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According to him, learning takes place at different levels. In "simple" learning new 
information leads to a change in means but not in ends, and in ''complex learning" a 
recognition of conflicts among values leads to a modification of goals as well as means”31.  
Philip Tetlock argues that foreign policy belief systems are organized hierarchically, 
with fundamental assumptions and policy objectives at the highest level, strategic policy 
beliefs and preferences at an intermediate level, and tactical beliefs at the bottom. He argues 
that most learning takes place at the tactical level, that political decision makers reconsider 
their basic strategic assumptions and orientation only after repeated failures to generate a 
tactical solution to their foreign policy problems, that policymakers reconsider their basic 
goals or objectives only after repeated strategic failures, and that fundamental learning is so 
psychologically difficult that it is likely to occur only in conjunction with massive personnel 
shifts32. 
In an alternative conception of learning – the so-called neorealist learning – is often 
qualified as “simple learning”, in which the actor “uses new information merely to adapt the 
means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor simply uses a 
different instrument to attain the same goal33.  
According to Wendt, since states failing to conform to the logic of self-help will be 
driven from the system, only simple learning or behavioral adaptation is possible; the 
complex learning involved in redefinitions of identity and interest is not. Questions about 
identity- and interest-formation are therefore not important to students of international 
relations. A rationalist problematique, which reduces process to dynamics of behavioral 
interaction among exogenously constituted actors, defines the scope of systemic theory34. 
In contrast, cognitive psychological perspectives predict learning to occur when the set 
of lenses applied by a policy-maker to view some simplified form of reality changes over time 
in some way and for some reason. In the outcome, the issue under question begins to be 
viewed differently than it appeared beforehand.  
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Hence, in Case-study II we are testing the between our empirical case with the 
propositions of cognitive learning research program. Criteria of evidence and falsifiability are 
discussed below. 
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CASE SELECTION 
 
One should select cases not simply because they are interesting, important, or easily 
researched using readily available data. Rather, case selection should be an integral part of a 
good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study. Hence, the primary 
criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, whether 
it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes35.  
In this regard, it would be relevant to look at how cognitive scholars justify their case 
selection. In a seminal study of John Foster Dulles’s cognitive perceptions of the Soviet 
Union, Holsti reasoned in the following way:  
“The selection of John Foster Dulles as the central figure for my study fulfilled a num- 
ber of historical and research requirements for the testing of hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the belief system and perceptions of other nations. He was 
acknowledged as a decision-maker of first-rate importance, and he held office during a period 
of dramatic changes in Soviet elites, capabilities, and tactics. In addition, he left voluminous 
public pronouncements and writings on both the Soviet Union and on the theoretical aspects 
of international politics, thus facilitating a reconstruction of salient aspects of both his belief 
system and his perceptions of the Soviet Union”. 
In our empirical case, the focus was given to Tony Blair for a number of reasons: 
a) Although his historical legacy is linked most frequently with his Iraqi decisions, our 
data sources show his important role in keeping the Middle East peace process on the 
international agenda, on a par with other international priorities. 
b) As Cederman pointed out, in a constructivist analysis, social structures and agent 
characteristics are mutually constitutive. The personality of Tony Blair has raised numerous 
questions of whether increases in Prime Ministerial power were transforming the British 
government into a pseudo-Presidential system36. He himself was frequently described as 
“national leader who rises above conventional party politics”37.  
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Hence, changes and stability in the belief system and policy position of the Prime 
Minister Blair will produce significant effects on the governmental behaviour. In the 
preceding lines it was already noted that certain sociological approaches demand that the unit 
of analysis be an individual exposed to regular interaction with the larger social environment. 
c) Tony Blair as “novice” in the Middle East Quartet system.  
“Sociological perspectives suggest that the impact of social environments will be 
greatest on new members, inductees, novices. That is, interaction between a ‘novice’ or an 
‘inductee’ and a social group leads to changes in the actor’s preferences over ends and 
actions, or both. Socialization is a process of creating members, inducting them into the 
prefered ways of thinking and acting”38.   
In Stryker and Statham's words, "Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the 
processes by which the newcomer […] becomes incorporated into organized patterns of 
interaction"39. 
But the concept of ‘noviceness’ appears to be undertheorized in international relations. 
Under ‘novices’ in international relations Johnston implies the actors from newly liberated or 
created states, or recently ‘integrated’ states, such as the newly decolonized states from 1950s 
on and the newly independent states that emerged in wake of Soviet Union's collapse40.  
In his study of China, Johnston argues whether it can be considered as a “novice” in 
international relations. “China is not exactly a novice in the same way as the newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union are, say. But in terms of its involvement in 
international institutional life, it has clearly gone through a period of noviceness in the 1980s 
and into the 1990s, as it moved from virtual aloofness from international institutions to 
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participation rates that are not all that different from those of the US and other developed 
states”41. 
He concludes that China is an interesting place to start a plausibility probe, since its 
status as both a hard realpolitik state and a novice means that the effects of socialization 
microprocesses (if there are any) should be unlikely, but if they occur it should be relatively 
easy to observe the potential contrast between a pre-and-post socialized China. This means, 
interestingly enough, China is at one and the same time a most likely and a least likely case 
for socialization42. 
We find certain similarities with this type of reasoning. We acknowledge that our 
empirical case (individual-centered) is largely incomparable with Johnston’s case (state-
centered). But, there are certain logical similarities.  
First of all, Tony Blair is a novice in the institutional system of the Middle East Quartet. 
At the same time, our data show, he was one of the most active proponents of the so-called 
Roadmap for peace, which is the principal document in the Quartet activities. Blair’s 
biographer wrote that certain members of Prime Minister Sharon’s cabinet “dismissed Bush’s 
new-found enthusiasm [publication of the Roadmap] as a mere transitory reward to Blair for 
Iraq”43.   
Many insiders of behind-the-scenes discussion attribute the primary role to Tony Blair 
in promoting the Roadmap. Among them is Colin Powell who acknowledged: “I couldn’t get 
the President to say the words “road map”. It was finally Blair who said to Bush, “You have 
got to do this. You have got to say this”. And Bush agreed”44.  
In addition, twice during his Premiership, in 2003 and in 2005, Tony Blair chaired a 
significant London conference on Palestinian capabilities which involved all the members of 
the Quartet. In his private and public discourse, as our data show, Tony Blair consistently 
attempted to urge President Bush to appoint a special US envoy to the region with full 
presidential authority, believing that the problem demanded a high-ranking figure who gave it 
his priority45.  
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In summary, though institutionally Tony Blair is a novice in the Quartet, throughout his 
years in Downing Street he was consistently engaged to pursuing the Middle East peace 
process. As he himself later acknowledged:  
“[M]y portfolio is a little broader than that [of Wolfensohn] and 
also in some ways this is a political problem and therefore there is a 
level of political engagement that I can have as a result of the 
experience and context that I had as a prime minister”46.  
 
It implies that Tony Blair had entered the Quartet stage with his own background, 
experience, perceptual understanding of the issue. Thus similar to Johnston’s reasoning, we 
suppose that Tony Blair is at one and the same time a most likely and a least likely case for 
socialization. 
The factors and arguments discussed above, we suppose, will give us certain ground for 
calling our empirical case to be a “crucial case”. Significantly, crucial cases “offer valuable 
tests because they are strongly expected to confirm or disconfirm prior hypotheses”47. They 
can be, if conducted with rigour, quite revealing about the strength of the theory under our 
investigation.  
 
 
                                                 
46
 Transcript of an interview with Quartet Representative Tony Blair, Al Jazeera, December 
17, 2007. 
47
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International institutions and socialization in Europe: introduction and 
framework”, in Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., International institutions and socialization in Europe, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 63. 
 
 28 
 
The case-study method will be more effective if the research design includes a 
specification of the data to be obtained from the case or cases under study. Data requirements 
should be determined by the theoretical framework and the research strategy to be used for 
achieving the study’s research objectives. Specification of data requirements structures the 
study48.   
Whether a single-case study or a case comparison is undertaken, specification of the 
data requirements should take the form of general questions to be asked for each case. This is 
a way of standardizing data requirements so that comparable data will be obtained from each 
case so that a single-case study can be compared later with others. … Unless one asks the 
same questions of each case, the results cannot be compared, cumulated, and systematically 
analyzed49.  
Since we are focusing on the cognitive processes which Tony Blair undergoes, 
throughout our analysis treat general questions concerning his reception of consonant and 
dissonant information. Thus we are interested in such questions, as: 
- To what kind of incoming information is Blair mostly receptive? 
- What is the role of his pre-existing beliefs in taking policy decisions? 
- Does he regard in both case studies Middle Eastern issues as conceptually 
interdependent or does he take a more compartmentalized approach? 
- How are his perceptions of regional threats and opportunities changing or conserved 
temporally? 
- What is the impact of his perception of other Middle Eastern issues (Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Iran) on his cognition of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians? 
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SECTION 2. SPECIFICATION OF DATA REQUIREMENTS 
AND EVIDENCE 
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EVIDENCE FOR CASE-STUDY I 
 
The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to 
answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible. Obtaining relevant evidence entails 
specifying the type of evidence needed to answer the research question, to test a theory, to 
evaluate a programme or to accurately describe some phenomenon. In other words, when 
designing research we need to ask: given this research question (or theory), what type of 
evidence is needed to answer the question (or test the theory) in a convincing way?50  
Similarly, in social research the issues of sampling, method of data collection (e.g. 
questionnaire, observation, document analysis), design of questions are all subsidiary to the 
matter of `What evidence do I need to collect?51 
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”52. In other terms, 
practitioners of mediation attribute this thinking to the so-called “top-
down strategy”.  
 
Our central hypothesis suggests that Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of 
his beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We have already noted that our 
exploration of the issue in the first case-study will be consistently guided by the propositions 
of the cognitive dissonance theory.   
If we assert that the Prime Minister has conserved stability of his instrumental beliefs 
about the peace process, then we count as evidence his encouragement of the top-down 
strategy across all historical instances under our investigation. According to it, we expect that 
under any circumstances of decision-making with regard to the peace process, he will scan 
incoming information through this assumption, not admitting any alternative thinking. An 
alternative to the top-down strategy is the so-called “bottom-up approach” which holds that it 
is not a political agreement which is to be attained to improve the lives of the Palestinians, 
but, on the contrary, it is the change in Palestinian thinking and recognition of Israel which 
needs to precede the political agreement. To count as evidence of stability, we also expect 
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that any seminal events or complex decision-making contexts should strengthen his “top-
down” position. 
At the same time, social science theories must be built around clear, specific and value-
free, and empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Falsification requires at least the possibility and 
preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the 
phenomenon that we explain. 
We adopt the strategy of constructivists who in assessing evidence and arbitrating 
among interpretations use similar criteria, as other researchers. They judge an interpretation of 
evidence by comparing it with alternative explanations. They search for evidence that would 
confirm alternatives and disconfirm the explanation being assessed. They ask if an 
explanation is supported by multiple streams of data53.  
Acknowledging that hypotheses need to be formulated so as permit some form of 
falsification through empirical observation, we sought to generate our hypothesis as a 
falsifiable proposition admitting the probability that at some given historical period Tony 
Blair might reassess the content of his beliefs during his Premiership.  
This means that we are empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in 
his cognitive views. But to be precise, we need to specify the following analytic distinctions. 
Certain scholars working on learning theories equate policy change with belief change. Others 
fail to differentiate learning from alternative sources of policy change, such as structural 
adjustment54.  
Therefore, if Prime Minister Blair introduces certain changes in his Middle East foreign 
policy, we do not interpret it as reconsideration of beliefs. We evaluate the pattern in light of 
analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to learning55.   
In addition, we add another cautionary note. We would like to make precision of what 
kind of learning we seek to establish and explain. Levy defines experiential learning “as a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
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beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”56. 
For us what counts as change of belief, or learning, is reassessment of prior beliefs and their 
replacement by different understandings as a result of experiential observations.  
Why we seek to make precisions at this point? Quite often it is possible that learning 
may reinforce decision makers' current beliefs and actually inhibit policy change. This last 
point is particularly important, for a great deal of research suggests a strong tendency for 
people to interpret information in a way that conforms to their prior expectations and 
worldviews57. This increases confidence in existing beliefs and thus reinforces continuity in 
behavior58.  
For all the reasons shown above, for our analytic purposes we count as evidence only 
those instances, in which policy change was preceded and, possibly, affected by reassessment 
of beliefs about optimal strategies for the conflict resolution. In our case study, this 
reassessment can be operationally imagined as a putative shift from the top-down to the 
bottom-up strategy. It can also be re-evaluation of the policy of not dealing with Hamas 
towards direct contacts with the group. 
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EVIDENCE FOR CASE-STUDY II 
 
The need for research design stems from a sceptical approach to research and a view 
that scientific knowledge must always be provisional. The purpose of research design is to 
reduce the ambiguity of much research evidence. We can always find some evidence 
consistent with almost any theory59. 
However, we should be sceptical of the evidence, and rather than seeking evidence that 
is consistent with our theory we should seek evidence that provides a compelling test of the 
theory. There are two related strategies for doing this: eliminating rival explanations of the 
evidence and deliberately seeking evidence that could disprove the theory60.  
Rather than asking `What evidence would constitute support for the theory?', ask `What 
evidence would convince me that the theory is wrong?' It is not difficult to find evidence 
consistent with a theory. It is much tougher for a theory to survive the test of people trying to 
disprove it61.  
Our data sources show that in the new institutional context Tony Blair has reassessed 
some of his perceptions of the perennial issue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. More 
specifically, in the current situation he has been advocating the “bottom-up strategy” which is 
in contrast with his key policy positions throughout his Premiership. He has not only 
reconsidered and modified some of his prior beliefs, but this belief change has also led to 
policy change.  
With the question in mind “What evidence would convince me that the theory is 
wrong”, our analytic objective is to search out instances, in which Tony Blair’s change of 
policy implies simple neorealist adaptation to the current circumstances with which he 
confronts as Quartet Representative. For our analytic purposes evidence disconfirming our 
central hypothesis is his response to structural changes in Palestinian and Israeli politics, 
without reconsidering his former causal conceptions. 
We remind that in his conception of the peace process during his Premiership the main 
causal links were constructed in the following manner:  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
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- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”62.  
 
Hence, for us disconfirming evidence in this case-study is conservation of this 
worldview, but adapted to the new capacities of Israeli and Palestinian governments   
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE BELIEF SYSTEM 
 
As it is clear from the formulation of our research objective, we seek to explore and 
explain Tony Blair’s beliefs about the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. One 
of the current trends in the academic community is increasing interest in the cognitive 
approach. 
Holsti specifies a number of conditions, under which the cognitive approach may prove 
rewarding. These conditions include innovative decision-making situations, long-range policy 
planning situations, decisions under highly complex, ambiguous, or unanticipated 
circumstances, decisions under stress, and decisions made by individuals at the top of the 
bureaucratic pyramid63.  
Under these circumstances Holsti hypothesizes that an individual's belief system may 
heavily influence his diagnosis of the situation, his search and analysis of different action 
alternatives, and his subsequent prescriptions and choices that lead to a foreign policy 
decision64.   
In our case-study of Tony Blair’s Premiership we claim that his strategic beliefs about 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have remained stable from 2001 to 2007. Put differently, in all 
historical instances of Israeli-Palestinian peace process, with which he confronted, we 
preclude the possibility of cognitive learning, or reassessment of prior beliefs. In order to test 
this argument we are in need of defining some indicator of change and stability. 
One of the most frequently applied indicators of change in goals, beliefs, attitudes and 
other social-cognitive processes of policy-makers are “operational code” and “cognitive 
mapping”. 
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THE OPERATIONAL CODE 
 
One of the most popular approaches for getting at broad, general images has been the 
development of what has been called "the operational code," based upon Nathan Leites's 
study of communism in the Soviet Union and subsequently refined by Alexander George65.  
George maintained that  
“It is widely recognized that there are important cognitive limits on the possibility of 
rational decision-making in politics as in other sectors of life. In contrast to models of “pure” 
rationality in statistical decision theory and formal economics, efforts at rational decision-
making in political life are subject to constraints of the following kind: (1) The political 
actor's information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) his 
knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the 
consequences of choosing one or another course of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him 
to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action 
is "best"66.  
“How do political leaders in varying political cultures and institutional structures 
approach the task of making calcnlations, of deciding what objectives to select, and how to 
deal with uncertainty and risk-that is, more generally, how to relate means and ends, etc. ? 
What styles of political calculation and strategies are developed for this purpose by different 
leaders?67  
Op-Code analysis specifically examines the relationship of the individual leader to his 
environment through his perception of this environment, his own place within it and his 
relationship to others and their places in the same environment. It acknowledges that “the 
decisions of individuals aggregate into the behavior of…groups, institutions, and states,” but 
the construct retains the individual as the basic unit of analysis because it assumes that “the 
influence of domestic and foreign processes is mediated by emotional and motivational 
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processes within the individual’s personality and also by cultural processes reflecting 
expectations and constraints”68. 
The operational code assumes an overall coherent set of beliefs about the nature of 
political life and consists of two fundamental types of central beliefs (organized around ten 
broad questions): "philosophical" beliefs, which help diagnose the definition of the situation, 
and "instrumental" beliefs, which affect the likely choice of action69.  
The philosophical questions pertained to beliefs about other political actors and about 
the political universe in general, while the instrumental questions examined how political 
actors planned to achieve their goals70.  
The following are the five philosophical questions: 
1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe one of 
harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?  
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political 
values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in 
what respects the one and/or the other?  
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?  
4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is 
one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?  
5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?  
 
The five instrumental questions are the following:  
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?  
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?  
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?  
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?  
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?71  
                                                 
68
 B. Gregory Marfleet and Hannah Simpson, “Learning from Foreign Policy Crises: Belief 
Change in Response to Crisis Management Outcomes”, Prepared for the 2006 Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 22-25, San Diego CA. 
69
 Jerel A. Rosati, “The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics”, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 45-75. 
70
 Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Ways of Assessing Cognition in International 
Relations”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (May, 1998), pp. 63-96. 
71
 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”, Political Psychology, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 403-418. 
 37 
 
In an essay published a decade later, George elaborated upon the nature of the causal 
nexus between an actor's operational code beliefs and political behaviour72. According to 
Walker, if there is a connection between the operational code and foreign policy constructs, it 
should show up as a congruent relationship between the various components of a decision 
maker's operational code and the components of his foreign policy73.  
Subsequently, George also identified two techniques to detect the impact of operational-
code beliefs upon decisions. The "congruence" procedure estab- lishes consistency "between 
the content of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)”74.  
The "process-tracing" procedure traces in detail the steps in the process wherein the 
beliefs influence the process of defining the situa- tion, identifying options and then 
evaluating them prior to choice. The first procedure establishes a plausible link between 
beliefs and behavior by draw- ing attention to the possibility that the correlation is of causal 
significance. The second procedure assesses and may strengthen the link by making ob- 
servations of the intervening causal sequence between stimulus and response75.  
George himself complains that “the "process-tracing" technique has not been employed 
extensively to examine intervening attribution processes and perceptions, which are the 
immediate antecedents of behaviour”76. 
 
                                                 
72
 See Alexander George, “The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision-making 
behavior: The “operational code”, in Falkowski, L. (ed.), Psychological Models in 
International Politics, (Westview, Boulder, 1979), pp. 95-124. 
73
 Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's 
Operational Code and the Vietnam War”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 
(Mar., 1977), pp. 129-168. 
74
 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”. 
75
 See Alexander George, “The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision-making 
behavior: The “operational code”, pp. 105-119. 
76
 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”. 
 38 
THE COGNITIVE MAP 
 
Every individual's perceptions (and actions based on those perceptions) are filtered 
through clusters of acquired concepts and beliefs. The process in which this is accomplished 
is called cognition. A belief system is a set of interrelated beliefs that help the individual to 
make sense out of what might otherwise be a confusing array of signals from his 
environment77. 
The leading scholar of cognitive mapping Robert Axelrod defines this concept in a 
following way: “A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions about 
some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the 
person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this structure”78.  
A cognitive map neither portrays the full range of an individual's belief system nor even 
all of his relevant political beliefs. Furthermore, it portrays only beliefs which take the form 
of causal assertions between pairs of concepts in the decision maker's belief system79.  
In cognitive maps are emphasized causal beliefs. Empirical studies have shown that 
causal inference play a large role in problem solving and decision making. When people are 
faced with a problem, they look for the cause of the problem. When contemplating action, we 
imagine what consequences are likely to result through chains of causality80.  
Young and Schafer maintain that cognitive mapping was designed to integrate and make 
explicit expressed causal relationships between concepts. If it is possible to ascertain the 
network of connections between causal statements in an individual's belief system, we can 
analyze the chain of reasoning they are likely to use in any given situation81.  
Thus, at its core, cognitive mapping is concerned with two types of causal relationships: 
(1) positive or generating causes, and (2) negative or inhibiting causes82.  
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More precisely, causal beliefs are assumed to take one of the following simple forms: (i) 
an increase in A produces an increase in B (represented graphically as A → + B), or (2) an 
increase in A produces a decrease in B (A → - B)83.  
Taken together, the concepts and the causal linkages between the concepts form a 
"cognitive map" of a person's belief system. It is this cognitive map which allows a person to 
relate an event or a series of events to policy alternatives and policy objectives84. 
 
Limits of operational code and cognitive map 
Knowledge of the actor's approach to calculating choice of action does not provide a 
simple key to explanation and prediction; but it can help the researcher and the policy planner 
to "bound the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations 
and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action. 
Knowledge of the actor's beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria, 
requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to 
make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making 
utility calculations85.  
The "operational code" is a particularly significant portion of the actor's entire set of 
beliefs about political life. Not all the beliefs and attitudes that influence a political actor's 
behavior, then, will be considered here. A comprehensive model of decision-making 
behavior, for example, would also consider the actor's ethical and normative beliefs86. 
As for the cognitive map, it has an essential advantage over the operational code. The 
former more discretely focuses on the relationships between specific propositions. A major 
disadvantage is the need to represent these relationships in a network that can quickly become 
quite cumbersome87.  
 
                                                 
83
 Jeffrey A. Hart, “Cognitive Maps of Three Latin American Policy Makers”, World Politics, 
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1977), pp. 115-140. 
84
 G. Matthew Bonham, Michael J. Shapiro, Thomas L. Trumble, “The October War: 
Changes in Cognitive Orientation toward the Middle East Conflict”, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 3-44. 
85
 Alexander L. George, “The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. 
(Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222. 
86
 Ibidem. 
87
 See Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Ways of Assessing Cognition in International 
Relations”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (May, 1998), pp. 63-96. 
 40 
Synthesis of operational code and cognitive mapping 
According to Young and Shafer, cognitive research programs (which include the 
operational code, cognitive mapping, as well as image theory, and conceptual complexity) 
have each been designed to achieve essentially the same goal-to explain political behavior by 
the analysis of cognition revealed in texts. They therefore expect a close relationship between 
these research programs and the possibility of integrating them in the future88.  
In the field of quantitative studies, there have already been attempts to integrate the 
operational code with cognitive mapping. “For example, Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) 
have extracted operational code data from Young's (1994) existing WorldView-based 
cognitive maps of President Carter. They accomplished this process by selecting only those 
relationships in the cognitive map that corresponded to operational code questions. The 
resulting data were used to refine their Verbs In Context System (VICS) and to contribute to 
the development of their quantitative indices”89. These authors derived extracted operational 
codes from cognitive maps. 
In our study, by means of the operational code we will explore whether Tony Blair’s 
beliefs about the best approach for selecting goals and how the risks of political action are 
calculated and controlled have been stable over time. 
And by means of cognitive mapping, we shall deepen our cognitive analysis by looking 
at the persistence of causal links in the conceptual vision of Blair over time. 
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OPERATIONAL CODE: THE CONGRUENCE METHOD 
Based on a seminal study of Henry Kissinger’s operational code, we analyze Tony 
Blair’s strategic beliefs in the following way. First of all, we precise that since we do not have 
much space and time, for analytical purposes we will reduce our work only to the study of 
Tony Blair’s instrumental operational beliefs, or his beliefs about the optimal strategies of 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  
According to George’s analytic approach, the "answers" given by a political actor to 
“instrumental questions” of the operational code construct are referred as "instrumental 
beliefs", that is, his beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action90.  
Thus, from a number of primary sources reflecting Tony Blair’s views, we specify 
explicitly his answers to George’s “instrumental question”. We will subsequently call them 
Blair’s “instrumental beliefs" (or, where necessary, strategic beliefs)  
We have already noted that most scholarly works on analyzing policy-makers’ beliefs 
(understood as operational codes) have applied two important techniques identified by A. 
George – the congruence method and the process-tracing.   
The "congruence" procedure establishes consistency "between the content of given 
beliefs and the content of the decision(s)." This procedure establishes a plausible link between 
beliefs and behavior by drawing attention to the possibility that the correlation is of causal 
significance91.   
In congruence testing, the researcher focuses on the values of the independent and 
dependent variables rather than the intervening variables. Here, the researcher tests whether 
the predicted value of the dependent variable, in view of the values of the case’s independent 
variables, is congruent with the actual outcome in the case. Congruence tests may be able to 
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rule out proposed necessary or sufficient conditions, and they may weaken the plausibility of 
particular historical explanations of cases92.  
In Walker’s study of Henry Kissinger’s operational code he also applied the congruence 
method. “A comparison of his academic writings and his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations 
reveals a congruent relationship between his operational code and his bargaining behaviour93.  
By means of the “congruence method” we shall explore whether Tony Blair acted 
during his Premiership according to these formulated answers to the “instrumental questions”. 
As was already noted in the introductory section, we shall multiply the number of historical 
observations throughout his years in Downing Street.  
If our data support the argument that the structure of Blair’s behavioural patterns 
matches his operational code, then we will assume that his strategic beliefs have been 
conserved unchanged, at least publicly. 
In a similar way we shall undertake the congruence method to establish whether on each 
historical occasion under our investigation Prime Minister Tony Blair’s beliefs are operating 
in consistency with each previous stage of decision-making. If from September 2001 until his 
departure from Downing Street we observe consistency between his beliefs and his political 
behaviour, we will assume they are expressed in a stable manner. 
If in some instance we detect incompatibility (“incongruence”) between his belief 
system and his actions, we shall undertake another method (which we discuss below) to 
identify whether the new decision implies change of beliefs or necessitated adaptation to the 
requirements of the external environment.  
In case we detect that his beliefs remain unchanged, we will continue the research with 
the same central hypothesis. Thus we find this method to be an important tool for our analytic 
enterprise to observe and explain the dynamics of Tony Blair’s cognitive views about the 
issue. 
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OPERATIONAL CODE: THE PROCESS-TRACING METHOD 
 
In a case-study the researcher applies the process-tracing method to explore how the 
intervening variables (put differently, causal mechanisms) between a hypothesized cause and 
observed effect move as predicted by the theory under investigation.  
In congruence testing, the researcher focuses on the values of the independent and 
dependent variables rather than the intervening variables. The congruence procedure 
establishes a plausible link between beliefs and behavior by drawing attention to the 
possibility that the correlation is of causal significance.  
But the process-tracing procedure assesses and may strengthen the link by making 
observations of the intervening causal sequence between stimulus and response94. Since the 
application of the congruence method does not show the presence of the intervening variable, 
we find this method necessary, but insufficient for our analytic enterprise.  
However, as was formulated in our introductory notes about our research objective, we 
seek to explain the presence and causal impact of the intervening variable. For this reason, 
we will draw our analysis on the second method in the operational code research program – 
the process-tracing method.  
The undertaken method will enrich our understanding of how Tony Blair’s beliefs are 
operating and how they are affecting the choice of his policy options. By definition, the 
"process-tracing" procedure traces in detail the steps in the process wherein the beliefs 
influence the process of defining the situation, identifying options and then evaluating them 
prior to choice95. See more details of our application of the method in further sections. 
 
Multiplication of a number of observations  
Keohane, King and Verba hold that through the practice of process tracing the 
researcher looks closely at 'the decision process by which various initial conditions are 
translated into outcomes'". These authors interpret the advantages of process tracing, 
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assimilating it to their favourite goal of increasing the number of theoretically relevant 
observations96.  
At the beginning of each case-study we specify those historical instances under our 
investigation, in which we will explore the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs. For example, in 
the first chapter, in which we discuss the presence of causal mechanisms of cognitive stability 
affecting his policy options, we explore the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs in the 
following principal instances. 
- the immediate aftermath of 911 and the need to assure the assistance of Arab states for 
the anti-terror international coalition;  
- deliberations leading to military action against Iraq in 2003; 
- efforts to persuade the Bush administration to publish the Roadmap for creation of an 
independent Palestinian state; 
- aftermath of the Roadmap’s publication; 
- the Israeli plan of unilateral disengagement; 
- the victory of Hamas in Palestinian elections.  
 
This method will help us trace the operation of the uninterrupted chain of evidence from 
hypothesized cause to observed effect. By means of the process-tracing, we observe and 
verify whether the intervening variable (in the first case, stability of beliefs; in the second 
case, cognitive learning) are moving as predicted by relevant theories.  
We find the process-tracing method to be particularly helpful for our analytic study on 
the salience of both – individual and institutional – factors in specific instances to see how 
and why certain cases have or have not influenced his perceptions and what the motivations 
behind them were. 
Process-tracing facilitates us the transition from the first case-study to the second. 
Before dealing with stability or change in cognitive beliefs of Tony Blair during his Quartet 
years, we must precisely know which of the beliefs have existed during his Premiership and 
which of them have been newly developed. The process-tracing method will help us show the 
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existence of his beliefs or the absence thereof over time, before the activation of his Quartet 
behavior that we seek to explain.  
In addition to the above mentioned remarks, we apply the process-tracing techniques to 
examine the impact of the same political phenomena and processes on his cognition but under 
two different institutional contexts. Sayer also reminds that "the operation of the same 
mechanism can produce quite different results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may 
produce the same empirical results"97.  
 
Theoretically informed chain 
Practitioners of the process tracing methods posit that its application presumes 
theoretically informed historical research to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to an 
outcome98. Causal relations may be inferred from straight historical observation, but historical 
research must be informed by theory to identify the mechanisms responsible for producing 
causation between independent and dependent variables99. 
Recall our central hypothesis in Case-study I:  
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
If we seek to explain the cognitive consistency of his beliefs, we find that Blair’s 
cognitive stability is most adequately explained by means of the cognitive dissonance theory. 
Hence, in our study we are reconstructing the sequence of events leading to an outcome based 
on predictions of the cognitive dissonance theory. Stephen Van Evera advises theory-testers 
to test “as many of a theory’s hypotheses as possible. Testing only a subset of a theory’s 
hypotheses is bad practice because it leaves the theory partly tested”100. Further, he 
encouraged to “[i]nfer and test as many predictions of each hypothesis as possible”101.  
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If our hypothesis about consistency and stability of Blair’s strategic approaches to the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process is correct, then constitutive parts of the historical chain under 
our investigation should be linked by the propositions of the cognitive dissonance perspective. 
By the same token, we remind the central hypothesis of our second case-study: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy level. 
If our hypothesis on socialization is plausible, we expect that our process-tracing and 
cognitive mapping methods will show us on each occasion the operation of the propositions 
of the cognitive learning research program. 
The power of process tracing arises from the fact that it requires continuity and 
completeness in explaining a case (although there are pragmatic limits on the ability or need 
to examine the infinite “steps between steps” in a temporal process)102.  
If even a single significant step in a hypothesized process is not as predicted, the 
hypothesis must be modified, sometimes trivially and other times substantially, if it is to 
explain the case103. We keep this caveat throughout our analysis.  
 
THE COGNITIVE MAP 
We have already noted the rationale for choosing this method as technique of our 
analysis. Causal beliefs are emphasized in cognitive maps because causal inference had been 
shown to play a large role in problem solving and decision making. When people are faced 
with a problem, they look for the cause of the problem. When contemplating action, we 
imagine what consequences are likely to result through chains of causality. Cognitive 
mapping was designed to integrate and make explicit expressed causal relationships between 
concepts. If it is possible to ascertain the network of connections between causal statements in 
an individual's belief system, we can analyze the chain of reasoning they are likely to use in 
any given situation104.  
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In general terms, cognitive mapping is concerned with two types of causal relationships: 
(1) positive or generating causes, and (2) negative or inhibiting causes105.  
More precisely, causal beliefs are assumed to take one of the following simple forms: (i) 
an increase in A produces an increase in B (represented graphically as A → + B), or (2) an 
increase in A produces a decrease in B (A → - B)106.  
Below we give an example of a model of a cognitive map. Essentially, the analyst looks 
for the familiar subject-verb-object construction. When the intent of the cognitive map is to 
identify causal connections, the focus is only with verb constructions that indicate either a 
positive or negative causal relationship107.  
In a press conference on July 30, 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair has made the 
following statement: 
“[W]hat we don’t want is a situation where de facto the 
boundaries are changed, because that would mean that a peace 
settlement is less likely and less possible. But I have got no doubt at all 
that the only way of dealing with this ultimately is to get the 
agreement on the security measures that need to be taken by the 
Palestinian Authority, on the Israeli side as well, in cooperation 
together … [I]n the end unless you get an agreement, and that 
agreement has got to start with the security measures, you are not 
going to make progress on this”108.  
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In this extract displaying Tony Blair’s cognitive map “security measures” will facilitate 
“political agreement” which will lead to a “peaceful settlement”. But “unilateral steps” take 
by Israel over the issue of boundaries will inhibit this “peace settlement”.  
We shall undertake this method of exploring cognitive mapping throughout Tony Blair’s 
years in Downing Street. The method will help us establish whether in various historical 
instances under our investigation his conception of the conflict embraces the same causal 
relations between concepts and phenomena.  
For example, in the above-mentioned figure Blair argues that “political agreement” will 
lead to “peace settlement”. This conceptual assertion is a reflection of the “top-down” 
strategy. We seek to trace Tony Blair’s public discourse, and where possible private 
reasoning, from 2001 to 2007. If his strategic approach prescribes the same “top-down” 
strategy, then we will assume that his beliefs are held constant. If at some hypothetical point, 
he claims that “peace” will lead to “political agreement”, this will be an assertion of advocates 
of the bottom-up approach. In this case, we will assume that his instrumental beliefs have 
undergone changes, or we will seek an alternative explanation. 
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION:  
THE PROCESS TRACING METHOD 
 
Process tracing involves examining the hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and 
its associated causal mechanisms predict should have taken place in a case, then determining 
whether the intervening variables along these pathways, or those predicted by alternative 
explanations, were in fact extant in the case109. It means that the researcher using the process-
tracing must verify the operation of an alternative explanation. 
Gerring reminds us the following essential point: (1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, 
or verifications, for nearly every theory— if we look for confirmations. (2) Confirmations 
should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by 
the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the 
theory— an event which would have refuted the theory. (3) Every "good" scientific theory is 
a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen”110. He concludes that the more a theory 
forbids, the better it is111. 
In our analytic enterprise, the process-tracing is indispensable for the evaluation of 
‘plausible rival hypotheses’. We need to examine and evaluate alternative ways of explaining 
a particular phenomenon. This applies regardless of whether the data are quantitative or 
qualitative; regardless of the particular research design (experimental, cross-sectional, 
longitudinal or case study); and regardless of the method of data collection (e.g. observation, 
questionnaire). Our mindset needs to anticipate alternative ways of interpreting findings and 
to regard any interpretation of these findings as provisional – subject to further testing112. 
As well as evaluating and eliminating alternative explanations we should rigorously 
evaluate our own theories. Rather than asking `What evidence would constitute support for 
the theory?', ask `What evidence would convince me that the theory is wrong?' It is not 
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difficult to find evidence consistent with a theory. It is much tougher for a theory to survive 
the test of people trying to disprove it113.  
For example, the analysis of our data through the congruence method has allowed us 
establish incongruence between Tony Blair’s operational beliefs and his foreign policy in 
2004-2005.  
Though his operational code incorporates his explicit instrumental belief about “a viable 
Palestinian state with negotiated boundaries, not unilaterally decided by Israel but 
negotiated”114, he gave his public support for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral 
disengagement plan. This instance is marked by “incongruence”.  
Blair’s support to the Israeli plan was assessed by The Guardian to be tantamount “to a 
turnaround in British Middle East policy” based on the assumption that until then the country 
had “opposed unilateral withdrawal and remained committed to the idea of a peace settlement 
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians”115.  
The change in Tony Blair’s behaviour might suppose, at first sight, that there is a change 
in the belief system of Blair thus questioning the validity of our central hypothesis. But an 
inductive element to process tracing will help us elaborate a new hypothesis that Prime 
Minister Blair’s response would explained better not as a diagnostic change (learning 
explanation), but rather as a structural adjustment to the external environment (neorealist 
explanation). The process-tracing method will help us establish this hypothesized outcome, 
excluding the rival explanation. 
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THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS  
 
Some people regarded that striving for a two-state outcome manifested by Tony Blair is 
merely a tactical position necessitated by the political circumstances. They thought that this 
position is ephemeral and is more a bargaining than a genuine aspiration to contribute to a 
final resolution. For example, certain members of Prime Minister Sharon’s cabinet “dismissed 
Bush’s new-found enthusiasm [publication of the Roadmap] as a mere transitory reward to 
Blair for Iraq”116.  
Implicit in these claims is the idea that if not the need for the support of Arab and 
Muslim countries in military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United Kingdom and the 
United States would not have supported the creation of two-state solution. 
Hence, we set an objectives to propose one of possible answers to the question: Would 
have Tony Blair promoted creation of the Palestinian state if military action in Afghanistan 
and Iraq had not occurred? Put differently, was his commitment to creation of the Palestinian 
state made for tactical reasons? 
We draw on James Fearon’s claim that arguments in the counterfactual strategy are 
made credible (1) by invoking general principles, theories, laws or regularities distinct from 
the hypothesis being tested; and (2) by drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a 
counterfactual scenario117.  
For this reason, in our counterfactual empirical case we attempt to reconstruct individual 
and institutional determinants of the UK position in the Middle East peace process:  
a) the position of formal British foreign policy-related institutions over Israeli-
Palestinian peace process; 
b) strategic beliefs of Tony Blair about the issue prior to and during his Premiership. 
The exploration of his cognitive perceptions of the conflict will enrich our 
understanding of how his beliefs had developed during his years in opposition or prior to 
September 11. This would be essential for observing stability and fluctuations in his 
behaviour, for tracing how certain events cause changes and how others fail to. 
In an important study about socialization inside European institutions, Jeffrey Checkel 
has applied a combination of several techniques to multiply the observable implications of his 
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approach. This allowed him to triangulate when assessing the degree to which, and through 
what mechanism(s), agent preferences change as a result of interaction118.  
He reported that the use of process tracing, as well as alternative and counterfactual 
explanations, enabled him to minimize reliance on “as if” assumptions at the national/agent 
level119. Since counterfactual analysis sharpens the researcher’s analytic claims, we sought to 
apply it in our empirical case. 
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THE EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
As we have already noted we examine Tony Blair’s belief system operationalized 
through “operational code” and “cognitive mapping”. Scholars engaged in exploration of 
policy-makers cognitive processes place their empirical focus on primary public sources. 
In order to analyze Tony Blair’s thinking about the Middle East peace process during 
his Prime Ministership, we have studied 48 speeches, interviews, press conferences, in which 
was highlighted his position on the issue.   
For the analysis of his cognition during his Quartet years we have explored the content 
of 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until September 2010. In addition, we 
have used seven media sources with reference to Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his 
interviews, whose transcript was not published (mostly from Haaretz, Reuters, The 
Independent, The Telegraph, The Times). 
 
Tony Blair as Prime Minister  
1. Scholars who are interested in worldviews of political elites have traditionally used 
the writings of the key “to infer images, believing that these materials would be less sanitized 
and more representative of the images these elites held”120. For example, Herrmann looked at 
“a substantial portion of the academic writings” made by prominent scholars to assess the 
prevailing images in the relevant governments121.  
Given this analytic need to diversify data sources to explore Tony Blair’s perceptions 
over time, we have also used memoirs of Cabinet members. Alastair Campbell, former Press 
Secretary of Tony Blair, a close confidant and Director of communications and strategy (1994 
– 2003) provides us with ample materials in this regard.  
In his memoirs “Blair years: extracts from the Alastair Campbell diaries” the author 
recalls public and private Cabinet meetings and discussions almost day by day. According to 
the London Review of Books, “in terms of Blair’s relations with the public” this book “mostly 
covers the good years”122. For our work, these diaries are of essential analytic utility in terms 
of access to Prime Minister Blair’s spontaneous answers and policy deliberations. 
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Sir Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to Washington, published his memoirs in 
2005 under the title of “DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain's 
Ambassador to the U.S. at the Time of 9/11 and the Run-Up to the Iraq War”. In this book the 
author has undertaken critical insight into British foreign policy strategies particularly around 
military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Secretary of State for International Development in Tony Blair’s government from 1997 
to May 2003 Clare Short wrote in 2005 her memoirs “An Honourable Deception: New 
Labour, Iraq, and the misuse of power”. We use this source in order to observe the attitude of 
government members towards the British Middle East foreign policy under Tony Blair.     
Tony Blair’s Personal Envoy to the Middle East Lord Michael Levy provides us with 
ample primary materials in his memoirs “A question of honour” (2008). We found this source 
to be indispensable to reconstruct Tony Blair’s attitude to the peace process in three periods 
of analytic importance for us: in opposition as Labour leader; from 1997 until September 11, 
2001; and post-911 period.   
Last, but not least, Tony Blair published his own memoirs “A Journey” in September 
2010. Though along its lines he speaks principally about his Iraqi decisions, as well as aspects 
of domestic politics, there are certain important recollections of his decisions concerning the 
peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.   
 
2. In order to enrich the validity of our findings, we did not reduce our empirical base 
solely to primary public sources. Scholars working on cognitive processes as a rule apply the 
qualitative technique to documents in the public and private domains which might contain 
expressions of philosophical and instrumental beliefs123. Thus we have used a number of 
private sources which were published some years after the period of the decision-making 
under investigation.  
One of the most highly debated confidential papers was the one produced by the Cabinet 
Office on July 21, 2002. Published in The Sunday Times on June 12, 2005 under the title of 
“Cabinet Office Paper: Conditions for Military Action”, this paper qualified the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process as “quiescent” and argued that “[r]eal progress towards a viable 
Palestinian state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists”124. 
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An important confidential source, to which we refer, is the so-called “Manning memo”. 
On 14 March, 2002  Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser David Manning sent him a secret 
memorandum recounting the meetings with his US counterpart Condoleeza Rice (National 
Security Advisor), and giving advice to Prime Minister Blair with regard to the April 
Crawford visit. According to The New York Times, “[s]tamped “extremely sensitive”, the 
five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior 
aides, had not been made public”125. 
Also, we have consulted a secret memorandum of March 25, 2002 from Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw to Prime Minister Tony Blair in preparation for the latter’s visit to 
Crawford. The letter which was published for the first time in January 2010 “warned the 
prime minister that the case for military action in Iraq was of dubious legality and would be 
no guarantee of a better future for Iraq even if Saddam Hussein were removed”126.  
In particular, in this letter the Foreign Secretary secretly argued that the “whole exercise 
is made much more difficult to handle as long as conflict between Israel and the Palestinians 
is so acute”127. 
Another private source can be found in a series of The Guardian interviews in January 
2003 with members of the Blair Cabinet, in which they privately recalled his position on 
dealing with the Middle East peace process in parallel with the Iraq issue128. 
 
3. Besides, we make frequent reference to Tony Blair’s biographers Anthony Seldon 
(Blair Unbound) and Con Coughlin (American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror) who 
provide us with important primary sources. In their books they have interviewed a number of 
Cabinet members, Tony Blair’s closest aides and confidants, as well as certain officials of the 
Bush administration. From these interviews we extract private recollections of the officials 
about Tony Blair’s thinking process, which turn out to be helpful in comparing with the 
public discourse.   
   In order to diversify our empirical base we sought to explore the cognitive thinking of 
Prime Minister Blair revealed through the public evidence of his Cabinet Ministers. In this 
regard, the so-called “Iraq Inquiry” was of instrumental utility for our analytic purpose. 
Launched on 30 July 2009 and continued into early 2010 this inquiry conducted public 
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hearings of scores of British and foreign officials. According to the Inquiry's Terms of 
Reference: 
“It will consider the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, embracing 
the run-up to the conflict in Iraq, the military action and its aftermath. We will therefore be 
considering the UK's involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions 
taken, to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that 
can be learned. Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situations in future, the 
government of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most effective 
manner in the best interests of the country”129.  
Though Iraq was the central issue of all pieces of evidence delivered by British officials 
at the Inquiry, the Middle East peace process was invoked by all of them either as a ‘critical 
issue’ or as a ‘competing agenda’. We sought to reconstruct Prime Minister Blair’s thinking 
processes about the Middle East peace process in the course of Iraqi decision-making 
discussions from public evidence of such officials, as Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary), Lord 
Prescott (First Secretary of State and Deputy Prime Minister), David Manning (Foreign 
Policy Advisor), Jonathan Powell (Chief of Staff to Prime Minister), Christopher Meyer 
(British ambassador to Washington), as well as public evidence of Tony Blair himself in the 
capacity of Quartet Representative on 29 January 2010.  
 
Tony Blair as Quartet Representative  
As was already noted, for the analysis of Tony Blair’s cognition during his Quartet years 
we have explored the content of 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until 
September 2010. Besides, we have used seven media sources with reference to Tony Blair’s 
official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not published (mostly from 
Haaretz, Reuters, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
We think that in order to enhance the validity of our findings and comparisons we need 
to explore the views of policy-makers who have been engaged in the institutional activities of 
the Quartet. Until today the only predecessor of Tony Blair as Quartet Representative was the 
former President of the World Bnak James Wolfensohn. He had occupied this position from 
31 May 2005 to 30 April 2006. We have studied 7 interviews delivered by James 
Wolfensohn, in which he spoke about the Quartet policies towards Gaza and the West Bank. 
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These primary sources are important for comparison of two patterns of cognition – of Tony 
Blair and James Wolfensohn.  
In one of recent seminal studies on processes of socialization under the edition of 
Jeffrey Checkel, the authors who use the process-tracing method seek also to triangulate 
across multiple data streams, including interviews, surveys, secondary literature (newspaper 
reports, scholarly analyses), and primary sources (archival materials or confidential meeting 
summaries)130. In a similar vein, we also sought to complement our primary and secondary 
sources with interviews with experts in the domain under our investigation.  
On 22 June 2010 we had a telephone conversation with Dr Christian-Peter Hanelt, a 
German expert of the Bertelsmann Foundation. We give the transcript of our telephone 
conversation in the Appendix. 
Dr Hanelt in cooperation with Dr Almut Möller was one of the first scholars who have 
analyzed current and perspective problems which Tony Blair would confront as Quartet 
Representative. They have produced recommendations under the title of “Tony Blair Needs a 
Plan. Suggestions for the Working Agenda of the New Representative of the Middle East 
Quartet”, to which we also refer in our work131.   
Later we also had an opportunity to get into correspondence with Dr Almut Möller, who 
is currently Head of Program at the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy 
Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations. We quote relevant extracts from the 
transcripts of communication with these authors.  
We also sought to contact the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel Shlomo Ben 
Ami. He is currently Vice-President of the Toledo International Centre for Peace (TICpax). 
At first, the Secretariat of Dr Shlomo Ben Ami had fixed an appointment for a telephone 
conversation for 7 July 2010. But for certain reasons this conversation failed to occur. 
On 27 March 2009 we were in correspondence with Professor Stephen Dyson, from the 
University of Connecticut, USA. He has published a number of studies on Tony Blair’s belief 
system, his operational code and personality characteristics132.   
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SECTION 1. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND  
TONY BLAIR’S POSITION 
 
Before proceeding to exploring Tony Blair’s cognitive processes, we need to make some 
brief introductory notes about how the Bush administration perceived the issue and with what 
kind of cognitive information he had to cope with. 
When the Bush Administration assumed office in January of 2001, it shifted direction in 
a number of foreign policy areas. Nowhere was the shift in direction and priority more 
pronounced than in the approach to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It was not only that the President 
would not be engaged; it was also that there would be no American envoy to the peace 
process. Indeed, in the first months of the administration, the very words “peace process” 
were banned from the public and private lexicon133.  
According to Lasenky, the collapse of the Oslo process in late 2000-early 2001, and 
ensuing Israeli-Palestinian violence, convinced the newly installed Bush Administration that 
the situation was not ripe for resolution. American objectives became conflict containment 
and conflict management, rather than conflict resolution. The contrast with President 
Clinton’s approach could not be more profound. Clinton quickly took a deep personal interest 
in the peace process and believed that through patient mediation, carefully applied diplomatic 
pressure and generous inducements, the U.S. could shepherd Israeli-Arab peace talks134. 
The reluctance to become involved in mediation and consistent subordination of the 
Palestinian-Israeli issue to other concerns was well exemplified by National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice in early 2002, when she declared, alluding to U.S. priorities such as the war 
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on terror and ousting Iraq's Saddam Hussein, that there was no time for "marginal issues" like 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”135.  
The received wisdom in Washington is that it is the Palestinians who, by their failure to 
curb terrorism, are blocking the prospects of peace136. The Bush and Sharon administrations 
made further political concessions conditional on the Palestinians’ actions. Their design had 
“two halves”: in the first half, the responsibility was “placed on the Palestinians and only 
when they prove themselves in a long list of difficult demands, it will be time for the second 
half”137. 
The basic argument of the Sharon administration was that negotiations with the 
Palestinians elevated Yasser Arafat to the rank of an official negotiating partner, when his 
organization’s charter still demanded the destruction of the Jewish state138.  
The opposite spectrum was represented by the proponents of the so-called 
accommodation strategies. President Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross 
recalled how such key Palestinian figures Mahmoud Abbas and Muhammed Dahlan would 
remind him “that only Arafat had the moral authority among Palestinians to compromise on 
Jerusalem, refugees, and borders. Whatever his limitations […], they would say “Remember, 
he is the only one who can concede on fundamental issues”.  Often Abu Mazen [Mahmoud 
Abbas], Abu Ala [Ahmed Qurei] or other Palestinian negotiators would tell me, “You prefer 
dealing with us because you see us as more moderate, but we cannot deliver, only he can”139.  
In an open letter to Prime Minister Blair the Palestinian General Delegate to the United 
Kingdom Afif Safieh argued in a similar vein: “Mr Arafat is the democratically elected 
President and remains the embodiment of Palestinian legitimacy and the pillar and cement of 
central authority. Yasser Arafat has always been, in Arab politics and Arab summits, one of 
the major leaders of the pragmatic school of thought140.  
But in the first years of the Bush Administration, with very limited American diplomacy 
between Israelis and Palestinians, the intifada was transformed into a war with a vast 
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escalation in the suffering on both sides. For Israelis and Palestinians alike, the price they paid 
for having no peace process was very high141.  
As a result of regular pressures from the European and Arab states, finally on 24 June 
2002, President Bush announced a new diplomatic initiative designed to achieve a just and 
sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinians. As was stated, he envisioned two states, 
Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace, security, and dignity. In this historical 
speech the US President called for new Palestinian leadership and new, transformed, and 
democratic Palestinian institutions. He also called for an end to the violence and terror that 
had prevented peace. The Palestinians took steps to reform their institutions and to create a 
credible leadership committed to peace. Yasser Arafat was moved out of the picture, albeit 
not fully out of the process, as he retains an ability, often utilized, to slow the process and to 
put roadblocks on the proposed road142.  
In the aftermath of this speech until the eve of military action in Iraq, the US 
administration did not commit itself to a certain plan, or a roadmap, for which Arab leaders 
and Europeans were pleading. Both argued that the U.S. position in the Middle East was 
being threatened by the administration’s reluctance to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian war and 
its apparent eagerness to go to war with Saddam Hussein. Faced with the uncertainty of who 
to deal with on the Palestinian side and with the tactical need to gain support for its Iraq 
policy—or at least the prospect of acquiescence in it—the administration agreed to work with 
the EU, the UN and Russia in forging a roadmap to carry out the President’s vision143.  
Ross also claims that while the United States would not let these other countries 
determine its response to Iraq, it would let them shape the conduct of U.S. diplomacy between 
the Israelis and Palestinians—an unprecedented step in the U.S. approach to Arab- Israeli 
issues. Few things better indicate that the real objective here had less to do with Middle East 
peace and much more to do with the Bush Administration’s Iraq policy. Arabs, Europeans and 
others would find it easier to tolerate what the United States was doing in Iraq if the 
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administration could point to its making a serious effort on Israeli-Palestinian peace—or so 
the thinking went144.  
The aim of the Road Map was to create a viable, independent Palestinian state by 2005 
living in peace alongside Israel. The ultimate Palestinian objective—the end of the Israeli 
occupation and the establishment of a sovereign, viable, democratic Palestinian state—was 
clear. The Israeli equivalent was less precise. Israel's ultimate goal remained its acceptance as 
a Jewish state living securely in the region where it is recognized and accepted as such by its 
Arab neighbors. This would mean an end to violence and recognition of Israel's Jewish 
character. It would also mean that the Palestinian right of return would be relegated to a 
concept of history and not remain as a viable Palestinian objective. The nature of the 
Palestinian state's sovereignty as well as its borders were not made specific145.  
The negotiated settlement was expected to “result in the emergence of an independent, 
democratic, and viable Palestinian state” that would live side by side in peace and security 
with Israel and its other neighbors146. According to this design, the settlement would “resolve 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict" and would will end the occupation that began in 1967. The 
Road Map thus was seen as a vital element "to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, 
including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks”147. 
Lasenky argues that the Roadmap’s principal weakness is that it is silent on parameters 
for a permanent settlement. The Road Map lacks specificity about any of the core issues – e.g. 
security, settlements, Jerusalem, borders and refugees. He believes that if these subjects were 
addressed, each side would be forced to engage in a serious internal political discourse. 
Without specifying even the most general outlines of a final settlement, the U.S. and the 
Quartet leave the parties free to pursue policies that ultimately undermine the prospect of a 
negotiated solution148.  
At the same time, the roadmap reflected agreement with parties that had no 
responsibility for carrying out even one of the steps for which they were calling. Conversely, 
the parties that would have to implement these steps were presented the roadmap after the 
Quartet had already agreed to it. They were each offered the opportunity to make comments 
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but not to engage in a negotiation about its content or how it might actually be implemented. 
Perhaps the need to avoid negotiating with Yasir Arafat—as well as the desire to have an 
international consensus that would be difficult to reject—influenced the administration’s 
approach149.  
But despite this serious weakness, the Road Map has real promise. The Quartet’s role as 
monitor offers a corrective to one of the principal failings of the Oslo process. During the 
Oslo years, there was no outside party responsible for determining compliance. The Road 
Map invests the Quartet with the power to verify and monitor steps taken by each side. 
According to the Road Map, the Quartet, rather than the parties, has the authority to determine 
if the process should move forward from stage to stage. How this new role will be 
operationalized (including the crucial question of whether the U.S. will have veto authority 
over security monitoring) remains unclear. Even more important, what kind of enforcement 
mechanism will the U.S. and the Quartet use? Still, the Road Map’s monitoring and 
verification provisions are a critical innovation and may prove to be an invaluable instrument 
for ending the current crisis150.    
 
ISRAELI REACTION TO THE ROADMAP 
In general terms, the Israeli political audience has received this shift in international 
policy with scepticism. Prime Minister Sharon’s close aide Dov Weisglass contended that 
“the term ‘peace process’ is a bundle of concepts and commitments. The peace process is the 
establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks that entails. The peace process is 
the evacuation of settlements, it's the return of refugees, it's the partition of Jerusalem. And all 
that has now been frozen.... what I effectively agreed to with the Americans was that part of 
the settlements would not be dealt with at all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the 
Palestinians turn into Finns. That is the significance of what we did”151.  
Nathan Sharansky in his book The Case For Democracy recalls his concerns that “in 
granting the Palestinian Authority a state even before final status talks would begin, the Road 
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Map was rewarding Palestinian terrorism”. He claimed that by internationalising the conflict, 
the plan was undermining Israeli sovereignty152.    
A Likud party minister Uri Landau denounced the plan as "more dangerous than the 
Oslo accords". Arieh Eldad, one of the seven National Union MPs, said: "There are red lines 
that can't be crossed." Yuval Steinitz, the Likud chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs 
and defence committee – “I will vote against it in the Knesset and the party forums. The road-
map is a completely unbalanced plan, which takes account of the essential demands of the 
Palestinians, but ignores those of Israel”153. 
 
TONY BLAIR’S POSITION 
 In the historical analyses, as well as in the reports of media about the position of the 
Bush administration vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian peace process Tony Blair is one of the 
most frequently quoted international leaders.  
Gerson believes that more than that of any other world leader, Blair's foreign policy 
approach is a rigorous, logical argument. Like advancements in communications and the 
global economy, political challenges, Blair contends, have "immediate impact, an ability to 
cross frontiers." Irresponsible and failing states become bases of operation for terrorist, crime 
and drug syndicates. This chaos is tamed, in his view, by promoting economic development, 
treating killer diseases, fighting global warming and achieving peace in the Middle East -- an 
agenda of exhausting idealism. "Justice," he says, "is the thing that is most powerful in its 
appeal to people”154.  
Tony Blair’s appeal for more active international commitment to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict predates the famous Bush speech of June 24, 2002. In the immediate aftermath of the 
911 events, when the Bush administration was deliberating over the succeeding response, 
Prime Minister Tony Blair became the first foreign leader who proposed President Bush to 
include the Middle East peace process into his agenda.  
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In his public discourse he determined a future Palestinian state and Israel’s security as 
“two fixed points of this whole conflict”155. He subsequently argued that “[t]he rest is to find 
our way to those fixed points, through negotiation and discussion, through necessary 
compromise and debate”156. 
Principal participants of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations testify that in the first years 
of the Bush Administration with very limited American diplomacy between Israelis and 
Palestinians, the intifada was transformed into a war with a vast escalation in the suffering on 
both sides”157. Against this background of low-profile US involvement in the conflict Tony 
Blair maintained that without the third party involvement the both sides are unlikely to break 
the cycle of violence. In one of his interviews Tony Blair admitted: 
In that situation where the two sides are so locked in conflict like 
that, they can't get together without an external force bringing them 
together”158.    
 
He continued:  
“I don't believe this will happen unless there is external force and 
pressure, not in the sense of trying to push people into positions they 
don't want to be pushed into, but in attempting to settle the situation 
sufficiently, give people something to aim for that isn't the next day's 
conflict”159.  
 
Most insiders of the Blair administration acknowledge that the peace process was the 
point of most divergences between the US and British conceptions. A senior Foreign Office 
official recalled: “the Arab-Israeli issue was the most difficult, protracted issue between us 
and the Americans over the whole ten-year period of Blair premiership”160.   
In a similar way Donald Rusmfeld’s aide Ken Adelman, who served on Defence Policy 
Board, expressed the recollections of his colleagues: “the fact is the players weren’t there, the 
timing wasn’t there, the substance wasn’t there. Tony Blair would respond, “Yes, but you 
have to create all those”. It just wasn’t going to happen”161.  
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A large number of primary and secondary sources on the events of 2002-2003 testify 
that Tony Blair undertook personal efforts to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian process issue on 
a par with the Iraq issue. In a series of The Guardian interviews in January 2003 members of 
the Blair Cabinet privately recalled the position of Tony Blair on this subject.  
According to this source Tony Blair told his “colleagues that he was aware that the 
potential Achilles heel of his Iraq strategy was the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He said that he 
was clear that movement in the peace process had to be made in parallel with Iraq, otherwise 
resentment in the Arab world against the west could fester”162.  
In fact, as Coates et al. point out, it was noticeable, throughout the build-up to the 
invasion, that it was the UK Government, not the Bush Administration, that making the 
running on the Israeli-Palestinian link to the Iraqi crisis”163.  
In this historic period Tony Blair’s efforts were to urge President Bush to commit 
himself through the publication and implementation of the Roadmap. Even in Israel, 
according to The Guardian, Tony Blair “is widely seen in Israel as having played a key role in 
persuading President George Bush to endorse the "road map"164.  
When President Bush finally agreed to publication of the "road map", a peace plan 
which would see the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005, most media stated that this action 
had been made by the US President “at Blair's request”165.  
In this respect, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell also attributes the primary role to 
Tony Blair by acknowledging: “I couldn’t get the President to say the words “road map”. It 
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was finally Blair who said to Bush, “You have got to do this. You have got to say this”. And 
Bush agreed”166.  
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As was remarked above, drawing on a seminal study of Henry Kissinger’s operational 
code167, we analyze Tony Blair’s strategic beliefs in the following way. First of all, we precise 
that since we do not have much space and time, for analytical purposes we will reduce our 
work only to the study of Tony Blair’s instrumental operational beliefs, or his beliefs about 
the optimal strategies of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  
George’s analytic approach suggests that the "answers" given by a political actor to 
“instrumental questions” of the operational code construct are referred as "instrumental 
beliefs", that is, his beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action168.  
Thus, from a number of primary sources reflecting Tony Blair’s views, we specify 
explicitly his answers to George’s “instrumental questions”. We will subsequently call them 
Blair’s “instrumental beliefs" (or, where necessary, strategic beliefs, or belief system).  
We have already noted that most scholarly works on analyzing policy-makers’ beliefs 
have applied two important techniques identified by A. George – the congruence method and 
the process-tracing. The "congruence" procedure establishes consistency "between the content 
of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)." This procedure establishes a plausible link 
between beliefs and behavior by drawing attention to the possibility that the correlation is of 
causal significance169.   
In congruence testing, the researcher focuses on the values of the independent and 
dependent variables rather than the intervening variables. Here, the researcher tests whether 
the predicted value of the dependent variable, in view of the values of the case’s independent 
variables, is congruent with the actual outcome in the case. Congruence tests may be able to 
rule out proposed necessary or sufficient conditions, and they may weaken the plausibility of 
particular historical explanations of cases.  
                                                 
167
 See Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's 
Operational Code and the Vietnam War”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 
(Mar., 1977), pp. 129-168. 
168
 Alexander L. George, “The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of 
Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. 
(Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222. 
169
 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”, Political Psychology, 
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 403-418. 
 
SECTION 2. TONY BLAIR’S STRATEGIC BELIEFS:  
CONGRUENCE METHOD 
 
 68 
In Walker’s study of Henry Kissinger’s operational code the congruence method was 
also applied. Through a comparison of Kissinger’s academic writings and his conduct of the 
Vietnam negotiations, Walker’s findings revealed a congruent relationship between his 
operational code and his bargaining behaviour170.  
In a similar vein, by means of the “congruence method” we shall explore whether Tony 
Blair acted during his Premiership according to his previously formulated answers to the 
“instrumental questions” which make his operational code (or, belief system). As was already 
noted in the introductory section, we shall multiply the number of historical observations 
throughout his years in Downing Street.  
If our data support the argument that the structure of Blair’s behavioural patterns 
matches his operational code, then we will assume that his strategic beliefs have been 
conserved unchanged, at least publicly. 
Coupled with this, we shall undertake the congruence method to establish whether on 
each historical occasion under our investigation Prime Minister Tony Blair’s beliefs are 
operating in consistency with the previous stage of decision-making. If from September 2001 
until his departure from Downing Street we observe consistency between his beliefs and his 
political behaviour, we will assume they are expressed in a stable manner. 
Walker’s study of Kissinger’s operational code found that strategic and tactical mosaic 
formed by the types and series of American behaviours during the Vietnam conflict was 
essentially congruent with the premises of Kissinger's operational code and with his 
conception of a mutually satisfactory outcome for the war171.  
At the same time, Walker discovered a deviation from Kissinger's operational code in 
the pattern of American behavior that occurred in October 1972.  This happened due to the 
fact that other variables in the decision-making process inside both Washington and Hanoi 
delayed the acceptance of the draft agreement negotiated by Kissinger and Tho as the basis 
for a settlement of the conflict. He concludes that the factors that reversed the trend away 
from a settlement and toward escalation were those articulated by the "bureaucratic politics" 
models of foreign policy decision-making172.  
Likewise, we will use the congruence method to find whether there are certain 
deviations in Tony Blair’s foreign policy from his stated instrumental beliefs. If the 
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congruence method shows such deviations ‘”incongruence”, then we will seek to find the 
reason for this mismatch. 
Following the principle of falsifiability, we assume that this incongruence may be 
caused by changes in his belief system. In this case, our hypothesis that Blair conserved 
consistency of beliefs does not hold true. Equally, we assume that this incongruence may be 
caused by alternative sources in our empirical case: bureaucratic determinants or structural 
adjustment to the new political environment, but by conserving the stability in perceptions of 
the conflict. (This case will be treated more adequately in the section of the process-tracing 
method). In case we detect that his beliefs remain unchanged, we will continue the research 
with the same central hypothesis. 
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TONY BLAIR’S INSTRUMENTAL OPERATIONAL BELIEFS  
 
The operational code assumes an overall coherent set of beliefs about the nature of 
political life and consists of two fundamental types of central beliefs (organized around ten 
broad questions): "philosophical" beliefs, which help diagnose the definition of the situation, 
and "instrumental" beliefs, which affect the likely choice of action173. We remarked above, 
that for analytic purposes we omit the discussions of philosophical beliefs and instead focus 
on instrumental dimensions. 
The five instrumental questions of the George model are the following:  
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?  
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?  
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?  
4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?  
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?174  
 
Based on Blair’s pubic discourse we now determine his answer to these questions and 
will regard them as his “operational code”.  
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I. SELECTING GOALS FOR POLITICAL ACTION 
On the 15 of October 2001 Prime minister Tony Blair for the first time gave his public 
backing to the creation of a Palestinian:  
“A viable Palestinian state, as part of a negotiated and agreed 
settlement, which guarantees peace and security for Israel is the 
objective"175.  
 
Conceptually Blair characterized the significance of the peace process as  
“[T]he single most important thing, making progress, that we can 
do in terms of our relationship with the Arab and Muslim world”176.  
 
II. PURSUIT OF GOALS  
According to his cognition, the above-mentioned objective of creating the Palestinian 
state can be attained only by sustained international engagement and mediation. In his 
interview for NBC, he argued:  
“In that situation where the two sides are so locked in conflict 
like that, they can't get together without an external force bringing 
them together, and as I say that is why I support the efforts that the 
United States is making and I think we have got to deepen that 
process…”177.    
 
III. CALCULATION AND CONTROL OF RISKS 
Furthermore, a set of cognitive beliefs of Tony Blair about the proper means of 
controlling risks in the peace process stresses on the efforts that the parties should take.  
Concerning the Palestinians, Blair believes that  
“the precondition of getting a viable peace process in place and 
concluded is an end to terrorism and the support for terrorism and 
preparation for terrorism”178.  
 
Concerning the Israelis, he advocates  
“the aim of a viable Palestinian state with negotiated boundaries, 
not unilaterally decided by Israel but negotiated… 179”  
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IV. THE BEST TIMING OF EFFORTS 
An important facet of a leader’s operational code is his answer to the question about the 
best timing of efforts. Blair believed it would be unfeasible  
“to get this issue back into any form in which you will have final 
status negotiations, which is what the Palestinians want to see, until we 
have done the preparatory work”180.  
 
For this purpose, the UK Government under Tony Blair organised in 2003 and 2005 
London conferences as part of international engagement for political reform within the 
Palestinian Authority.  
He justified his efforts by the following belief:  
“And the reason why I think it is important to discuss political 
reform with the Palestinians is that there has been a sense in Israel and 
outside that unless we get the right political mechanisms in place then 
it is difficult to make progress on the Middle East”181.  
 
V. UTILITY OF MEANS FOR ADVANCING ONE'S INTERESTS 
There have been two major strategies to the resolution of the conflict aimed at creating 
the Palestinian state: the “top-down strategy” (creation and strengthening of a Palestinian 
Authority, making territorial concessions) and the “bottom-up strategy” (obliging the 
Palestinian Authority first to prove its ability to govern, conducting reforms within Palestinian 
civil society).  
From the primary sources we see that the “top-down strategy” of supporting the 
Palestinian Authority has guided Tony Blair’s thinking throughout his Prime Minister years. 
For example, Blair said:  
“[Y]ou can stand here and disagree with certain measures that 
are taken by the Israeli government or the Palestinian Authority, but in 
the end unless you get an agreement, and that agreement has got to 
start with the security measures, you are not going to make progress on 
this”182. 
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In summary, these "answers" given by Tony Blair to the “instrumental questions” of 
George’s operational code construct are referred by us as "instrumental beliefs", that is, his 
beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action183.  
In the following lines, by means of the “congruence method” we shall explore whether 
Tony Blair acted during his Premiership according to these previously formulated answers to 
the “instrumental questions”. We shall multiply the number of historical observations 
throughout his years in Downing Street.  
If our data support the argument that the structure of Blair’s behavioural patterns 
matches his operational code, then we will assume that his strategic beliefs have been 
conserved unchanged, at least publicly. In a similar manner, we shall undertake the 
congruence method to establish whether on each historical occasion under our investigation 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s beliefs are operating in consistency with the previous stage of 
decision-making. If from September 2001 until his departure from Downing Street we 
observe consistency between his beliefs and his political behaviour, we will assume they are 
expressed in a stable manner. 
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I. SELECTING OBJECTIVES  
 
The first in the set of questions in the theoretical model of an operational code by 
Alexander George is: “What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political 
action?” In his fundamental article the founder of the operational code approach gives the 
results of his study of the Bolsheviks’ belief about the best approach for selecting political 
objectives184.  
He writes that the “classical Bolshevik answer to the question of how best to set one's 
goals in embarking upon action was influenced” by the combination of “determinist and 
indeterminist conceptions regarding future historical developments and the view of one's role 
in "moving" history in the right direction. He continues: “How, then, did the Bolsheviks orient 
themselves more specifically to the critical question of determining what one should strive 
for, and what the goals and objectives of action should be when an "opportunity" to make 
gains arises?185” 
For our part, in this section we will observe whether Blair’s belief about the “best 
approach” discussed above has been conserved or undergone certain changes under political 
circumstances. We also trace how he oriented his domestic and international discourse over 
the critical question of what the objectives of action should be when an "opportunity" to make 
arises. 
Scholars working on cognitive processes apply the qualitative technique to documents in 
the public and private domains which might contain expressions of philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs186.  We have studied 48 speeches, interviews, press conferences, in which 
was highlighted his position on the issue during his years in Downing Street. Based on the 
views expressed in these primary soruces, we sought to explore Tony Blair’s operational 
code.  
Following the events of 911 when military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan 
was the international priority, Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted on another priority, which 
was the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and creation of the independent 
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Palestinian state. According to Dyson, in operationalizing his plan of action, Blair focused 
upon an immediate and middle-range goal. His immediate goal was to ensure that the military 
response of the Bush administration was judicious, well-targeted, and multilateral, while the 
middle-range objective was to make progress on a settlement of the Palestinian issue187. 
In this respect, the Prime Minister made explicit that “[a] viable Palestinian state as part 
of a negotiated and agreed settlement which guarantees peace and security for Israel was the 
objective” of the Middle East peace process188. 
“The end we desire, therefore, is a just peace in which Israelis 
and Palestinians live side by side each in their own state, secure and 
able to prosper and develop. […] That is the only sensible outcome 
and we must seize this moment to make progress towards that end, 
otherwise more bloodshed and violence will drive out the 
overwhelming desire for peace in the region and the wider world”189. 
 
From the very beginning, as our primary sources show, Blair had incorporated into his 
cognitive outlook the objective of creation of a Palestinian state as one of the two “fixed 
points” of the conflict: 
“[I]n the end let us come to the simple realities. The simple 
realities are one, that Israel exists and will exist and should and is 
entitled to security and confidence in its own security, and secondly 
that the Palestinian people deserve a just and peaceful future in their 
own state. Now those are the two fixed points of this whole 
conflict”190.  
 
Amidst these preparations for the military action in Afghanistan, we have consulted an 
important source which was published years later after these decisions, which reveals the 
position of Tony Blair by September 12, 2001 about his perception of the conflict resolution 
as an explicitly selected goal. In his diary Alastair Campbell recalled:  
“TB was starting to think about the long term and what to do about the whole terrorism 
agenda. … TB wanted as much information as possible and he wanted to be in a position to 
work out Bush’s likely reaction. … TB commissioned a note on what Bush’s options were, 
saying he had to get inside his mind if he could. … TB wrote off a note for Bush’s eyes only, 
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which spelled out some of the problems we were facing and where Bush might go to build 
useful alliances”191. 
The Washington Post also quoted this five-page memorandum “outlining the prime 
minister's thoughts on how the campaign against terrorism should be shaped and executed”, in 
which he emphasized “the importance of making a concerted effort to restart the peace 
process in the Middle East as a way to solidify support in the Arab world for the war on 
terrorism”192. 
On 13 September 2001, as was shown in Campbell’s diaries, Tony Blair “said there 
were three areas to focus on – whatever US military response is made and our participation 
within it. Politics and diplomacy and in particular to get impetus in to the Middle East peace 
process. And practical security arrangements193.  
Further, throughout his discourse in 2002 we see the stability of his vision of these 
“fixed points” of the conflict:  
“Two things are necessary now: an acceptance by all of the fixed 
points of principle for any final settlement - Israel, secure, its right to 
existence unchallenged in the Arab world; a viable Palestinian state for 
the Palestinian people; and a ceasefire agreed now, to let the political 
dialogue recommence”194.  
 
An important principle of our exploration of Tony Blair’s operational beliefs is looking 
at primary sources concerning his cognition of George’s “best approach” for selecting 
objectives across multiple instances and different political circumstances. Now we focus our 
attention on Blair’s position about the peace process during the period when the emphasis on 
the Afghan campaign was replaced by the discourse of the Bush Administration on military 
action against Iraq.  
The April 2002 meeting at Crawford between Tony Blair and George W. Bush is one 
the most significant events in the history of UK-US “special relationship”. While no definitive 
records of proceedings are available, there is some evidence that Blair committed himself to 
joining a US invasion of Iraq at this meeting. It seems as if Blair determined at this meeting 
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that Bush was set upon war, and made the decision that he would support the president in 
this195.  
The British Ambassador to Washington believes “that the talks appeared to be a major 
turning point in Mr Blair's view on the threat posed by Saddam and British policy”196 even 
supposing that the two leaders “signed in blood” their agreement to oust Saddam Hussein in 
secret talks. 
Though meeting their closest ally, the Bush Administration focused on possible military 
action against Iraq, at Crawford “Blair was more interested in discussing the Israeli-
Palestinian issue than was Iraq. So far as Blair was concerned, the priority was to stabilize the 
situation in the Middle East before tackling the issue of Saddam and his WMD”197.   
Likewise, an important private source that later became published conveys Tony Blair’s 
attitude in his discussions with his cabinet. "As the discussion went round the table, it was 
Palestine, Palestine, Palestine, all the way," a cabinet minister said. There was a consensus 
that the Israeli-Palestinian issue had to be dealt with in tandem with Iraq, or preferably 
before”198. Further, this source continues that Tony Blair “told colleagues that he was aware 
that the potential Achilles heel of his Iraq strategy was the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He said 
that he was clear that movement in the peace process had to be made in parallel with Iraq, 
otherwise resentment in the Arab world against the west could fester”199.  
Throughout 2002, consistent with his operational code, our data show Blair was pushing 
for a resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks, backed by an international conference, and even 
proposing time frames on his behalf. On October 1, 2002 he stated:  
“And there is only one answer. By this year's end, we must have 
revived final status negotiations and they must have explicitly as their 
aims: an Israeli state free from terror, recognised by the Arab world 
and a viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of 1967”200.  
 
Further, our data show, that Blair’s cognition that the peace process necessitates the 
urgent international focus equal to the Iraq issue was consistently conserved even after the 
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launch of military operations in Iraq. In the following extract we observe the same pattern of 
identification of the MEPP as a top international priority parallel to Iraq: 
“…I understand why people in the Middle East and in the Arab 
Muslim world are cynical about this issue, because they think well we 
are talking about it now because we are invading Iraq, but are we 
really serious about it. There is a viable set of proposals. It is contained 
in what is called the road map, which was drawn up by America, 
Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. When the new 
Palestinian Prime Minister puts his Cabinet in place, that road map 
will be published. That is a set of specific proposals leading to the 
creation of a two state solution: Israel, recognised by the Arab world, 
confident of its own security; and a viable Palestinian state. And I can 
assure you I regard this as every bit as much a priority for us as 
making sure we get rid of Saddam in Iraq”201.  
 
Until this point our data of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 until the aftermath of 
military action in Iraq show us Tony Blair answered the question of “the best approach for 
selecting goals or objectives for political action” through keeping the Middle East peace 
process on international agenda.  
From the aftermath of 9/11 until military action in Iraq we have 18 primary sources 
available which are Tony Blair’s speeches, interviews, press conferences and policy 
staataments. The analysis of these data showed us the consistency between Blair’s discourse 
and his beliefs.  
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II. PURSUIT OF GOALS 
In George’s study of the Bolshevik answer to the question “How are the goals of action 
pursued most effectively?” he finds that that starting the “first part of the answer, "push to the 
limit," enjoins that maximum energy be exerted to attain the objectives of action”202. 
Cognitive scholars suggest that the policy-maker’s beliefs provide him with a relatively 
coherent way of organizing and making sense of what would otherwise be a confusing and 
overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up from the environment from his senses. 
These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify and structure the external world203. 
As such, we start this section by specifying his principal belief that is applied to simplify 
and structure the conflict environment. According to Blair’s simple assertion,  
“[H]aving a peace process is better than not having one”204.   
 
As was already noted we analyze Tony Blair’s thinking about the Middle East peace 
process during his Premiership through 48 speeches, interviews, press conferences. We show 
several extracts from documentary sources to trace his cognitive process, namely that for this 
type of a protracted conflict external assistance of mediation is indispensable.   
According to Lasensky of the Council of Foreign Relations, despite these new 
possibilities and new imperatives, the prospects for deep (and sustained) American 
engagement remain uncertain. The parties are locked in violent confrontation and the politics 
of the conflict offers few diplomatic openings. The Bush Administration may fall back on its 
default position and continue to see Israeli-Palestinian affairs as more of a problem to contain 
than an opportunity to seize205.  
Cognitive dissonance approach suggests that the person may also search out additional 
information supporting his decision and find new reasons for acting as he did and will avoid, 
distort, or derogate new dissonant information206.  
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Hence, Blair’s argumentation was aimed at triggering these diplomatic openings in 
order to achieve consonance.  
With regard to that in his interview for NBC he claimed:  
 “In that situation where the two sides are so locked in conflict 
like that, they can't get together without an external force bringing 
them together”207.    
 
This reasoning is further continued as follows:  
“I don't believe this will happen unless there is external force and 
pressure, not in the sense of trying to push people into positions they 
don't want to be pushed into, but in attempting to settle the situation 
sufficiently, give people something to aim for that isn't the next day's 
conflict”208.  
 
Compatible with this thinking was his following statement during the same month of 
April, when violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians had reached a high level. 
“In monitoring any such ceasefire and in ensuring that the 
Palestinian Authority genuinely take action against the terrorists, we 
and others stand ready to help in any way we can. I know the deep-
rooted objections to any outside help. But when the situation is as grim 
as it is now, only some external assistance can establish the minimum 
trust to get security back on the agenda in a realistic way. And without 
a proper ceasefire we can't even take the first steps”209. 
 
Blair’s cognitive system embraces a belief frequently recurrent in his discourse about 
the presence of the US engagement as an indispensable factor.  
“I think there is a lot that we can build on there, they are issues 
that are different, but all I would say to you is that in my view the key 
thing in respect of the Middle East peace process is that we have the 
right vision but this will not be negotiated unless there is the most 
Intensive engagement, in particular from the US, and I am sure that 
there will be, but the two sides, I can’t see myself are going to reach an 
agreement themselves”210.   
 
The succeeding analysis of data sources shows us the consistency between his beliefs 
that international crises should be managed through permanent involvement. Tony Blair’s 
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position was that the US should be involved in the process through a commonly accepted 
document, the Roadmap.  
When President Bush finally declared his support for the twin-state "roadmap" solution - 
for the first time publicly backing a Palestinian state, certain observers assessed this as a 
“reward” to Tony Blair's “powers of persuasion”211. 
By the same token, following the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in spring 2003, Blair 
further advocated his position of permanent engagement in the Middle East: 
“The ending of Saddam's regime in Iraq must be the starting 
point of a new dispensation for the Middle East: Iraq, free and stable; 
Iran and Syria. […] And to symbolize it all, the creation of an 
independent, viable and democratic Palestinian state side by side with 
the state of Israel”212.  
 
Blair’s discourse on more active engagement of the Bush administration in 2004 also 
shows us compatibility with his operational code. During the November visit to Washington 
Tony Blair undertook efforts to win President Bush’s support for the appointment of a special 
US envoy to the region with full presidential authority. Seldon notes Blair was disappointed 
with the President’s low profile engagement, “given his belief that the problem demanded a 
high-ranking figure who gave it his priority”213.  
In summary, these facts and data show consistency between his beliefs that the process 
should be managed through intensive engagement and his subsequent behaviour.  
We believe that at this point it would relevant to draw on secondary literature on the 
interface between beliefs and behaviour. The cognitive literature has largely worked on such 
individual characteristics of leaders as “belief in ability to control events”. Leaders with high 
scores on this variable have an ‘internal’ locus of control: they perceive themselves as 
efficacious in relation to their political environment, and perceive that their state is an 
influential political actor. This can lead to the challenging of environmental constraints upon 
action, expansionist or interventionist foreign policy orientations and preferences for more 
active, less deliberative decision processes214. 
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With his high belief in ability to control events, Blair would be expected to take a 
proactive foreign policy stance, to believe himself influential over international actors and 
events, and to hold an optimistic view of the outcome of action215. His biographer Seldon 
wrote that Blair was on many occasions convinced not only that action was necessary, but that 
“his own leadership was vital”216.  
In his evidence to the Iraqi Inquiry, First Secretary of State and Deputy Prime Minister 
Lord Prescott testified Tony Blair’s belief in interventions in the following way:  
“To my mind it was a real achievement to persuade the United States to follow the UN 
route on Iraq and provide a road map for the Middle East process, sadly yet to be realised. 
The Prime Minister passionately believed in the humanitarian interventions and we used to 
discuss that from time to time, which he set out in his speech in Chicago in 1999 which you 
have discussed in your evidence as The Doctrine of International Community. This was 
consistent in his approach to Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000 and Afghanistan in 2001, 
policies that were all endorsed by the Cabinet and Parliament. This belief in humanitarian 
interventionism stemmed from his desire to prevent the repeat of the genocide that he saw in 
Rwanda in 1994, when the UN failed to act and almost 1 million people were murdered”217. 
Our data relevant to this section showed us that on numerous occasions Tony Blair was 
receptive to diplomatic openings. Whenever he perceived US disengagement, he attempted to 
urge the Bush administration to provide the local parties with the external assistance in order 
to establish the minimum trust and to get security back on the feasible agenda. 
                                                 
215
 Ibidem. 
216
 Anthony Seldon, Blair, (The Free Press, 2005). p. 394. 
217
 Oral evidence of Lord Prescott to the Iraq Inquiry, 30th July 2010. 
 83 
 
III. CONTROL OF RISKS 
The same public sources belonging to Tony Blair as Prime Minister were consulted for 
answering the question “control of risks”. The objective in this part of the study is to explore 
his beliefs about proper means of calculating and controlling risks in the peace process 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  
In this regard, we have already noted that the focus of the Prime Minister’s thinking was 
on the one hand directed at the Palestinian obligations to renounce violence, and on the other 
hand at the Israelis not to undertake unilateral demarches to define boundaries of the future 
Palestinian states.  
The analysis of his operational thinking process reveals us that throughout his Prime 
Minister years Tony Blair had been consistent in pursuing the policy of strengthening 
Palestinian security compatibilities (“top-down strategy”). At the same time we have 
incongruence between his operational beliefs and his foreign policy found in 2004-2005.  
Though his instrumental belief embraced “the aim of a viable Palestinian state with 
negotiated boundaries, not unilaterally decided by Israel but negotiated”218, his support for 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan was marked by this 
incongruence. First, we now look at his position on the Palestinian performance in curbing 
terrorist infrastructure and then we proceed to discussing Blair’s discourse on Israel’s 
disengagement plan.   
 
A) Palestinian security  
Every negotiation and plan for peace between Israel and its neighbours has had one pre-
eminent element: those issues and concerns that can be subsumed under the blanket term 
'security'. It trumps everything else. Like it or not, in all efforts to end conflict and to design 
the framework of a viable Palestinian state, security issues will continue to have primacy. 
Other aspects of state creation, with few exceptions, will need to be related to these issues and 
the ways in which they are worked out219.   
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According to the official Israeli thinking “the wave of terrorism is the result of a 
strategic Palestinian decision to use violence – rather than negotiation – as the primary 
instrument of advancing their political cause”220. 
Our data show that Tony Blair was consistently proposing security plan as an important 
prerequisite for resuming and conducting peace negotiations. Hence, his discourse from 2001 
up to the end of 2005 is characterized by the “top-down strategy” of empowering Palestinian 
capabilities of dismantling the terrorist infrastructure.   
As early as October 2001 he claimed that to move the peace process forward the earliest 
step should be international efforts “to construct at least the right platform of security”: 
“We need to get that sufficiently under control in order to give 
yourself the space then to move into a process of talking and 
confidence-building which allows in particular the Palestinians to 
some sort of ability to go about their daily life”221. 
 
Blair made it clear that  
“the precondition of getting a viable peace process in place and 
concluded is an end to terrorism and the support for terrorism and 
preparation for terrorism”222.  
 
More specifically, the assumption behind this position was empowering the Palestinian 
institutions:  
“The question is how do we get to that point, and in getting to 
that point I think we need to sit down with the Palestinians and work 
out the proper means of developing a security infrastructure in the 
parts controlled by the Palestinian authorities where we can be sure 
that it is capable of dealing with the terrorist threats that arise from 
extremists within the Palestinian authorities, and where they are 
incapable of dealing with such threats, that we can be sure that the 
Palestinian authorities themselves are not complicit in any 
terrorism”223. 
 
But the Israeli government asserted the Palestinian institutions had not so far 
accomplished their obligations to abandon terrorism. It argued that in the many years that 
have passed since the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PA has done nothing to fulfill its obligation to 
end the terrorism. On the contrary, the Palestinian leadership has actively encouraged and 
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supported terrorist activities. Clearly, the continued violence is not a function of the 
Palestinian Authority's ability to prevent terrorism, but rather its desire to do so”224. 
Prime Minister Blair was aware of the unwillingness of the Sharon administration to 
make concessions and to encourage peace process amidst active Palestinian terrorism, and 
that the Palestinians could not put an end to terrorism so rapidly.  
The Israel Government made it clear that provided that the Palestinians fulfil “their 
obligations in terms of fighting terror and implementing reforms, in accordance with the road 
map”, only then “will the sides be able to resume negotiations”225.  
Accordingly, Blair sought to cope with the Israeli thinking that the Palestinians were 
unable to fulfil the prerequisite for the peace process – to abandon violence – by proposing a 
conceptual framework of security, within which performance of Palestinian institutions could 
be judged.  This assumption persists throughout all his further discourse:  
“Supposing you had a calm period for 6 months and the Israelis 
started lifting some restrictions, the Palestinians started moving 
forward, if you get another suicide bomber and a whole lot of innocent 
people die again, then there will be obviously measures taken by the 
Israelis and then more people die and then the whole thing begins 
again and then the people divide apart from each other. Now since we 
know that you cannot guarantee there is not going to be some suicide 
bomber that gets through, you have to have a security plan with 
sufficient credibility that if a suicide bomber does get through the 
Israelis can be satisfied that the Palestinians did everything they could 
to stop it, and the Palestinians can be satisfied that they are not going 
to lose everything that they may have gained up to that point, as the 
result of the activities of someone that they profoundly disagree 
with”226.   
 
The same line of thinking is expressed in the following extract:  
And that is why, you ask what can be done, the only thing that 
can be done is get a sufficiently robust security plan under way that 
allows people to say not that all terrorism is going to stop, but that 
everything possible is being done to stop it and that states that have got 
an ambivalent attitude towards sponsoring terrorism are states that are 
way out of line with the rest of the international order227.  
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On another occasion he reiterated his position about the advantages of the security 
framework:  
“The problem is, supposing you got into a negotiation now, and 
then supposing you got another terrorist attack in Israel, not in the 
occupied territories but actually in Israel, what would then happen? 
The Palestinians would say we have done everything we could to 
prevent it, and the Israelis would say you haven’t, the international 
community goes, we don’t know. And so at the moment what we done 
is deliver into the hands of the terrorists the opportunity to let this 
process go forward or to stop it, and actually they want to stop it, so 
they can. The purpose of what I am doing is to provide us with such a 
clear and agreed set of structures on behalf of the whole of the 
international community that we get an insurance against the suicide 
bomber or the terrorist who goes and causes destruction to wreck the 
process, so that we can say no, the structures are in place, everyone is 
agreed, and those structures are operating properly. Now without that, 
believe me, people can call for peace conferences, demand peace 
conferences, pass resolutions for peace conferences, but you are not 
going to have one, except in the circumstances where the preparatory 
work is done, and that is my role228. 
 
So, these public speeches which we have shown in chronological order reveal 
consistency between his beliefs that the Palestinians need to construct a security framework to 
control risks of the peace process and his behaviour. But in the following section we see 
contrasting results concerning his beliefs about Israeli obligations to reduce the peace process 
risks and his subsequent behaviour. 
 
B) DISENGAGEMENT 
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
was adopted by the government on June 6, 2004 and enacted in August 2005. Its objective 
was to remove all Israelis from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the northern West 
Bank. 
The proposal argues that the “State of Israel has reached the conclusion that there is 
currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral 
process”229. Since the Government believes that the "stalemate embodied in the current 
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situation is damaging”, in order to break this stalemate it has decided to “initiate a process 
that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians”230.  
By end of the 2003 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s confidant Ehud Olmert had proposed 
a "formula for the parameters of a unilateral solution” which envisages “to maximize the 
number of Jews; to minimize the number of Palestinians; not to withdraw to the 1967 border 
and not to divide Jerusalem”231. 
To the surprise of many international and domestic actors, Prime Minister Blair gave his 
backing to the Israeli plan. Jack Straw admitted: “Tony Blair was one of the first European 
leaders to offer public support for the policy”232. 
A statement issued by Sharon's office said: "British prime minister Blair called to voice 
his support for the disengagement plan and his appreciation for the step Israel is taking. Blair 
added that he intends to work toward enlisting support for the plan among the international 
community”233. 
Blair’s support to the Israeli plan was assessed by The Guardian to be tantamount “to a 
turnaround in British Middle East policy” based on the assumption that until then the country 
had “opposed unilateral withdrawal and remained committed to the idea of a peace settlement 
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians”234.  
This particular occasion requires for our more careful analytic approach. The operational 
code scholarship qualifies this phenomenon as incongruence between the belief system and 
behaviour.  
The British Prime Minister’s support of the Israeli disengagement plan can be analyzed 
by us either by means of learning theories or by the neorealist perspective. In the first case, 
we should be able to present evidence that the decision was preceded by reassessment of 
cognitive beliefs about optimal strategies applied to the peace process. This would invalidate 
our central hypothesis that Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic 
beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
If we explain the event from the neorealist standpoint, then we can claim that the British 
response reflects the need to accept structural changes in the region and not reconsideration of 
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basic principles of a negotiated solution to which the country was committed. Therefore, we 
need to provide evidence that Tony Blair’s change of policy was not accompanied or caused 
by the change in cognitive characteristics. 
In more details we speak about this phenomenon in sections below. 
 
IV. BEST TIMING OF EFFORTS  
An important facet of a leader’s operational code is his answer to the question about the 
best timing of efforts. In the following lines we will examine how did Tony Blair determine 
appropriate timing to achieve the “stated objective” through the “stated means”. Then we 
shall try to observe constancy in his belief which we operationalize through his answers to 
these “instrumental questions” of George’s construct.  
Fist of all, Blair’s explicitly expressed belief was that it would be unfeasible  
“to get this issue back into any form in which you will have final 
status negotiations, which is what the Palestinians want to see, until we 
have done the preparatory work”235.  
 
Consistent with this belief the UK government under Tony Blair organised London 
conferences in 2003 and 2005 as part of international engagement for political reform within 
the Palestinian Authority.  
“We need urgent action to build a security infrastructure that 
gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next 
suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need 
political reform for the Palestinian Authority. And we need a new 
Conference on the Middle East Peace Process based on the twin 
principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state”236. 
 
In a consistent manner he further justified his efforts by the following belief:  
“And the reason why I think it is important to discuss political 
reform with the Palestinians is that there has been a sense in Israel and 
outside that unless we get the right political mechanisms in place then 
it is difficult to make progress on the Middle East”237.  
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Throughout 2004 he raised the question of another international conference in London. 
During his November visit to Washington he reached agreements with President Bush about 
organization of a London conference to support reform in the Palestinian Authority under his 
chairmanship.  
Prime Minister believed the London conference on Palestinian reform would offer a 
way back to an internationally-backed "road map" for a Palestinian state, after years of 
"paralysis" in Middle East diplomacy238.  
He justified his position by reference to the need to further strengthen Palestinian 
capabilities:  
“Now we can help in the international community empower the 
Palestinians to put in place the measures that they want to put in place, 
because the Palestinian leadership want this to succeed, then we have 
got a chance of actually getting into that peace conference with the 
Israelis”239. 
 
The speeches from 2001 to 2005 showed us that in every historical instance he tended to 
organize “preparatory work” with the Palestinians so that they were able to participate in 
“final status negotiations”. In addition, these data show that he was committed to the so-called 
top-down strategy by “empowering the Palestinians to put in place” the necessary measures. 
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V. UTILITY OF MEANS 
Discussion of leaders’ perception of ends-means is one of the most prevalent 
discussions in operational code literature. In his seminal article George discusses the 
conception of strategic and tactical means by the Bolsheviks240. Elaborating on Dulles’s 
operational code, Holsti points out such means, as compromise, crisis management and 
negotiations241. 
In our empirical study of the peace process we observe that there are two basic strategic 
approaches to achieving the Palestinian state: “top-down” and “bottom-up” strategy. Under 
the first we understand the so-called “Oslo process” designed to construct a viable Palestinian 
state through such means as creation of a Palestinian national authority, consistently 
strengthening of its capacities (political and security power, its financial system). This top-
down strategy embraced holding national elections aimed at increasing the power of the 
moderate leadership. The focus of the international third parties was turning the Palestinian 
Authority into a genuine partner of Israel and the world, with all the necessary capacities to 
conduct credible negotiations. It involved negotiations on the parameters of the permanent 
status agreement. In contrast, the so-called “bottom-up” strategy focused on making 
improvement in day-to-day living conditions for the Palestinians. 
Among the secondary sources used for this section are the books of Tony Blair’s 
bioghrapher Con Coughlin American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror and of Natan 
Sharansky and Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome 
Tyranny and Terror. The Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of 
Commons (Session 2003–2004) entitled Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism 
was of particular utility for this section. 
We observe that throughout his years as Prime Minister of the UK his strategic 
discourse at home and abroad was based mainly on creating and strengthening Palestinian 
political institutions leading to the permanent status agreement.   
In retrospect, Tony Blair’s beliefs are explicitly summarized in the following extract: 
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
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- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”242.  
 
In the lines below we will show a number of extracts from his speeches, in which he 
was advocating the top-down strategy. Throughout 2002 his speeches show his focus on 
strengthening Palestinian political reform: 
“The answer is to move the process forward: on security, on 
political reform, on the only viable solution the whole world now 
supports - an Israeli state, recognised by all and a viable Palestinian 
state”243. 
 
In a famous press conference hosted by US President George Bush, Spanish Prime 
Minister Jose Maria Aznar and Portugal's Prime Minister Jose Durao Barroso at the Azores on 
March 16, 2003 Tony Blair argued:  
“I think the coming appointment of Abu Mazen is so important 
there. It allows us to take this process forward. The road map give us 
the way forward. The appointment of Abu Mazen gives us the right 
partner to take this forward. And I believe that that will demonstrate, 
and it's important to demonstrate, in particular at this time, that our 
approach to people in the Middle East, in that troubled region is indeed 
even-handed. And all of us will work to make sure that that vision of 
the Middle East, two states, Israel confident of its purity, a Palestinian 
state that is viable, comes about and is made reality”244. 
 
Following the military action in Iraq, his basic preoccupation was empowering the 
Palestinian institutions of Prime Minister Abbas: 
“[T]he most important thing we can do you know is to show real 
practical progress, that is what Abu Mazen needs to show his people, 
that his way of working, which is to advocate and work closely for a 
Palestinian state, but in a way where there is peaceful co-existence 
with the state of Israel, and that delivers results, and that is the most 
important thing that we can do to help him do that, which is what we 
are trying to do”245.  
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Certain Israeli officials did not share Tony Blair’s agenda of empowering Palestinian 
institutions, but focusing less on preparing the ground of the civil society (“bottom-up 
strategy”). Prime Minister Sharon’s adviser Dore Gold: “Mr Blair's determination to link the 
Iraq war with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at virtually every US-UK summit meeting only 
increases Israeli concerns about the quartet. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian prime minister, 
is already being praised even before there is any evidence that he will in fact stop terrorism 
against Israel. The best way to help the postwar peace process is to stop the diplomacy of 
linkage. It may answer some short-term political needs but it undermines the credibility of its 
advocates and their ability to play any role in an eventual Arab-Israeli peace settlement”246.  
 
Further study of his public discourse shows the same consistency between his behaviour 
and his belief in dealing with the conflict through the top-down strategy. 
On July 2003, he said: 
“But I have got no doubt at all that the only way of dealing with 
this ultimately is to get the agreement on the security measures that 
need to be taken by the Palestinian Authority, on the Israeli side as 
well, in cooperation together because that is the only way we are going 
to take away the pressure on the Israeli government to carry on doing 
what it can to protect its citizens. And I have learnt enough from the 
process that we have engaged in Northern Ireland to realise you can 
stand here and disagree with certain measures that are taken by the 
Israeli government or the Palestinian Authority, but in the end unless 
you get an agreement, and that agreement has got to start with the 
security measures, you are not going to make progress on this. So yes, 
we have the same misgivings, but in the end the only way we are 
going to get that security fence taken down is to make the progress in 
the peace deal”247.   
 
In September 2003 the Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigned “weakened 
by a power struggle with Yasser Arafat”248. The Guardian made reference to Prime Minister 
Abbas's aides who reported that the former “had been frustrated by the constant wrangling 
with [Chairman] Arafat, the near-collapse of the US-backed "road map" plan for peace with 
Israel and his inability to improve the daily lives of Palestinians”249.  
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A senior Bush administration official recalled: “Bush lost [his energy] after Arafat 
appointed Abbas and then refused to let him do anything. that was it for Bush. He would have 
nothing to do with the Palestinian leadership so long as Arafat was in control”250. 
The British Parliament consequently concluded: “Violence has repeatedly derailed 
progress towards a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the 
devastating cycle of terrorist attack and Israeli retaliation resumed in August, prospects for 
implementation of the Road Map —the Quartet’s plan for a two-state solution to the 
conflict—have appeared remote”251.  
On 15 September 2003, the UN’s Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 
Process, Terje Roed-Larsen told the Security Council that the peace process has stalled. The 
recent cycle of terror attacks and extrajudicial killings has broken the Palestinian ceasefire and 
brought the process to a standstill. A combination of violence and the too slow 
implementation of the road map peace plan have brought the region to a potential turning 
point…. Unfortunately, implementation of the road map never effectively began252.  
Against this background we see that his operational code did not change. He persistently 
continued to insist on the top-down strategy calling to resume the Roadmap:  
“I don’t think it is a question of the Road Map as such being 
finished because in the end you will come back to something like the 
Road Map, even if you get rid of the Road Map. There’s no other 
solution waiting out there other than a solution that means either the 
State of Israel ends which isn’t going to happen, or the Palestinians go 
away, which isn’t going to happen. So you will be left with a situation 
where Israelis and Palestinians have to find a way of living together, 
and the only way they are ever going to agree to live together is if they 
each have sovereign independent states, side by side. So my point is 
that in the end you will always come back to that issue”253.  
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Nathan Sharansky in his book The Case For Democracy argued that “moderation is not 
a function of a leader’s disposition or promises, but rather a function of the nature of the 
society he or she governs” 254. 
But the public discourse of Tony Blair shows us his consistent commitment first of all to 
the terms of the two-state solution, which would then change the reality of what was 
happening on the ground. He insisted on putting  
“in place plans that do guarantee that the viable Palestinian state 
that we want to see is viable not just in terms of territory, but viable 
also in terms of its political institutions, its economy and its security 
measures, because that is essential on both sides”255. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this section we sought to explore Tony Blair’s strategic beliefs. First of all, we have 
determined his instrumental operational beliefs, or his beliefs about the optimal strategies of 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In it we drew on George’s analytic approach which 
suggests that the "answers" given by a political actor to “instrumental questions” of the 
operational code construct are referred as "instrumental beliefs", that is, his beliefs about 
ends-means relationships in the context of political action256.  
The congruence method applied to the key events of Blair’s Premiership concerning his 
position over the peace process was intended with the purpose of establishing consistency 
between the content of his given beliefs and the content of the his decision. This procedure 
establishes a plausible link between beliefs and behavior by drawing attention to the 
possibility that the correlation is of causal significance257.   
We have focused on the values of the independent and dependent variables rather than 
the intervening variables. On various occasions we sought to test whether the predicted value 
of the dependent variable, in view of the values of the case’s independent variables, is 
congruent with the actual outcome in the case.  
We also drew on Walker’s study of Henry Kissinger’s operational code in which he 
applied the congruence method. Through a comparison of Kissinger’s academic writings and 
his conduct of the Vietnam negotiations, Walker’s findings revealed a congruent relationship 
between his operational code and his bargaining behaviour258.  
In our empirical case, by means of the “congruence method” we explored whether Tony 
Blair had acted during his Premiership according to his previously formulated answers to the 
“instrumental questions” which make his operational code (or, belief system). And we have 
multiplied the number of historical observations throughout his years in Downing Street.  
Our assumptions were that if our data supported the argument that the structure of 
Blair’s behavioural patterns matched his operational code, then we would suppose that his 
strategic beliefs have been conserved unchanged, at least publicly. 
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At the same time, we applied the congruence method to establish whether on each 
historical occasion under our investigation Tony Blair’s beliefs were operating in consistency 
with the previous stage of decision-making. We assumed that if from September 2001 until 
his departure from Downing Street we observed consistency between his beliefs and his 
political behaviour, we would suggest they were expressed in a stable manner. 
We already noted that Walker’s study of Kissinger’s operational code on which we drew 
in our section, had found that strategic and tactical mosaic formed by the types and series of 
American behaviours during the Vietnam conflict was essentially congruent with the premises 
of Kissinger's operational code and with his conception of a mutually satisfactory outcome for 
the war259.  
Nevertheless, Walker discovered a deviation from Kissinger's operational code in the 
pattern of American behavior that occurred in October 1972.  This happened due to the fact 
that other variables in the decision-making process inside both Washington and Hanoi 
delayed the acceptance of the draft agreement negotiated by Kissinger and Tho as the basis 
for a settlement of the conflict. He concludes that the factors that reversed the trend away 
from a settlement and toward escalation were those articulated by the "bureaucratic politics" 
models of foreign policy decision-making260.  
In our empirical case exploration of the content of his speeches by means of the 
congruence method helped us find there were certain deviations in Tony Blair’s foreign 
policy from his stated instrumental beliefs.  
We assumed that this incongruence might be caused by changes in his belief system. In 
this case, our hypothesis that Blair conserved consistency of beliefs does not hold true. 
Equally, we assumed that this incongruence might be caused by alternative sources: 
bureaucratic determinants or structural adjustment to the new political environment, but by 
conserving the stability in perceptions of the conflict.  
We elaborate on this deviant case more adequately in the section of the process-tracing 
method. In case we detect that his beliefs remain unchanged, we will continue the research 
with the same central hypothesis. 
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As was noted above, in the first case-study we argue that Tony Blair has conserved his 
strategic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his years in Downing Street. First 
of all, we need to clarify what kind of strategic approaches to the investigated conflict have 
existed until nowadays. 
In the practice of Israeli-Palestinian conflict mediation there have been two basic 
strategic approaches, to which policy-makers commit themselves. The first is the so-called 
“top-down strategy”, or the Oslo process. The Oslo process tried to build a Palestinian state 
from the top down: create a Palestinian national authority, hand over territory to it, give it 
increasing power, arm it and finance it, hold elections, and a Palestinian state would emerge. 
In other words, political agreement on creation of an independent Palestinian state precedes 
changing the ground conditions.  
The opposite approach posits the central focus should be made on fostering 
improvements in day-to-day living conditions of the Palestinian people, and not on the 
parameters of the permanent status agreement. In other words, changes in social and 
economic lives of the Palestinian people should precede the political agreement.  
Our data show that Tony Blair during his Premiership has committed himself to the 
consistent support of the first approach, “top-down strategy”. Hence, our independent variable 
makes up the institutional context, i.e., the Premiership of Tony Blair. Our dependent variable 
is his foreign policy, i.e., support for the top-down strategy.   
The most widely understood definition of causation holds that a factor is a cause if its 
presence increases the likelihood of an outcome261. Yet as Roberts explains, “one event does 
not cause another”262.  In other words, a cause-and-effect relationship is an emergent property 
of a set of interacting conditions263. The intermediate causal processes, or intervening 
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variables, through which causal (explanatory) variables produce causal effects, are defined as 
called “causal mechanisms”264. 
For this reason, since our goal is explanation of probable changes and stability in the 
cognitive beliefs of Tony Blair from September 11, 2001 to June 27, 2007 as Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, and from June 27, 2007 until nowadays, as Quartet Representative, 
we will widely rely upon the exploration of causal mechanisms linking the institutional 
context with individual views.  
How do we operationally these theoretically informed intermediate causal mechanisms? 
The logic of our causal chain incorporates the presence of a third parameter, i.e., the 
intervening variable, which we qualify as “stability of beliefs”. This is the chief parameter 
which we tend to explain through theoretical methods in our work.  
In the preceding section we have applied the congruence method to observe 
compatibility between his belief system and his behaviour. But this process does not allow us 
trace the operation of the intervening mechanism. For this analytic purpose more adequate is 
another tool in the set of techniques by George – the process tracing method. 
The central hypothesis of our Case-study I has already been shown in Figure 1. 
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If we seek to explain the cognitive consistency of his beliefs, then we need a theoretical 
construct to deal with this argument. Tony Blair’s cognitive stability is most adequately 
explained by means of the cognitive dissonance theory.  
The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to 
answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible. Obtaining relevant evidence entails 
specifying the type of evidence needed to answer the research question, to test a theory, to 
evaluate a programme or to accurately describe some phenomenon. In other words, when 
designing research we need to ask: given this research question (or theory), what type of 
evidence is needed to answer the question (or test the theory) in a convincing way?265  
Similarly, in social research the issues of sampling, method of data collection (e.g. 
questionnaire, observation, document analysis), design of questions are all subsidiary to the 
matter of `What evidence do I need to collect?266 
Before proceeding to discussing the propositions of the cognitive theory, we would like 
to remind what we count for evidence in our analysis. In retrospect, Tony Blair’s beliefs are 
explicitly summarized in the following extract:  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”267.  
 
We also noted that this thinking developed by Prime Minister Blair is best qualified the 
“top-down strategy”. If we assert that Prime Minister has conserved stability of his 
instrumental beliefs about the peace process, then we count as evidence his encouragement of 
this top-down strategy across all the historical instances under our investigation.  
Besides, we expect that under any circumstances of decision-making with regard to the 
peace process, he will scan incoming information through this assumption, not admitting the 
alternative thinking, which is the “bottom-up approach”. To count as evidence of stability, we 
also expect that any seminal events or complex decision-making contexts should strengthen 
his “top-down” position. 
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At the same time, social science theories must be built around clear, specific and value-
free, and empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Falsification requires at least the possibility and 
preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the 
phenomenon that we explain. 
In assessing the evidence and arbitrating among interpretations we adopt the strategy of 
constructivists who use similar criteria, as other researchers. They judge an interpretation of 
evidence by comparing it with alternative explanations. They search for evidence that would 
confirm alternatives and disconfirm the explanation being assessed. They ask if an 
explanation is supported by multiple streams of data268.  
Based on the assumption that hypotheses need to leave room for some form falsification 
through empirical observation, we sought to generate our hypothesis as a falsifiable 
proposition admitting the probability that at some given historical period Tony Blair might 
reassess the content of his beliefs during his Premiership.  
On the one hand, we are empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in 
his cognitive views. But to be precise, we need to specify the following analytic distinctions. 
Certain scholars working on learning theories equate policy change with belief change. Others 
fail to differentiate learning from alternative sources of policy change, such as structural 
adjustment269.  
Therefore, if Prime Minister Blair introduces certain changes in his Middle East foreign 
policy, we do not interpret it as reconsideration of beliefs. We evaluate the pattern in light of 
analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to learning270.   
In addition, we add another cautionary note. We would like to make precision of what 
kind of learning we seek to establish and explain. Levy defines experiential learning “as a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”271. 
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For us what counts as change of belief, or learning, is reassessment of prior beliefs and their 
replacement by different understandings as a result of experiential observations.  
Why we seek to make precisions at this point? Quite often it is possible that learning 
may reinforce decision makers' current beliefs and actually inhibit policy change. This last 
point is particularly important, for a great deal of research suggests a strong tendency for 
people to interpret information in a way that conforms to their prior expectations and 
worldviews272. This increases confidence in existing beliefs and thus reinforces continuity in 
behavior273.  
For all the reasons shown above, for our analytic purposes we count as evidence only 
instances, in which policy change was preceded and, possibly, affected by reassessment of 
beliefs about optimal strategies for the conflict resolution. In our case study, this reassessment 
can be operationally imagined as a putative shift from the top-down to the bottom-up strategy. 
It can also be re-evaluation of the policy of not dealing with Hamas towards direct contacts 
with the group. 
 
THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE PERSPECTIVE 
Our hypothetical claim that Blair will conserve stability of his conceptual views about 
the most effective strategies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict implies that he will be resistant 
to any incoming information that his option is not the most effective means or ill-timed.  
The process tracing method under our investigation involves examining the 
hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and its associated causal mechanisms predict 
should have taken place in a case, then determining whether the intervening variables along 
these pathways, or those predicted by alternative explanations, were in fact standing out in the 
case274.  
Hence, in our study we are reconstructing the sequence of events leading to an outcome 
based on predictions of the cognitive dissonance theory. Stephen Van Evera advises theory-
testers to test “as many of a theory’s hypotheses as possible. Testing only a subset of a 
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theory’s hypotheses is bad practice because it leaves the theory partly tested”275. Further, he 
continues: “Infer and test as many predictions of each hypothesis as possible”276.  
Therefore, our goal is first of all to specify the propositions of the cognitive dissonance 
theory. Then we will examine whether they are held in our empirical case-study. The founder 
of the theory Leon Festinger advanced two basic theoretical propositions. 
Proposition 1: The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will 
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. 
Proposition 2: When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person 
will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance277.  
In international relations scholarship Robert Jervis was one of the leading analysts of 
this phenomenon. Largely supporting the hypotheses of Festinger, Jervis further maintained 
that “the basis of dissonance theory lies in the postulate that people seek strong justification 
for their behaviour. They are not content to believe merely that they behaved well and chose 
wisely – if these were the case they only have to maintain the beliefs that produced their 
decisions. Instead people want to minimize their internal conflict278.  
Proposition 3: The policy-maker will seek strong justification for his beliefs and his 
political behaviour. 
Jervis also finds that the person may also search out additional information supporting 
his decision and find new reasons for acting as he did and will avoid, distort, or derogate new 
dissonant information. If doubts nevertheless creep in, he will redouble his efforts to justify 
his decision279.  
Dissonance theory asserts that, after making a decision, the person not only will 
downgrade or misinterpret discrepant information but will also avoid it and seek consonant 
information280.  
Hence, Proposition 4: The policy-maker will search out additional information 
supporting his cognitive view and will actively seek new reasons for acting in the preferred 
manner. 
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Proposition 5: The policy-maker will reject the incoming discrepant information and 
tend to accept only the consonant information   
As a result, following a decision there is an increase in the confidence in the decision or 
an increase in the discrepancy in attractiveness between the alternatives involved in the 
choice, or both281.  
It was discovered by dissonance analysts that after making a difficult choice; people 
experience dissonance, cognitions about any negative attributes of the preferred object are 
dissonant with having chosen it; cognitions about positive attributes of the unchosen object 
are dissonant with not having chosen it. To reduce dissonance, people emphasize the positive 
aspects and deemphasize the negative aspects of the chosen objects, while emphasizing the 
negative and deemphasizing the positive aspects of the unchosen object282.  
For his part Brehm came at a similar conclusion that following the decision, when the 
subjects reevaluated their alternatives, they enhanced their liking for the chosen appliance and 
downgraded their evaluation of the unchosen one283.  
Proposition 6: An essential step in dissonance reduction efforts is emphasizing the 
positive aspects and deemphasizing the negative aspects of the preferred belief. 
A major deduction from the dissonance theory is that expending resources increases 
dissonance and thus increases the pressures to believe that the policy is succeeding. The 
argument here is the reverse of the obvious one that people will pay a high price for things 
they value highly: sacrifices increase the value placed on the goals that are sought and 
achieved284.  
This perspective suggests that the people most involved with a policy will be the most 
deeply committed to its continuation. And the increased valuation of the goal will provide the 
actor with even greater incentives to redouble his efforts285.  
                                                 
281
 See Deutsch M, Krauss R, Rosenau N. “Dissonance or defensiveness?”, Journal of 
personality (1962 March), 30, pp. 16-28.  
282
 Leonard Berkowitz, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 4, (Academic 
Press, 1969), p. 4. 
283
 Elliot Aronson, “Dissonance theory: progress and problems” in Robert P. Abelson, ed. 
Theories of cognitive consistency: a sourcebook, (Rand McNally, 1968), p. 6. 
284
 Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics, (Princeton 
University Press, 1976), p. 393. 
285
 See Jervis, pp. 395-398. 
 104 
Finally, if contradictory evidence arouses sufficient discomfort to trigger dissonance 
reduction but is not convincing enough to change the person’s mind, he may end up holding 
his views even more strongly than before286.  
We thus come at Proposition 7: The more the person is committed to the advocated 
policy, the more he will resist to reassessing his belief and modifying his behaviour. 
Scholars elaborating on cognitive processes emphasize that there are two important 
conditions for this theory. First, there must be a definite commitment resulting from decision. 
Second, the person must feel that his decision was a free one, i.e.  that he could have chosen 
otherwise. If he had no real choice, then he disadvantages of the policy will not create 
dissonance because his lack of freedom provides sufficient justification for his action287.  
Our final Proposition 8: The policy-maker possesses sufficient and conscious liberty 
either to accept the incoming information or reject it.  
 
How do we operationalize the abstract theoretical concept of cognitive dissonance?   
Cognitive dissonance is seen as an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented 
toward dissonance reduction. Through the primary sources relating to the Israeli position we 
establish this antecedent condition which is subjectively perceived by Tony Blair as 
dissonance, which he will tend to reduce. 
First of all, the Israeli Government indicated that it had reached the “conclusion that 
there is currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a 
bilateral process”288.  
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s adviser Zalman Shoval following his first visit to the US 
after George W. Bush had been elected President of the US recalled that the new US and 
Israeli administrations were “like-minded” in the view that “our predecessors made the 
mistake of thinking that this conflict [between Israelis and Palestinians] was the most 
important reason for all the ills of the Mideast, and that if only it were laid to rest, all the 
problems would go away289.  
                                                 
286
 Leon Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance, (Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 
231 – 232. 
287
 Jervis, pp. 383 – 384. 
288
 Haaretz, 28 May 2004. 
289
 Mark Matthews, Lost years: Bush, Sharon, and failure in the Middle East, (Nation Books, 
2007), p. 79. 
 105 
Second, according to Lasesnky, the collapse of the Oslo process in late 2000-early 2001, 
and ensuing Israeli-Palestinian violence, convinced the newly installed Bush Administration 
that the situation was not ripe for resolution.290. 
As a result, one of the earliest shifts that were made in the foreign policy of the Bush 
Administration was the Israeli-Palestinian direction. The US chief negotiator in the conflict of 
the Clinton period Dennis Ross argues that nowhere “was the shift in direction and priority 
more pronounced than in the approach to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It was not only that the 
President would not be engaged; it was also that there would be no American envoy to the 
peace process. Indeed, in the first months of the administration, the very words “peace 
process” were banned from the public and private lexicon291.  
In summary, we operationalize this “antecedent condition” as:  
a) the US and Israeli claims about the absence of a peace partner on the Palestinian side; 
and  
b) the ensuing disengagement of the Bush administration from the mediation efforts of 
its predecessor.  
For his part, Prime Minister Blair believed that the peace process needs to be sustained 
without any interruption. Recall his further position: 
I don't believe this will happen unless there is external force and 
pressure, not in the sense of trying to push people into positions they 
don't want to be pushed into, but in attempting to settle the situation 
sufficiently, give people something to aim for that isn't the next day's 
conflict”292. 
 
That is why the existence of two contradicting cognitions (his view that peace process 
should be maintained versus US disengagement) implies the existence of cognitive 
dissonance. As a result, this cognitive dissonance in Tony Blair’s perception will lead him to 
activity oriented toward dissonance reduction.  
See Figure 3 on consonant and dissonant information with which Tony Blair had to 
cope:  
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Multiplication of a number of observations  
Keohane, King and Verba hold that through the practice of process tracing the 
researcher looks closely at 'the decision process by which various initial conditions are 
translated into outcomes'". These authors interpret the advantages of process tracing, 
assimilating it to their favourite goal of increasing the number of theoretically relevant 
observations293.  
At the beginning of each case-study we specify those historical instances under our 
investigation, across which we will explore the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs. For 
example, in the first chapter, in which we discuss the presence of causal mechanisms of 
cognitive stability affecting his policy options, we explore the expression of Tony Blair’s 
beliefs in the following principal instances. 
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- the immediate aftermath of 911 and the need to assure the assistance of Arab states for 
the anti-terror international coalition;  
- deliberations leading to military action against Iraq in 2003; 
- efforts to persuade the Bush administration to publish the Roadmap for creation of an 
independent Palestinian state; 
- aftermath of the Roadmap’s publication; 
- the Israeli plan of unilateral disengagement; 
- the victory of Hamas in Palestinian elections.  
 
If our theoretical position is correct is correct, then we expect to observe in each 
instance under investigation the constancy of his operational beliefs. This means that every 
time Tony Blair is confronted with the arguments that the Palestinian institutions are not 
ready for forming an independent state or the US low-profile engagement in the peace 
process, he is expected to put under question the plausibility of these arguments.  
To reduce this cognitive dissonance, he is expected to argue that only by reaching an 
agreement on final status issues and creating an independent Palestinian state would it be 
possible to resolve the conflict. Put differently, in the “top-down” and “bottom-up” strategy 
continuum he will locate himself at the extreme of the “top-down strategy”. 
In the extract which we have already quoted he has summarized the key points of his 
belief throughout his Premiership. 
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”294.  
  
We also expect that, as predicted by the cognitive dissonance approach, he will distort 
the incoming discrepant information or he will interpret it into his pre-existing beliefs in 
such a manner as to confirm and reinforce them, but not to reassess them. If our tracing 
shows that at some stage of the historical chain Tony Blair has reconsidered his beliefs, then 
our hypothesis needs to be reformulated. 
 Scholars engaged in exploration of policy-makers cognitive processes place their 
empirical focus on primary public sources. In order to analyze Tony Blair’s thinking about the 
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Middle East peace process during his Prime Ministership, we have studied 48 speeches, 
interviews, press conferences, in which was highlighted his position on the issue.  We have 
also used the primary sources which came into being many years later, in which key 
participants of the events under study recall the thinking process of the British Prime 
Minister.  
We believe that in order our analysis to be comprehensive it needs to incorporate not 
only individual characteristics of the decision-making process, but also institutional 
determinants. In this regard, we draw on Allison’s bureaucratic politics model which deals 
with a "government" as a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with 
a substantial life of its own295.  
According to his model, government leaders do sit formally, and to some extent in fact, 
on top of this conglomerate. But governments perceive problems through organizational 
sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as organizations process 
information. Governments act as these organizations enact routines. Government behavior can 
therefore be understood according to a second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices of 
leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns 
of behaviour296.  
 
Evidence and falsifiability 
At the same time, social science theories must be built around clear, specific and value-
free, and empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Falsification requires at least the possibility and 
preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the 
phenomenon that we explain. 
We adopt the strategy of constructivists who use similar criteria, as other researchers, in 
assessing this evidence and arbitrating among interpretations. They judge an interpretation of 
evidence by comparing it with alternative explanations. They search for evidence that would 
confirm alternatives and disconfirm the explanation being assessed. They ask if an 
explanation is supported by multiple streams of data”297.  
                                                 
295
 See Graham Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American 
Political Science Review, (September 1969), vol., LXIII, 3, pp. 689 - 718 
296
 See ibidem. 
297
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, «Taking stock: the constructivist research 
program in international relations and comparative politics”, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 2001. 4:391–416. 
 109 
Acknowledging that hypotheses need to be formulated so as permit some form of 
falsification through empirical observation, we sought to generate our hypothesis as a 
falsifiable proposition admitting the probability that at some given historical period Tony 
Blair might reassess the content of his beliefs during his Premiership.  
This means that we are empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in 
his cognitive views. But to be precise, we need to specify the following analytic distinctions. 
Certain scholars working on learning theories equate policy change with belief change. Others 
fail to differentiate learning from alternative sources of policy change, such as structural 
adjustment298.  
Therefore, if Prime Minister Blair introduces certain changes in his Middle East foreign 
policy, we do not interpret it as reconsideration of beliefs. We evaluate the pattern in light of 
analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to learning299.   
In addition, we add another cautionary note. We would like to make precision of what 
kind of learning we seek to establish and explain. Levy defines experiential learning “as a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”300. 
For us what counts as change of belief, or learning, is reassessment of prior beliefs and their 
replacement by different understandings as a result of experiential observations.  
Why we seek to make precisions at this point? Quite often it is possible that learning 
may reinforce decision makers' current beliefs and actually inhibit policy change. This last 
point is particularly important, for a great deal of research suggests a strong tendency for 
people to interpret information in a way that conforms to their prior expectations and 
worldviews301. This increases confidence in existing beliefs and thus reinforces continuity in 
behavior302.  
For all the reasons shown above, for our analytic purposes we count as evidence only 
instances, in which policy change was preceded and, possibly, affected by reassessment of 
                                                 
298
 For more details see Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual 
Minefield”, International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312. 
299
 See Philipp Tetlock, “Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy: In search of an elusive 
concept”, in G. Breslauer and P. E. Tetlock, Eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 20-61. 
300
 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”. 
301
 See Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics, chapter 4, 
(Princeton University Press, 1976). 
302
 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”. 
 110 
beliefs about optimal strategies for the conflict resolution. In our case study, this reassessment 
can be operationally imagined as a putative shift from the top-down to the bottom-up strategy. 
It can also be re-evaluation of the policy of not dealing with Hamas towards direct contacts 
with the group. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF 911 
In the data sources from 12 September 2001 until the beginning of the war in Iraq in 
March 2003 we sought information indicating that Prime Minister Tony Blair had underwent 
cognitive change in his strategic approach to the peace process. We failed to find such a 
probability within the indicated period.  
This chronological period was chosen by us for the analysis since during this period 
there were intense international discussions between key international actors around military 
action in Afghanistan and Iraq. If this mechanism was operating, we expected to see its 
impact on Blair’s discourse about the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  
Following the events of 911, when the Bush administration was deliberating over the 
succeeding response to these events, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair became the first 
foreign leader who proposed President Bush to include the Middle East peace process into his 
agenda.  
Amidst these preparations for the military action in Afghanistan, we have consulted an 
important source which was published years later after these decisions, which reveals the 
position of Tony Blair by September 12, 2001. In his diary Alastair Campbell recalled:  
“TB was starting to think about the long term and what to do about the whole terrorism 
agenda. … TB wanted as much information as possible and he wanted to be in a position to 
work out Bush’s likely reaction. … TB commissioned a note on what Bush’s options were, 
saying he had to get inside his mind if he could. … TB wrote off a note for Bush’s eyes only, 
which spelled out some of the problems we were facing and where Bush might go to build 
useful alliances”303. 
The Washington Post also quoted this five-page memorandum “outlining the prime 
minister's thoughts on how the campaign against terrorism should be shaped and executed”, in 
which he emphasized “the importance of making a concerted effort to restart the peace 
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process in the Middle East as a way to solidify support in the Arab world for the war on 
terrorism”304. 
On 13 September 2001, as was shown in Campbell’s diaries, Tony Blair “said there 
were three areas to focus on – whatever US military response is made and our participation 
within it. Politics and diplomacy and in particular to get impetus in to the Middle East peace 
process. And practical security arrangements305.  
This standpoint of Tony Blair confronted with the dissonance in the mindset of the US 
administration. Ross holds that it was not only that the President would not be engaged; it was 
also that there would be no American envoy to the peace process. Indeed, in the first months 
of the administration, the very words “peace process” were banned from the public and 
private lexicon306.  
As predicted by the dissonance reduction perspective (Proposition 6) Tony Blair tended 
to justify his position about the peace process by emphasizing the negative aspects of the 
option he rejects.  
As early as October 14, 2001 he was arguing: 
“What happens when the process breaks down is that the fanatics 
and extremists use the breakdown as an excuse to engage in more 
violence, because there's a vacuum, and when there's a vacuum these 
people move in and exploit it, in exactly the same way that bin Laden 
is exploiting the Palestinian cause”307. 
 
He continued: 
 “So, you know I think that what we're saying is that, in this 
situation, we mustn't allow a vacuum. It is in a vacuum that these 
people exploit the situation”308.  
 
He further justified his position by seeking reinforcing information, as predicted by 
Preposition 4. In his public discourse he sought parallels with Northern Ireland: 
“Nothing justifies this type of savagery and fanaticism, but I see 
strong parallels with the Northern Ireland peace process”309.  
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This search for analogies is also discussed in political psychology. As was supposed by 
Robert Jervis, leaders' firsthand experiences early in life which have consequences are 
particularly important. He also notes the power of analogies and overgeneralization when 
leaders do not have the experience of alternative explanation310. 
Further, historically, on October 15, 2001 Tony Blair gave his first public backing to the 
creation of a Palestinian state.  
“A viable Palestinian state, as part of a negotiated and agreed 
settlement, which guarantees peace and security for Israel is the 
objective"311.  
 
On November 7, 2001 the British Prime Minister made a visit to Washington. Blair’s 
biographer Anthony Seldon writes: “it was when Blair insisted that a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict was the lynchpin of winning Muslim hearts and minds that Bush began to 
realise that he and Blair had real differences”312. By this time Colin Powell had already been 
pressing the President for permission to deliver a keynote speech on the Middle East peace 
process, but to no avail313.  
This mindset of the Bush administration by November 2001 is treated by our theoretical 
position as dissonance. Further data show us the deepening of this dissonance between the 
approaches of Tony Blair and President Bush. The British ambassador to the US Sir 
Christopher Meyer recalls in his memoirs the meeting in Washington: “Blair too wanted to 
hear something that signalled greater American involvement in the perennial issue of Israel 
and the Palestinians. It was a leitmotiv of his foreign policy. But the President’s antipathy 
towards Yasser Arafat was undisguised”314.  
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During a visit to the US in November 2001, Tony Blair tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
Bush to negotiate with Yasser Arafat, whom he considered a “necessary evil. Bush 
increasingly viewed him as just evil”315. 
Despite his attempts during a summit in November 2001 to have Bush link the Afghan 
war with an Israeli–Palestinian peace initiative, the President declared at the joint press 
conference that he would defeat Al-Qaeda, ‘peace or no peace in the Middle East’316.  
By the end of 2001 the media even spoke about “major split with America over the 
Middle East peace process as Israel continues to bombard northern and southern parts of Gaza 
in its search for terrorist suspects and the US did commit itself to influence the process317. 
 Number 10 sources also told The Observer that domestic considerations will force 
President Bush to stand foursquare behind Israel despite Blair's desire for a 'lasting peace' to 
be rapidly negotiated. These officials privately doubted President Bush's commitment to a 
solution in the Middle East318.  
The media reports showed that the rift between Britain and the US was strengthened due 
to the fact that America vetoed a UN Security Council resolution defining the Palestinian 
Authority's “essential role” in any future peace negotiations319. 
We have summarized causal linkages in Tony Blair’s conceptual understanding of the 
conflict by the end of 2001 in Figure 4 below.  
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APRIL 2002 
Key participants of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations testify that in the first years of the 
Bush Administration with very limited American diplomacy between Israelis and 
Palestinians, the intifada was transformed into a war with a vast escalation in the suffering on 
both sides. For Israelis and Palestinians alike, the price they paid for having no peace process 
was very high”320.  
As was noted above, the low-profile US engagement is dissonant information for Tony 
Blair’s perceptions. Against the background of proliferating violence in the region, Blair 
rejected the discrepant information about the low-profile US participation in the peace process 
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by his argument that without the third party involvement the both sides are unlikely to break 
the cycle of violence. In his interview for NBC he asserted: 
In that situation where the two sides are so locked in conflict like 
that, they can't get together without an external force bringing them 
together”321.    
 
This reasoning is further continued as follows:  
“I don't believe this will happen unless there is external force and 
pressure, not in the sense of trying to push people into positions they 
don't want to be pushed into, but in attempting to settle the situation 
sufficiently, give people something to aim for that isn't the next day's 
conflict”322.  
 
Compatible with this thinking was his following statement during the same month of 
April, when violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians had reached a high level. 
“In monitoring any such ceasefire and in ensuring that the 
Palestinian Authority genuinely take action against the terrorists, we 
and others stand ready to help in any way we can. I know the deep-
rooted objections to any outside help. But when the situation is as grim 
as it is now, only some external assistance can establish the minimum 
trust to get security back on the agenda in a realistic way. And without 
a proper ceasefire we can't even take the first steps”323. 
 
The Bush administration continued to prefer outlining broad goals and approaches for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without charting practical steps and addressing specific 
hurdles324. To reinforce his position, as predicted by Proposition 4, Prime Minister Blair 
sought and presented only consonant information. Shapiro and Bonham point out, that actors 
scan past experience and attempt to analogize from what they regard, given the categories 
they utilize, as similar past experience325.  
“Of course, the Palestinians should stop the terrorism. They 
should have stopped it months ago. Of course Israel must withdraw 
from the occupied territories. But I give you my frank assessment from 
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five years experience of what is now a reasonably successful process 
in Northern Ireland: there is no prospect of the bloodshed abating, 
unless everyone realises there is not and will never be an answer to 
this issue in solely military or violent terms. Unless the moderates 
have a political process, a vision of the future to aim for, they are 
powerless and the extremists move into the vacuum”326.  
 
In another passage we read: 
“In the end, as we have learned from bitter experience in 
Northern Ireland, the only solution is a political process that works327.  
 
BUSH-BLAIR CRAWFORD MEETING  
The April 2002 meeting at Crawford between Tony Blair and George W. Bush is one 
the most significant events in the history of UK-US “special relationship”.  
The British Ambassador to Washington believes “that the talks appeared to be a major 
turning point in Mr Blair's view on the threat posed by Saddam and British policy”328 even 
supposing that the two leaders “signed in blood” their agreement to oust Saddam Hussein in 
secret talks. 
Though meeting their closest ally, the Bush Administration focused on possible military 
action against Iraq, at Crawford “Blair was more interested in discussing the Israeli-
Palestinian issue than was Iraq. So far as Blair was concerned, the priority was to stabilize the 
situation in the Middle East before tackling the issue of Saddam and his WMD”329.   
Later Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning recalled: “There were 
constant worries and concerns about what was going on between Israel and the Palestinians, 
and indeed -- and we may get on to this -- at the time of the Prime Minister's visit to Crawford 
in April 2002, one of the major pre-occupations of that visit was what to do, if possible, to 
damp down the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians”330.  
In order to establish the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs about the process, we need to 
identify the information that can be either consonant or dissonant for him, and with which he 
will have to cope. This will help us establish whether around this historical meeting at 
Crawford, he continued commitment to his prior beliefs.  
                                                 
326
 Speech of Prime Minister Tony Blair at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, 
Texas, 8 April 2002. 
327
 Tony Blair, House of Commons, Hansard, Column 17, 10 April, 2002.  
328
 Christopher Meyer quoted in Daily Mail, 27 November 2009. 
329
 Con Coughlin, American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror, (Ecco, 2006), p. 220. 
330
 Oral evidence of David Manning to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 November 2009. 
 117 
One of our principles in choosing empirical data and in enhancing the validity of our 
findings is that we do not limit our empirical base only to primary public sources. Cognitive 
analysts apply the qualitative technique to documents both in the public and private domains 
which might contain expressions of philosophical and instrumental beliefs331. Thus we have 
used a number of private sources which were published some years after the period of the 
decision-making under investigation.  
First of all, an essential confidential paper under our investigation was the one produced 
by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002. Published in The Sunday Times on June 12, 2005 
under the title of “Cabinet Office Paper: Conditions for Military Action”, this paper qualified 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as “quiescent” and argued that “[r]eal progress towards a 
viable Palestinian state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists”332. 
Another confidential source which will be shown below is the “Manning memo”. On 14 
March, 2002 Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser David Manning sent him a secret 
memorandum recounting the meetings with his US counterpart Condoleeza Rice (National 
Security Advisor), and giving advice to Prime Minister Blair with regard to the April 
Crawford visit. According to The New York Times, “[s]tamped “extremely sensitive”, the 
five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior 
aides, had not been made public”333. 
Coupled with this, we have consulted a secret memorandum of March 25, 2002 from 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Prime Minister Tony Blair in preparation for the latter’s visit 
to Crawford. The letter which was published for the first time in January 2010 “warned the 
prime minister that the case for military action in Iraq was of dubious legality and would be 
no guarantee of a better future for Iraq even if Saddam Hussein were removed”334. In 
particular, in this letter the Foreign Secretary secretly argued that the “whole exercise is made 
much more difficult to handle as long as conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is so 
acute”335. 
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These data show us explicitly that the Cabinet members through various channels urged 
Tony Blair to advance the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process during discussions 
with the Bush administration about future action towards Iraq. We show some of them below: 
1. David Manning: “I also said that the Middle East peace process […] was in a very 
dangerous state at this time, that the Israel/Palestine issue was critical; it was not an optional 
extra”336. 
2. David Manning: “The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on 
the Middle East. The Iraq factor means that there may never be a better opportunity to get this 
Administration to give sustained attention to reviving the MEPP”337.  
3. Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Blair Jonathan Powell: “I actually put a note to the 
Prime Minister setting out what I thought we should focus on, which was to say, This is not 
Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. If you are thinking about Iraq, you have to think about it in a 
different way. You have to be able to put it in a political context. I referred back to the 
Chicago speech and what he set out there. I said, You need to think about the long term, about 
the Middle East peace process and where you could get to on that, and how you'd put Saddam 
in a sort of proper framework to consider this sort of action”338.  
4. “Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way to undercut 
Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action against Saddam 
Hussein339. (Cabinet Office paper - Conditions for military action) 
5. A private source that later became published conveys the contents of discussions with 
of Tony Blair inside his cabinet. "As the discussion went round the table, it was Palestine, 
Palestine, Palestine, all the way," a cabinet minister said. There was a consensus that the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue had to be dealt with in tandem with Iraq, or preferably before”340.  
6. The British ambassador to Washington sir Christopher Meyer goes even further by 
claiming that Prime Minister Blair should have presented the option of engagement in the 
peace process as one of British conditions to join the US-led coalition in Iraq. 
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"We could have achieved more by playing a tougher role ... if we had made it a 
condition of our participation in any military operation that indeed a major effort should be 
made with the Arab/Israel dispute and ... detailed planning for what would happen if and 
when we remove Saddam Hussein, there could have been a very different outcome”341. 
How has Tony Blair coped cognitively with these pieces of information? According to 
Proposition 5 of the dissonance theory under investigation, he is expected to reject the 
incoming discrepant information and tend to accept only the consonant information. We find 
that the first five pieces of advice were consonant with the definition of the situation by the 
Prime Minister.  
One of the above quoted sources testifies Tony Blair told his “colleagues that he was 
aware that the potential Achilles heel of his Iraq strategy was the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He 
said that he was clear that movement in the peace process had to be made in parallel with Iraq, 
otherwise resentment in the Arab world against the west could fester”342.  
This private source reveals that the cognition to make progress on the peace process on a 
par with the Iraq issue was consonant for Tony Blair. But, as our data show, Christopher 
Meyer’s proposition about preconditions was dissonant with Tony Blair’s own vision, thus it 
was rejected. Subsequently, rejecting the cognition about setting the Middle East peace 
process as a pre-condition, Prime Minister said:  
“it wouldn't be right to do that either. You should only take the 
action in respect of Iraq if you think it is intrinsically plausible valid in 
its own terms”343.   
 
In another passage he defended his position likewise: 
“I think we should certainly, in order to understand my mindset, 
avoid this language of trading this policy for that policy. I would not 
have done Iraq, if I hadn't have thought it was right, full stop, 
irrespective of the Middle East”344. 
 
Two days prior to the Crawford meeting on April 4 2002 President Bush made an 
important policy statement on the Middle East peace process. The statement of President 
Bush said: “The United States is on record supporting the legitimate aspirations of the 
Palestinian people for a Palestinian state. Israel has recognized the goal of a Palestinian state. 
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The outlines of a just settlement are clear: two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side 
in peace and security. This can be a time for hope, but it calls for leadership, not for terror”345.  
According to ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer, the White House had not 
wanted what would have been as a major row between Bush and Blair. They needed Blair’s 
support for whatever the future held for Iraq. Bush had also been coming under criticism at 
home for his inconsistency in his approach to Israel/Palestine346.  
Subsequently, when Blair met Bush at Crawford the Middle East was discussed at 
length, at Blair’s insistence, and Bush subsequently dispatched Colin Powell to the region to 
convey the President’s new stance in person347.  
Blair’s biographer wrote that Secretary Powell’s trip was “undermined by the hawks 
back in Washington. The Vice-President [Dick Cheney] had no enthusiasm for engaging with 
Blair’s peace process. The constant neocon refrain was that the ‘only way to unwind the 
violence in the Middle East was to do Iraq first”348.  
Traditionally, the pursuit of the Middle East peace process was portrayed by certain 
members of the US administration as giving out mixed messages of fighting a ‘war on 
terrorism’ internationally, but appearing to reward Palestinian terrorism against Israel349. In 
the face of this perception ambassador Meyer recalled that several senators had told him that 
“the 4 April statement had been a mistake”350.  
The events around the Crawford are sophisticated with a wide range of deliberations 
about policy options that’s why we focus on them in a lengthier way. This leads us to another 
aspect which is quite recurrent in the discourse of key players of the Blair government. Many 
British officials claimed that striving for dealing with the Iraq issue at the expense or without 
equally focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is interpreted as pursuing “double 
standards”.  
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Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development under Tony Blair, argued: 
“We all know that the failure to implement the Oslo peace accords and establish a Palestinian 
state alongside Israel is the underlying cause of deep anger and bitterness in the Middle East, 
and the sense of double standards around the world”351.  
In a similar vein, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued the West might be seen uneven-
handed not to demand the same sort of adherence to UN Security Council resolutions for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as it does for Iraq: “There is a real concern too that the West has 
been guilty of double standards - on the one hand saying the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions on Iraq must be implemented; on the other hand, sometimes appearing rather 
quixotic over the implementation of resolutions about Israel and Palestine”352.  
In one of the secret memoranda of this period that we have studied Foreign Secretary 
again warned the Prime Minister Jack Straw: “The whole exercise is made much more 
difficult to handle as long as conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is so acute”353.  
At the parliamentary level, one of Labour MPs Jon Owen Jones, a former Welsh Office 
minister, said it was vital to tackle both the Middle East conflict and the Iraq situation without 
being seen to use "double standards"354. 
How did Tony Blair cope with these arguments? The basis of dissonance theory lies in 
the postulate that people seek strong justification for their behaviour355. In seeking consonant 
information, Tony Blair is expected to search out additional information supporting his 
decision and find new reasons for acting as he did (Proposition 4).  
Foreign advisor Manning recalled: “Fairly or not, some administrations, some states, 
made a connection between how energetic are you willing to be to deal with Iraq and how 
energetic are you willing to be to deal with the Middle East peace process, and this was one 
reason why Prime Minister Blair was intent on trying to make progress there”356.  
Tony Blair himself recalled in his memoirs A Journey: “Patching it up and putting it [the 
peace process] back on track, was for me, utterly crucial to creating the conditions in which 
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the tougher, harder measures could be taken without a revolt on the Arab streets and upset 
across the Muslim world”357.  
As for the above-mentioned arguments of the governmental officials about “double 
standards”, they were functionally relevant for Tony Blair’s beliefs. Hence, in his public 
discourse we see that he justified Iraq’s non-compliance with the United Nations resolutions 
by linking it with the Middle East peace process.  
“When people talk about the problems between the Arab and the 
western world, I could be wrong in this, but I will give you my own 
opinion, I don’t think those problems are to do with the removal of 
Saddam, I think most of the Arab world would rejoice at that. I think 
they are to do with what I have described as a shadow hanging over 
the relations between the Arab and the Muslim world and the west, 
which is the issue of the Middle East peace process. And we have got 
a basis on which we can move it forward, which is the two-state 
solution, and we should do that and do that as soon as we possibly 
can”358. 
 
Similarly, on another occasion he argued:  
“This is about three things. It is about even-handedness. The 
reason there is opposition over our stance on Iraq has less to do with 
any love of Saddam, but over a sense of double standards. The Middle 
East peace process remains essential to any understanding with the 
Muslim and Arab world”359.  
 
Given this consistency in his cognition about “double standards” he insisted:  
“[I]t is also important to demonstrate very, very clearly to the 
whole of the world, particularly to the Arab and Muslim world, that we 
are not one-sided, we are even-handed in our approach, we want to see 
a just and secure and peaceful world everywhere, and that means we 
are prepared to bring peace to the Middle East, just as we are prepared 
to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destructions”360. 
 
Finally, in another passage he said: 
“The issue is how we deal with that—I said what I said on Iraq a 
moment or two ago—but in relation to the Middle East, it is not 
correct to say that there have been mixed messages. We are absolutely 
clear that we condemn entirely those things that are happening in the 
middle east at the moment, which is why Israel should withdraw from 
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the occupied territories and do so now, as the American President has 
said; but we also—I hope that my hon. Friend would do so too—
condemn without reservation the terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens: 
both must be condemned”361.  
 
We summarize the acceptance and rejection of the preceding information by Tony Blair 
along the consonance / dissonance spectrum in the following Figure 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESIDENT BUSH’S 24 JUNE STATEMENT 
As a result of regular pressures from the European and Arab states, finally on 24 June 
2002, President Bush announced a new diplomatic initiative designed to achieve a just and 
sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinians362.  
Endorsing an eventual two-state solution363 in Palestine, President Bush:  
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1. called on the Palestinians to stamp out violence against Israelis and  
2. pressed for reform of Palestinian institutions and the election of "new" leaders364. 
(67§) 
In this historical speech the US President called for new Palestinian leadership and new, 
transformed, and democratic Palestinian institutions. The Palestinians had to take steps to 
reform their institutions and to create a credible leadership committed to peace. Yasser Arafat 
was moved out of the picture, albeit not fully out of the process, as he retains an ability, often 
utilized, to slow the process and to put roadblocks on the proposed road365.  
The British ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer evaluated the speech in the 
following way: “The definitive American statement was then one made in June which rowed 
back a long way from what they had said on 4 April, and effectively said in a practical sense 
that, "We will leave the Middle East on a care and maintenance basis and, by the way, we are 
not going to do anything until the Palestinians democratise themselves", and what that means 
is getting rid of Yasser Arafat, which he didn't do until he died366.  
In his memoirs recalling this event ambassador Meyer continued: “The British 
government welcomed the statement, though from London’s point of view it was hardly ideal. 
It was, to be sure, a plan, signalling some measure of US engagement in the peace process; 
but more than ever it put the onus on the Palestinians to create the conditions for peace and 
negotiations with Israel. It was infused by a recent idea (acquired, so I was told, from 
Sharon’s people) that there had to be democratic reform of the Palestinian institutions before 
anything could move. This was code for getting rid of Arafat”367.  
Subsequently, as Meyer summarized, “For Britain the statement proved, in fact, to be a 
step backwards. By putting the onus so heavily on the Palestinians to move first, it meant that 
there would be no early progress”368.  
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TALKING TO PRESIDENT ARAFAT 
An important historical and institutional instance in which we sought to trace dynamics 
of Tony Blair’s thinking was the issue of talking to President Yasser Arafat. According to the 
Israeli perception, the British policy towards Israeli and Palestinian politics is defined by two 
very different, often clashing approaches to the region. The first, which can be termed the 
"Diplomatic" approach, is based on maintaining the best possible relations with the existing 
regimes or those forces which seem likely to take power369. 
Advocates of this viewpoint stress the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as quickly as 
possible, regarding this conflict as the key source of regional instability. This approach is seen 
to be prevalent in the minds and discourse of officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office370.  
The second approach, termed as the "Strategic" view, puts more emphasis on dividing 
Middle Eastern regimes into moderate and hostile ones. It assumes that aggressive, anti-
Western governments and belief systems--radical Pan-Arab nationalism; revolutionary 
Islamism--are the principle threats to regional stability and to British interests. Viewing the 
Diplomatic approach as often tending toward appeasement, it is more willing to use pressure 
or even confrontation when deemed necessary”. This approach was often present in the 
discourse and calculations of the Prime Minister's Office371.  
By 2002 the conventional wisdom in the US and Israel has been that negotiations with 
the Palestinians elevated Yasser Arafat to the rank of an official negotiating partner, when his 
organization’s charter still demanded the destruction of the Jewish state372. According to the-
then Israeli Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu “it was impossible to achieve reform while 
Yassir Arafat was in charge”373.  
But all the governments before Tony Blair have been dealing with Arafat as a leader of 
the Palestinian people. The official line of the FCO was outlined in the statement of Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw to the House of Commons that it was for the Palestinian people to 
decide "who will lead them towards a final and peaceful settlement"374. In another statement, 
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he said that “if [President] Arafat were re-elected by the Palestinian Authority”, London 
“would deal with him”375.   
Diplomatic sources in London have told Ha'aretz: “At the same time, we are talking 
about someone who still heads the PA and who cannot be ignored, even if the Israeli version 
is different"376. 
Specifically, Alastair Campbell in his diary recalls one of the internal discussions in a 25 
June 2002 Cabinet meeting regarding dealing with Chairman Arafat: 
“The Bush Middle East speech [of June 24] was making big waves right round the 
world but it didn’t seem terribly thought through. It seemed the White House was too 
consumed with the squabbles and struggles within the government, particularly Powell v 
Cheney/Rumsfeld than in really thinking through a plan on the Middle East. Also, truth be 
told, Bush had a surer touch on domestic than international. I pointed out that Bush calling for 
the Palestinians to reject Arafat was the surest way to ensure a boost for Arafat. … [W]e said 
it was up to the Palestinian people to elect their leaders, which was taken as an attack on Bush 
so we were heading for the rift headlines”377.  
How did Tony Blair cope with this information?  
Further we have consulted a number of primary and secondary sources to establish 
whether he acted according to his operational code when he confronted dissonance of not 
talking to Arafat.  
One of Tony Blair’s close aides in a private interview with biographer Anthony Seldon 
recalled: “Blair has always been uneasy about not having direct contact with people who are 
causing trouble and who are affecting your national interest”378.   
The data also show that even though President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon 
declared Arafat “irrelevant”, Tony Blair rejected their demands to oust him, at the cost of 
foreign policy rift between the UK and the US379. According to the same source, the UK has 
refused to back US President George W Bush's demand for the “removal of Yasser Arafat as 
the price for a future Palestinian state”380.  
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Blair’s vision was that it was up “to the Palestinians to choose their own leaders”381. In 
contrast to Bush and Sharon, Blair responded “positively” to Chairman Arafat, “regarding 
him as essential to future negotiations”382. He continued dealing with Arafat until his death in 
conformity with the British institutional norms and structured interactions, values and 
practices which were transmitted from one government to another government. 
During the G8 summit at Kananaskis (June 26 and June 27, 2002) Tony Blair, according 
to The Guardian, had his first “public row” with President George Bush having refused to 
back the president's call for the removal of Yasser Arafat as the Palestinian leader383.  
In a similar vein Prime Minister Blair argued:  
“It's for the Palestinians to choose the people they choose to 
elect. It's not a question of saying we are going to tell people who they 
will elect or not”384. 
 
The same source also reports that though Prime Minister Blair supported the US in its 
call for the Palestinian leadership to disavow terrorism and be prepared to negotiate a full 
settlement, he contended the US open call for Arafat's “removal was a strategic blunder that 
would damage the chances of peace by creating a political vacuum in the region”385.  
In his conception the alternative scenario would be that the elections would entrench 
either Arafat or an even more hardline Palestinian leadership. Opinion polls in the Palestinian-
controlled territories were showing that President Arafat would be the likely winner of any 
election386.    
We have summarized key cognitive assumptions of the above-mentioned actors about 
the peace process by the end of June, 2002 in Figure 6 
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Further, the analysis of his discourse shows us his belief that the process should proceed 
with strengthening the Palestinian institutions to cope with terrorist infrastructure on the 
territories: 
“The question is how do we get to that point, and in getting to 
that point I think we need to sit down with the Palestinians and work 
out the proper means of developing a security infrastructure in the 
parts controlled by the Palestinian authorities where we can be sure 
that it is capable of dealing with the terrorist threats that arise from 
extremists within the Palestinian authorities, and where they are 
incapable of dealing with such threats, that we can be sure that the 
Palestinian authorities themselves are not complicit in any 
terrorism”387.  
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On another occasion: 
“And that is why I say that in the end the only way to get this 
thing back on track again is to make sure that we sit down and work 
out the detail of the proposals necessary to rebuild the security 
infrastructure, to make the changes necessary in the political 
institutions of the Palestinian authority, and to do so within the 
framework of a negotiation towards a final settlement of a secure 
confident Israeli state and a viable Palestinian state”388.   
 
We have analyzed available data to reconstruct the discourses of the relevant actors 
from April to October 2002. Through various ways and in different forms Prime Minister 
Blair continued advocating the top-down strategy to the peace process. The data obtained 
until this point satisfy our hypothetical proposition about Tony Blair’s cognitive consistency 
about the issue under question. We remind that on each historical occasion that we observe 
we are guided by the cognitive dissonance theory. We assume that our intervening variable is 
conserved unchanged.  
We remind that our central hypothesis suggests that Tony Blair’s Premiership has 
triggered stability of his beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Our exploration of 
the issue in this first case-study is consistently guided by the propositions of the cognitive 
dissonance theory.   
Since we argue that the Prime Minister has conserved stability of his instrumental 
beliefs about the peace process, then we count as evidence his encouragement of the top-down 
strategy across all the historical instances under our investigation.  
According to it, we expect that under any circumstances of decision-making with regard 
to the peace process, he will scan incoming information through this assumption, not 
admitting any alternative thinking. An alternative to the top-down strategy is the so-called 
“bottom-up approach” which holds that it is not a political agreement which is to be attained 
to improve the lives of the Palestinians, but, on the contrary, it is the change in Palestinian 
thinking and recognition of Israel which needs to precede the political agreement. To count 
as evidence of stability, we also expect that any seminal events or complex decision-making 
contexts should strengthen his “top-down” position. 
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We have operationalized the “antecedent condition” with which Tony Blair will have to 
cope, as  
a) the US and Israeli claims about the absence of a peace partner on the Palestinian side; 
and  
b) the ensuing disengagement of the Bush administration from the mediation efforts of 
its predecessor.  
At the same time, we follow the proposition that our analysis must be built around clear, 
specific and value-free, and empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Falsification requires at least 
the possibility and preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial 
conditions as well as in the phenomenon that we explain. We admit the probability that at 
some given historical period Tony Blair might reassess the content of his beliefs during his 
Premiership.  
This means that we are empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in 
his cognitive views. But to be precise, we need to specify the following analytic distinctions. 
Certain scholars working on learning theories equate policy change with belief change. Others 
fail to differentiate learning from alternative sources of policy change, such as structural 
adjustment389.  Therefore, if Prime Minister Blair introduces certain changes in his Middle 
East foreign policy, we do not interpret it as reconsideration of beliefs. We evaluate the 
pattern in light of analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to 
learning390.   
But our analysis of key events from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 until the end of 
2002 has shown us that that our central hypothesis about Tony Blair’s stability of beliefs is 
working as predicted and guided by the propositions of the cognitive dissonance theory.  We 
continue our historical chain. 
 
OCTOBER 2002 
Our data show that most of domestic and international debates in which Tony Blair was 
involved reflected the claims that the Middle East peace process was subordinated to the 
agenda around the Iraq issue. At the same, our Proposition 7 posits that the more the person is 
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committed to the advocated policy, the more he will resist to reassessing his belief and 
modifying his behaviour. Furthermore, the increased valuation of the goal will provide the 
actor with even greater incentives to redouble his efforts391. (§ 4 – 398)  
Accordingly, our sources show that Prime Minister Blair sought to reject the 
information that he displayed engagement in the peace process as an agenda subordinated to 
the Iraq issue by attributing cognitive autonomy to the former: 
“And we shouldn’t be doing the Middle East peace process 
because of issues concerned with Iraq, we should be doing it because it 
is right anyway. However, it is important to emphasise our 
commitment to doing it to assuage the fear, or claims that there are, 
that we operate with double standards here. […] But even if Iraq were 
not an issue at all, even if Afghanistan had never been an issue at all, I 
would still have been working as hard as I could to bring about a 
peaceful situation there, because it is absolutely tragic and appalling at 
the moment, the suffering of people is very, very great indeed, and the 
only way of getting through it is to restart the peace process”392.  
 
In October The Guardian reported Tony Blair told colleagues that “with war looming in 
Iraq, he regards it as essential to deal with one of the main causes of Arab resentment against 
the west”393. Throughout this month the Prime Minister was pushing for a resumption of 
Israeli-Palestinian talks, backed by an international conference, and even proposing time 
frames on his behalf: 
“And there is only one answer. By this year's end, we must have 
revived final status negotiations and they must have explicitly as their 
aims: an Israeli state free from terror, recognised by the Arab world 
and a viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of 1967”394.  
 
The fact that Blair indicated the date by which political negotiations needed to be 
resumed was one of the most debatable issues of the period. According to Kampfner, this 
tight deadline for progress was a last minute insertion by Prime Minister Blair and his aide 
Jonathan Powell, without consulting the Foreign Minister Straw and Ambassador to Israel 
Cowper-Coles395.   
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In this promise for such a “massively important thing as final-status talks for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state by the end of the year” Clare Short claimed “there was no 
substance”396.  
Similarly, an influential member of the Bush administration pointed out: “It’s not like 
the President and Prime Minister to come at the Middle East from different poles, but the 
President thought this process was not susceptible to a time frame”397.  
As a result, as Seldon points out, Tony Blair and Jonathan Powell (???) were 
disconcerted to hear through unofficial channels that Bush was not keen to discuss anything 
as sensitive as the MEPP until after his mid-term elections were over that November”398. 
Further, his speech of 11 November 2002 shows us his continuous belief in the top-
down strategy. 
“The answer is to move the process forward: on security, on 
political reform, on the only viable solution the whole world now 
supports - an Israeli state, recognised by all and a viable Palestinian 
state”399. (11 November 2002) 
 
JANUARY 2003 CONFERENCE 
Proposition 7 predicts the more the person is committed to the advocated policy, the 
more he will resist to reassessing his belief and modifying his behaviour. The theory also 
predicts that the increased valuation of the goal will provide the actor with even greater 
incentives to redouble his efforts400.  
According to Hollis, Tony Blair tried to rescue the situation with a proposal to use the 
intervening period to focus on reform of the Palestinian Authority401. He organized a 
multilateral conference “on the Middle East Peace Process based on the twin principles of a 
secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state”402. 
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How has he justified this psychological situation? To reduce the dissonant attitude 
persisting in Israeli mindset, Tony Blair, as suggested by the cognitive dissonance 
perspective, emphasized the positive aspects and deemphasized the negative aspects of the 
advocated option. (Proposition 6) 
In this sense, Blair identified the process as beneficial for the interests of Israel itself. He 
further insisted that at the outcome Israeli concerns could be properly satisfied by pursuing 
the policy he was advocating  
“And the reason why I think it is important to discuss political 
reform with the Palestinians is that there has been a sense in Israel and 
outside that unless we get the right political mechanisms in place then 
it is difficult to make progress on the Middle East. So ours is an 
attempt to try and secure that, to try and push that forward”403.  
 
The historical period from January to mid-March 2003 is generally the one when the 
British political organizations were involved into protracted debates over the future British 
participation in the military action of the United States against Iraq. Knowledge of the 
domestic pressure upon Prime Minister Blair is essential for understanding both individual 
and institutional determinants of the decision-making context.     
Clare Short was one of the most active advocates of the publication of the Roadmap by 
President Bush. As Campbell notes in his diary (on 13 March 2003): “she said we needed the 
Roadmap [setting out next steps in MEPP] published. She also said “the world community 
was split because the Americans were rushing. […] ‘If we can get the Roadmap, we can get 
the world reunited behind it”404.  
In her interview Clare Short recalled later: 
I said I would resign if we didn’t have a UN resolution then Tony Blair entered into a 
big negotiation with me and said, “What will stop you?” I said, “Get me a UN resolution – 
there’s no imminent danger from anything Saddam Hussein’s got, we should have made 
progress on Israel-Palestine peace before doing anything about Iraq. And, thirdly, if there is to 
be a war any reconstruction must be organised with international cooperation under a UN 
mandate”405. 
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She continued: “[I]f there’s an international reconstruction and if we really do make 
progress on Israel-Palestinian (under the Roadmap there should have been a full Palestinian 
state by 2005) the Middle East would be a lot better off”406. 
The Prime Minister’s biographer Seldon wrote: “Blair badly needed movement on the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and a US commitment to involving the UN in post-war 
Iraq. He believed deeply in both, but he also needed to show domestic and world opinion that 
he was extracting something tangible from Bush in return for British support407.  
In a similar manner, The Guardian also wrote: “Tony Blair desperately needs it 
published to help neutralise those in his cabinet and party, and in the wider public, who 
complain that instead of concentrating on Iraq the US and Britain should make the resolution 
of the Israel-Palestinian conflict their priority”408.  
Further Seldon continued, “Blair knew that a public commitment from Bush along these 
lines would help him significantly with the party. The road map was also something he 
believed in deeply”409.   
For these and other reasons, the British side has activated all available channels of 
special relationship at full capacity to attain public commitment by President Bush. Key 
British figures of foreign policy proceeded to persuasion paths (Manning spoke to Rice and 
Straw to Colin Powell), saying that Blair’s future could hinge on this issue410.  
 
PRESIDENT BUSH’S COMMITMENT TO THE ROADMAP, 14 MARCH, 2003  
Finally, On March 14, 2003 “President Bush outlined his vision for peace in the Middle 
East, and said that as soon as a Palestinian Prime Minister "with real authority" is confirmed, 
the "road map" for peace will be presented to the Palestinians and Israelis411.  
President Bush pointed out that "this moment" offered a hopeful opportunity for 
progress towards peace, “since Israel has a new government following recent elections, and 
the Palestinian Authority has created the new position of prime minister”412. The road map 
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was expected to “set forth a sequence of steps toward the goals” set out by the President on 
June 24th, 2002413.  
Seldom believes that extracting this commitment had been no mean feat, and owed 
much to Blair personally414. As in the pre-war period, conviction and expediency were 
inseparable in Blair’s mind. He took Britain to war with a promise from Bush to publish the 
‘road map’ for the MEPP as soon as a new Palestinian Prime Minister took office. But he was 
serious about wanting to see progress415.  
In assuring President Bush’s publication of the Roadmap Colin Powell attributes the 
primary role to Tony Blair by acknowledging: “I couldn’t get the President to say the words 
“road map”. It was finally Blair who said to Bush, “You have got to do this. You have got to 
say this”. And Bush agreed”416.  
Similarly, in media many commentators saw President Bush's declaration of support for 
the twin-state "roadmap" solution - for the first time publicly backing a Palestinian state - as a 
"reward" to Tony Blair's powers of persuasion following UK backing of the US position on 
the Iraq war417.  
As predicted by the theory, the increased valuation of the goal will provide the actor 
with even greater incentives to redouble his efforts418. Symbolically, at the Azores summit on 
Iraq on March 16, where Bush, Blair, Spanish PM Jose Maria Aznar, and Portuguese PM José 
Manuel Durao Barroso – the leading coalition members – made a final ultimatum to Iraq, 
Aznar, Barroso, and Blair each mentioned the road map in their statements to the press, 
whereas Bush did not. According to the Journal of Palestinian Studies, this an omission was 
seen by certain actors as deliberate and an indication that Bush was not serious about pursuing 
the plan419.  
At the Azores summit Tony Blair made such a statement: 
“Finally, on the Middle East peace process, I welcome very 
much the statement that President Bush made the other day. I think it's 
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important now. He said he wanted a partner on the Palestinian side. I 
think the coming appointment of Abu Mazen is so important there. It 
allows us to take this process forward. The road map give us the way 
forward. The appointment of Abu Mazen gives us the right partner to 
take this forward. And I believe that that will demonstrate, and it's 
important to demonstrate, in particular at this time, that our approach 
to people in the Middle East, in that troubled region is indeed even-
handed. And all of us will work to make sure that that vision of the 
Middle East, two states, Israel confident of its purity, a Palestinian 
state that is viable, comes about and is made reality”420.  
 
In the period after the beginning of military action in Iraq, public declarations of Prime 
Minister Blair show his commitment to the peace process through the mechanism of the 
Roadmap: 
“I understand why people in the Middle East and in the Arab 
Muslim world are cynical about this issue, because they think well we 
are talking about it now because we are invading Iraq, but are we 
really serious about it. […] When the new Palestinian Prime Minister 
puts his Cabinet in place, that road map will be published. […] And I 
can assure you I regard this [Roadmap] as every bit as much a priority 
for us as making sure we get rid of Saddam in Iraq”421. 
 
But certain Israeli officials did not share Tony Blair’s agenda of empowering Palestinian 
institutions, but focusing less on preparing the ground of the civil society (“bottom-up 
strategy”). Prime Minister Sharon’s adviser Dore Gold: “Mr Blair's determination to link the 
Iraq war with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at virtually every US-UK summit meeting only 
increases Israeli concerns about the quartet. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian prime minister, 
is already being praised even before there is any evidence that he will in fact stop terrorism 
against Israel. The best way to help the postwar peace process is to stop the diplomacy of 
linkage. It may answer some short-term political needs but it undermines the credibility of its 
advocates and their ability to play any role in an eventual Arab-Israeli peace settlement”422.  
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AQABA SUMMIT 
In an important extract Blair’s Middle East envoy Lord Levy recalls: “Tony [Blair] did 
keep pressing Bush on the Middle East issue, particularly after the Iraq invasion. He won a 
number of isolated victories, including the publication of the ‘road map’ peace plan and the 
first formal public commitment by an American president to the goal of creating a Palestinian 
state”423.  
Our data show that by June 2003 Tony Blair had been urging President Bush to 
participate personally in the Aqaba summit hosting the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Minister. 
According to Coughlin, President Bush had been reluctant to engage in the Middle East peace 
process, and it was to Blair’s credit that the American president finally agreed to travel to the 
region in June, when, at the Jordanian resort of Aqaba, he met with both Sharon and Abbas424. 
Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross believes that this summit in Aqaba 
represented the culmination of the effort425. 
As was put by Sharansky, President Bush “stood between an elected Israeli prime 
minister and an unelected prime minister of the Palestinian Authority and proclaimed a 
hopeful new era”426.  
But Sharansky continued: “With Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] held up as a 
“moderate” leader who would fight Palestinian terrorism and make peace with Israel, it was 
clear to me that Oslo’s false assumptions would once again guide the peace process. Like 
their Oslo predecessors, those supporting the Road Map did not recognize that moderation is 
not a function of a leader’s disposition or promises, but rather a function of the nature of the 
society he or she governs. The Road Map had it precisely backwards. One can rely on a free 
society to create the moderate, but one cannot rely on a moderate to create the free society”427. 
The cognitive process paradigm predicts that new information becomes available, the 
cognitive process actor, rather than making major adjustments in his thinking, tends to 
integrate the information into pre-existing belief structures. Because the experience is 
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construed primarily on the basis of pre-existing categories, its contribution to subsequent 
decisions is likely to reinforce rather than to conflict with prior perspectives428. 
The Aqaba summit, from the cognitive dissonance perspective, was consonant with the 
pre-existing beliefs of Blair. Biographer Seldon wrote how Blair conceived the Aqaba 
summit: “Blair believed that his labours were beginning to pay off”429. Prime Minister Blair 
made the following statement at Evian:  
“The reason why President Bush is leaving is a reason which is 
understood by everybody, that the Middle East peace process is now 
moving forward. This is of fantastic importance. A few months ago if 
you had said at these press conferences, if I had said I think that 
President Bush will be seeing Palestinian leaders and Israeli leaders 
out in the region in order to push the Middle East peace process 
forward, I think most of you would have said I was being extremely, if 
not wildly, optimistic. It is happening. And he goes there with the full 
support of the G8 members”430.  
 
To reinforce his position, as suggested Proposition 6, the actor is expected to emphasize 
the positive aspects, deemphasizing the negative aspects of the preferred belief. In an 
important speech to the US Congress on 18 July 2003 Blair conceptually linked his option 
(“peace process”) with the leitmotiv of the US foreign policy in the region (“struggle against 
terror”) thus insisting on the merits of his own option:   
“I want to be very plain: this terrorism will not be defeated 
without peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine. Here it 
is that the poison is incubated. Here it is that the extremist is able to 
confuse in the mind of a frighteningly large number of people the case 
for a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel, and to translate this 
moreover into a battle between East and West, Muslim, Jew and 
Christian”431.  
 
Given new opportunities, as he believed, in the post-Iraq Tony Blair insisted on 
being more committed to the advocated agenda: 
 “The ending of Saddam's regime in Iraq must be the starting 
point of a new dispensation for the Middle East: Iraq, free and stable; 
Iran and Syria, who give succor to the rejectionist men of violence, 
made to realize that the world will no longer countenance it, that the 
hand of friendship can only be offered them if they resile completely 
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from this malice, but that if they do, that hand will be there for them 
and their people; the whole of region helped toward democracy. And 
to symbolize it all, the creation of an independent, viable and 
democratic Palestinian state side by side with the state of Israel”432.  
 
At this stage of our process-tracing we have analyzed the expression of beliefs in the 
cognitive map of Tony Blair based on his press conference given on July 30, 2003. In this 
press conference Tony Blair said: 
“We have expressed our own misgivings too because what we 
don’t want is a situation where de facto the boundaries are changed, 
because that would mean that a peace settlement is less likely and less 
possible. But I have got no doubt at all that the only way of dealing 
with this ultimately is to get the agreement on the security measures 
that need to be taken by the Palestinian Authority, on the Israeli side as 
well, in cooperation together because that is the only way we are going 
to take away the pressure on the Israeli government to carry on doing 
what it can to protect its citizens. And I have learnt enough from the 
process that we have engaged in Northern Ireland to realise you can 
stand here and disagree with certain measures that are taken by the 
Israeli government or the Palestinian Authority, but in the end unless 
you get an agreement, and that agreement has got to start with the 
security measures, you are not going to make progress on this. So yes, 
we have the same misgivings, but in the end the only way we are 
going to get that security fence taken down is to make the progress in 
the peace deal433. 
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We see the causal arrow connects the concept of “POLITICAL AGREEMENT” with 
the concept “PEACE SETTLEMENT” through the connecter “+”. Put differently, this figure 
means that by 2003, Tony Blair continued perceiving the progress in the issue through first 
making a political agreement. We qualify this approach as the “top-down” strategy. 
 
RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER ABBAS 
In September 2003 the Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigned “weakened 
by a power struggle with Yasser Arafat”434. The Guardian made reference to Prime Minister 
Abbas's aides who reported that the former “had been frustrated by the constant wrangling 
with [Chairman] Arafat, the near-collapse of the US-backed "road map" plan for peace with 
Israel and his inability to improve the daily lives of Palestinians”435.  
In order to verify the dynamics of Tony Blair’s beliefs we need to specify what kind of 
dissonant information he had to cope with on the occasion of Mahmoud Abbas’s resignation. 
First of all, a senior Bush administration official recalled: “Bush lost [his energy] after Arafat 
appointed Abbas and then refused to let him do anything. That was it for Bush. He would 
have nothing to do with the Palestinian leadership so long as Arafat was in control”436.  
In addition, the Israeli mindset was explicitly expressed by Nathan Sharansky in his 
book The Case For Democracy, in which he argued that “moderation is not a function of a 
leader’s disposition or promises, but rather a function of the nature of the society he or she 
governs”437. 
In Great Britain the Parliament also concluded: “Violence has repeatedly derailed 
progress towards a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the 
devastating cycle of terrorist attack and Israeli retaliation resumed in August, prospects for 
implementation of the Road Map —the Quartet’s plan for a two-state solution to the 
conflict—have appeared remote”438. 
On 15 September 2003, the UN’s Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 
Process, Terje Roed-Larsen told the Security Council that the peace process has stalled. The 
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recent cycle of terror attacks and extrajudicial killings has broken the Palestinian ceasefire and 
brought the process to a standstill. A combination of violence and the too slow 
implementation of the road map peace plan have brought the region to a potential turning 
point…. Unfortunately, implementation of the road map never effectively began439. 
Further, against this background we see that his operational code did not change.  Tony 
Blair, as our data show, chose to act in a manner, as predicted by our Propositions 1, 6, 7. 
Namely, the claims about the failure of the Roadmap were psychologically uncomfortable for 
Tony Blair motivating him to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. We see that 
since he was committed to the advocated policy, he displayed resistance to reassessing his 
belief and modifying his behaviour. In his discourse he chose to emphasize the positive 
aspects and deemphasizing the negative aspects of the preferred belief. He persistently 
continued to insist on the top-down strategy calling to resume the Roadmap.   
“I don’t think it is a question of the Road Map as such being 
finished because in the end you will come back to something like the 
Road Map, even if you get rid of the Road Map. There’s no other 
solution waiting out there other than a solution that means either the 
State of Israel ends which isn’t going to happen, or the Palestinians go 
away, which isn’t going to happen. So you will be left with a situation 
where Israelis and Palestinians have to find a way of living together, 
and the only way they are ever going to agree to live together is if they 
each have sovereign independent states, side by side. So my point is 
that in the end you will always come back to that issue”440.  
 
But the public discourse of Tony Blair shows us his consistent commitment first of all to 
the terms of the two-state solution, which would then change the reality of what was 
happening on the ground. He insisted on putting  
“in place plans that do guarantee that the viable Palestinian state 
that we want to see is viable not just in terms of territory, but viable 
also in terms of its political institutions, its economy and its security 
measures, because that is essential on both sides”441. 
 
                                                 
439
 Remarks by Terje Roed-Larsen, UN’s Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 
Process, 15 September 2003.  
440
 Transcript of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s press conference, 23 October 2003. 
441
 Transcript of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s press conference, 6 January 2005. 
 142 
APPEALS TO RECONSIDER THE BRITISH MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICY 
 
In 2004 our data show there have been a number of historical instances which have 
called for reassessing Tony Blair’s Middle East foreign policy. Some institutions of the 
British political system urged the Prime Minister to reconsider certain dimensions of the US-
UK “special relationship”.  
We have already noted in this section that the importance of knowledge about the 
perceptions and policy positions of British organizations relevant to the foreign policy 
decision-making. The discussions of Tony Blair’s decisions based on uniquely “rational actor 
model” (Allison’s Model I) will be insufficient and will omit a range of important institutional 
determinants of the decision-making process.   
Graham Allison claims that though government leaders do sit formally, and to some 
extent in fact, on top of this conglomerate, governments perceive problems through 
organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as 
organizations process information. Governments act as these organizations enact routines. 
Government behavior can therefore be understood according to a second conceptual model, 
less as deliberate choices of leaders and more as outputs of large organizations functioning 
according to standard patterns of behaviour442.   
An essential document calling for reconsideration and reassessment of Britain’s “special 
relationship” with the United States was the famous letter of 52 British retired diplomats. The 
former officials of the Foreign Office claimed that “Britain and the other sponsors of the road 
map merely waited on American leadership, but waited in vain”443.  
The virtually unprecedented letter criticised the prime minister for claiming influence 
over the US president, George Bush, and American policy, then backing the Israel policy 
when it was already “doomed to failure”444. 
The letter addressing to Prime Minister Blair emphasized: “We share your view that the 
British government has an interest in working as closely as possible with the US on both these 
related issues, and in exerting real influence as a loyal ally. We believe that the need for such 
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influence is now a matter of the highest urgency. If that is unacceptable or unwelcome there is 
no case for supporting policies which are doomed to failure”445.  
According to the interpretation of the Sky News, the diplomats “warned that Mr Blair 
must influence America's "doomed" policy, or stop backing it. And they accused ministers of 
abandoning the principles that had guided attempts to reach a settlement between Israel and 
the Palestinians for 30 years”446.  
Another piece of information provided to Tony Blair about his prospective alignment 
with the United States in his Middle East foreign policy was a report of the Department for 
International Development (DfID) in consultation with the Foreign Office. This analysis, The 
Guardian reports, “reveals the alarm within Whitehall at the disengagement of the Bush 
administration from events in Israel and the occupied territories”447.   
In this Report was expressed the perception that the US engagement does not match the 
requirements of the ground situation which it attributed to a number of priorities:  
“Without sustained pressure, from the region and internationally (notably the Quartet), 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders find it difficult to initiate negotiations. The role of the USA, the 
country with most leverage over Israel, is key. Frustration with aspects of the Palestinian 
leadership, preoccupations in Iraq, Presidential elections and security concerns for US citizens 
may risk USA disengagement at the highest levels from the peace process when it is most 
likely to start collapsing. US credibility as an honest broker between the parties is 
important”448. 
The analysis, signed off by the development secretary, Hilary Benn, concludes: "There 
is now a medium to high probability that there will be a lack of effective international 
engagement on the Middle East peace process due to other international priorities in 2004”449.  
Beside, during the following month senior figures across the Labour party intensified 
pressure on Tony Blair to publicly detach himself from the Bush administration, calling on 
him to spell out an independent British position on the Middle East, peacekeeping in Iraq and 
the US presidential election450.  
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Normally loyal ministers have joined backbench colleagues to urge the prime minister 
to demonstrate his political detachment from Washington amid fears that the crisis in Iraq is 
undermining his domestic standing. According to ministers and Labour backbenchers from all 
wings of the party interviewed by The Guardian, Prime Minster Blair should seize the earliest 
opportunity to recalibrate his approach to foreign affairs451.  
These Labour party members advised Downing Street to change tack in three key areas:  
• Drawing a line between Britain's widely acclaimed peacekeeping record and the 
heavy-handed military tactics of US forces in Iraq;  
• Advocating a more emollient approach to the Middle East peace process, undoing the 
damage of Mr Blair's Rose Garden endorsement of the Sharon plan. In particular, they want 
No 10 to highlight the EU's refusal to follow Washington's imposition of sanctions on Syria;  
• Courting US Democrats more actively in election year without breaking traditional 
conventions of government-to-government neutrality452.  
 
This antecedent condition is regarded by the cognitive dissonance theory as either 
consonance or dissonance. Alexander George argues that beliefs provide the actor “with a 
relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of what would otherwise be a 
confusing and overwhelming array of signals and cues picked up from the environment from 
his senses. These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify and structure the external 
world453.  
Each new decision-making experience can have an effect on future decisions, but 
because the experience is construed primarily on the basis of preexisting categories, its 
contribution to subsequent decisions is likely to reinforce rather than to conflict with prior 
perspectives454.  
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Therefore, people also try to counteract discrepant information by engaging in 
bolstering, a technique that involves seeking new information which strengthens the beliefs 
that are being challenged. 
Like many of its predecessors, Blair's government decided that UK interests were best 
served by remaining America's closest ally455. Blair made it clear that Britain and the EU were 
fully behind U.S. efforts to break the deadlock between the parties, and reiterated that Europe 
had no intention of trying to supplant the United States in its role as broker. Rather, Blair was 
keen to promote British involvement in the peace process in cooperation with the 
Americans456.  
Tony Blair’s Personal Envoy to the Middle East in his book recalls Tony Blair’s 
thinking. He says that he and Tony Blair “knew that a final peace deal, if and when it came, 
would not be negotiated by Britain”457. He continued: “The Americans were the key. But the 
immediate danger was that in  the absence of any negotiating process at all, the violence 
would get even worse, possibly ending the prospects of a compromise altogether. Our role 
was to keep talks, contacts, and hope, alive”458.   
Compare the 1998 speech of Tony Blair, in which he argued that the UK would have 
more influence on the US if it was at the heart of European decision-making, and it would be 
stronger in Europe because of the special relationship with the US with the discourse made 
during the press conference on April 22, 2004459.  
“What I do know is that if you believe passionately, as I do, that 
Britain’s place is as a central player in Europe, that we have got these 
two great alliances with America and with Europe and we keep both of 
them, we don’t choose one over the other, then it is time for people 
like me to make the argument”460.  
 
Despite the domestic criticism, as predicted by cognitive perspectives, Tony Blair 
continued his attachment to the belief that the British interests in the Middle East are best 
served through the alliance with the United States. At least, at the public level, we do not see 
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changes in his beliefs that the British Middle East policy will be best served by means of a 
close alliance with the United States. 
 
ISRAELI PLAN OF DISENGAGEMENT  
In the previous section we have already noted that there was a chain of events in 2004 
which aroused dissonance with regard to belief system of Tony Blair. Tony Blair has backed 
Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan.  
The support given by Tony Blair to the Israeli plan The Guardian judged as tantamount 
“to a turnaround in British Middle East policy” based on the assumption that until then the 
country had “opposed unilateral withdrawal and remained committed to the idea of a peace 
settlement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians”461.  
In a press conference on July 30, 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair has made the 
following statement: 
“[W]hat we don’t want is a situation where de facto the 
boundaries are changed, because that would mean that a peace 
settlement is less likely and less possible”462. 
 
This particular instance of Blair’s policy position needs a more careful and detailed 
analytic approach. The operational code scholarship qualifies this phenomenon as 
incongruence between the belief system and behaviour.  
How and why does this instance represent analytic interest for us? We have already 
noted that our causal chain incorporates the independent variable (institutional context) 
linking the dependent variable (foreign policy) through the intervening third variable 
(cognitive stability). 
We also remarked that the objective of our analytic enterprise is not a simple description 
of foreign policy outputs and decisions. Nor is the policy change our ultimate goal. We rather 
focus our attention on the analysis of changes and stability in the cognitive beliefs, identity 
and interests of Tony Blair which precede and cause foreign policy decisions. 
Hence, the fact that Tony Blair’s support of the Israeli plan of disengagement is 
perceived by us as foreign policy change, we cannot a priori assert that it implies a change of 
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beliefs. We remind that we seek to establish whether changes in the dependent variable were 
brought about by changes in the intervening variable.  
But if changes in Tony Blair’s policy are not caused by changes in beliefs, what is then 
the alternative explanation for this variance? For this purpose we have consulted a number of 
primary public and some private sources. These data show that Prime Minister Blair’s 
behaviour is more adequately explained as the outcome of structural adjustment and not of 
cognitive learning. We deal with this analytic distinction separately in the following section.   
 
We continue tracing the events of late 2004 to establish whether Blair’s strategic beliefs 
were conserved stable or modified for certain reasons.  
The November visit of Prime Minister Blair to Washington is considered by his 
biographers as “one of the most successful Bush meetings of his premiership”463. A senior 
British official is reported to have said: “The best moment for four years on the Middle East 
peace process”464.   
One of the earliest agreements that the both leaders have reached was organization of a 
London conference to support reform in the Palestinian Authority under the chairmanship of 
Prime Minister Blair.  
Cognitive perspectives emphasize the dominant role of pre-existing beliefs in 
interpreting new information and that the experience is construed primarily on the basis of 
these preexisting categories. The contribution of the previous experience to subsequent 
decisions is likely to reinforce rather than to conflict with prior perspectives. During this visit 
to Washington Tony Blair made efforts to win President Bush’s support for the appointment 
of a special US envoy to the region with full presidential authority given his belief that the 
problem demanded a high-ranking figure who gave it his priority465.  
In the role Quartet Representative Tony Blair later recalled his belief: 
"The interesting thing is how the international community 
delegates authority to make up for the limited knowledge that these 
leaders can have nowadays when they're dealing with a multiplicity of 
problems in their own domestic situation. [...]  I think, for example, 
there's no way the Middle East is going to be resolved unless there are 
empowered senior people from the international community able to do 
it. Because, as I say, I now have a far better understanding of what 
needs to happen than I did when I was British prime minister. And yet 
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in one sense when I was British prime minister I obviously had greater 
power over the situation”466. 
 
It is important to know this prior belief to understand the cognitive regularities of how 
his mind dealt with uncertainty and inferred inductively. Given his belief about high-level 
representation, when he received the discrepant information that President Bush would not 
send a presidential envoy to the region, Blair was disappointed467.  
Later Tony Blair’s chief of staff Jonathan Powell recollected: “Now, we did persuade 
the Americans to produce a road map, we did persuade them to opt for the two-state solution, 
but they didn't deliver as we'd hoped and as they gave us reason to expect might happen: a 
Madrid conference, such as had followed the first Gulf War, or an envoy permanently dealing 
with this problem, or indeed what President Bush said when he came to Hillsborough in 
Northern Ireland, where he had a joint press conference with the Prime Minister in which he 
said he would devote as much time and as much effort to the Middle East as the Prime 
Minister had to Northern Ireland. I think, if those things had happened, we would have found 
ourselves in a different place. […] For me personally, a major disappointment”468. 
 
THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 2005 
As was mentioned above, twice during his Premiership, in 2003 and in 2005, Tony Blair 
chaired a significant London conference on Palestinian capabilities which involved all the 
members of the Quartet. These conferences were organized as part of international 
engagement for political reform within the Palestinian Authority.  
Prime Minister believed that the conference on Palestinian reform would offer a way 
back to an internationally-backed "road map" for a Palestinian state, after years of "paralysis" 
in Middle East diplomacy469.  
In the Israeli mindset the efforts of Tony Blair were interpreted as part of his “top-down 
strategy”. The Guardian reported Israel’s scepticism about Tony Blair's proposals for a 
Middle East conference. The Israeli concern was that the meeting would bypass the first 
phase of the road map, particularly the requirement for the Palestinian leadership to curb 
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violence, and push on to the second phase which foresees the creation of a provisional 
Palestinian state470.  
According to the Palestinian Report, Israel did try to pressure Blair into pressuring the 
Palestinians. Blair, however, did not accept Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s position that 
the Palestinians must fulfil a series of obligations before the roadmap could begin”471.  
For its part, London presented the aims of the conference in more limited terms. London 
assured that the conference was intended to help the Palestinians prepare for Israel's unilateral 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and address security issues which would help meet 
Palestinian obligations under the first phase472. 
In summary, we show the cognitive map of Tony Blair by 2005 indicating his 
conception of causal relations in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The original text from which the cognitive map concepts were extracted is a transcript 
of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s press conference, 6 January 2005. In this discourse Tony Blair 
used the following concepts: 
“In respect of the Israeli-Palestinian issue, once the elections are 
out of the way I think the important thing then is to prepare for the 
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London Conference, because that will give us the opportunity of 
helping the Palestinians put in place the measures politically in terms 
of security, in terms of the economy, that will allow them to be not just 
a stable partner and a stable state next door to Israel, but also allow 
them to be a stable partner for the world community in helping to 
resolve this problem”473.  
 
Further,  
“Now we can help in the international community empower the 
Palestinians to put in place the measures that they want to put in place, 
because the Palestinian leadership want this to succeed, then we have 
got a chance of actually getting into that peace conference with the 
Israelis”474.  
 
It means that “national elections” will help turn the Palestinians into a “stable partner”. 
In its turn, “empowering Palestinian institutions” will lead to “peace conference” with Israel. 
The causal linkage between these dyads of concepts shows us that Blair continued to believe 
in the validity of the top-down strategy.  
Recall the Israeli concerns. They argued that the meeting would bypass the first phase of 
the road map, particularly the requirement for the Palestinian leadership to curb violence, and 
push on to the second phase which foresees the creation of a provisional Palestinian state475. 
That is, creation of state (top-down) which would precede changes in Palestinian behaviour 
(bottom-up).  
This cognitive map shows us that key terms in the conceptual understanding of Tony 
Blair were linked through the top-down strategy. Compare it with Tony Blair’s recollections 
of his Prime Minister beliefs in 2008.  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”476.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this first case-study we have advanced the hypothesis that Tony Blair has conserved 
his strategic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his years in Downing Street. 
According to it, we expect that under any circumstances of decision-making with regard to 
the peace process, he will scan incoming information through this assumption, not admitting 
any alternative thinking. An alternative to the top-down strategy can be the so-called “bottom-
up approach” which holds that it is not a political agreement which is to be attained to 
improve the lives of the Palestinians, but, on the contrary, it is the change in Palestinian 
thinking and recognition of Israel which needs to precede the political agreement. To count 
as evidence of stability, we also expect that any seminal events or complex decision-making 
contexts should strengthen his top-down position. 
At the same time we were open, in accord with the principle of falsification, to observe 
some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the phenomenon that we explain. We 
sought to generate our hypothesis as a falsifiable proposition admitting the probability that at 
some given historical period Tony Blair might reassess the content of his beliefs during his 
Premiership.  
With the objective to analyze Prime Minister Tony Blair’s thinking about the Middle 
East peace process during his Prime Ministership, from September 2001 to January 2006, we 
have studied 48 speeches, interviews, press conferences, in which was highlighted his 
position on the issue.   
Since the data for our analisys is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature, in addition to 
interviews, press accounts and archival documents, we have included historical memoirs as 
well. Among them were Alastair Campbell, the former Press Secretary of Tony Blair, a close 
confidant and Director of communications and strategy (1994 – 2003). In his memoirs “Blair 
years: extracts from the Alastair Campbell diaries” he describes essential events and private 
Cabinet meetings and discussions, in which we can explore the Prime Minister’s spontaneous 
answers and policy deliberations. 
We have used Christopher Meyer’s 2005 memoirs “DC Confidential: The Controversial 
Memoirs of Britain's Ambassador to the U.S. at the Time of 9/11 and the Run-Up to the Iraq 
War”, in which the British ambassador has undertaken critical insight into British foreign 
policy strategies particularly around military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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In addition, in terms of reconstruction of Tony Blair’s attitude to the peace process over 
time, the book of Lord Michael Levy (Prime Minister’s Personal Envoy to the Middle East) 
“A question of honour” has an enormous contributory power. 
Last, but not least we have made frequent reference to Tony Blair’s biographers 
Anthony Seldon (Blair Unbound) and Con Coughlin (American ally: Tony Blair and the war 
on terror) who provide us with important primary sources. In their books they have 
interviewed a number of Cabinet members, Tony Blair’s closest aides and confidants, as well 
as certain officials of the Bush administration. From these interviews we extract private 
recollections of the officials about Tony Blair’s thinking process, which turn out to be helpful 
in comparing with the public discourse.   
In general, our data consistently showed that in his discourse Tony Blair supported the 
top-down strategy without admitting, at least publicly, its alternative “bottom-up”. 
In our Figure 5, we analyzed the concepts in his cognitive map expressed in a press 
conference on July 30, 2003. The results showed that Tony Blair argued that “political 
agreement” would lead to “peace settlement”. We maintained that this conceptual assertion 
was a reflection of the “top-down” strategy.  
In Figure 6 we showed Tony Blair’s support for President Arafat given his belief that 
the latter was essential for peace negotiations.   
According to The Guardian, though Tony Blair backed the US in its call for the 
Palestinian leadership to disavow terrorism, he put his view that President Bush's open call for 
Arafat's “removal was a strategic blunder that would damage the chances of peace by creating 
a political vacuum in the region”477.  
This thinking is similar to the one of advocates of the top-down strategy who were 
described by Sharansky in his Case for Democracy in such way: “They remained convinced 
that Arafat and the PA were the only alternatives and nothing should be done to weaken 
them”478.  
These data show that Tony Blair advocated the top-down strategy. We also showed 
Figure 8 (transcript of a press conference, 6 January 2005). In this cognitive construct was 
expressed the belief of Tony Blair that “national elections” will help turn the Palestinians into 
a “stable partner”. In its turn, “empowering Palestinian institutions” will lead to “peace 
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conference” with Israel. The causal linkage between these dyads of concepts shows us that 
Blair continued to believe in the validity of the top-down strategy.  
Compare the causal assertion of Tony Blair that “national elections” will help turn the 
Palestinians into a “stable partner” with the thinking of Israeli advocates of the alternative 
bottom-up strategy. The same politician Nathan Sharansky argued: “[E]lections in a free 
society can never come at the beginning of a reform process. Invariably, such elections cannot 
be free because they will be held in an environment of fear and intimidation. Moreover, those 
elected in that type of environment will have absolutely no interest in reform”479.  
In summary, by means of the process-tracing and the congruence method, we sought to 
trace Tony Blair’s public discourse, and where possible private reasoning, from 2001 to 2005. 
We assumed that if his strategic approach prescribed the same “top-down” strategy, then we 
would claim that his beliefs were held constant. If at some hypothetical point, he claimed that 
“peace” will lead to “political agreement”, this would be an assertion of advocates of the 
bottom-up approach. In this case, we would assume that his instrumental beliefs had 
undergone changes, or we would seek an alternative explanation.  
But our data showed that causally he believed that “political agreement” should precede 
“peace” and change in the psychology of the Palestinians. This will help us assume we did not 
find the evidence disconfirming our central hypothesis Tony Blair has conserved his strategic 
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his years in Downing Street.  
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As we have already remarked we are applying two chief methods of analysis of a 
policy-maker’s operational code – the congruence method and the process-tracing. These both 
methods were identified by George to detect the impact of operational-code beliefs upon 
decisions. The "congruence" procedure establishes consistency "between the content of given 
beliefs and the content of the decision(s)”. The "process-tracing" procedure traces in detail the 
steps in the process wherein the beliefs influence the process of defining the situa- tion, 
identifying options and then evaluating them prior to choice480.  
In some works about policy-makers’ operational codes there are findings about the 
phenomenon of “incongruence”. One example is H. Starr’s analysis of Henry Kissinger’s 
operational code in his book Henry Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics481.  
Stephen G. Walker claims that H. Starr failed to confirm a hypothesized congruent 
relationship between Kissinger's perceptions and American foreign policy behaviour482. 
Kissinger concludes after an exhaustive statistical analysis: “[I]t is apparent that Kissinger's 
images are not congruent with American foreign-policy behavior. Although Kissinger was the 
dominant foreign-policy decision maker dur- ing the period under investigation, his words-
and the evaluative assertions that they contained - did not simply and directly reflect 
American behavior toward the Soviet Union and China”483.  
In our case-study, our data sources have also shown that at one point there has been 
incongruence between Tony Blair’s belief system and his chosen policy option. The 
“congruence” method invoked by George to establish an observed link between beliefs and 
behaviour was particularly helpful. In the previous sections we applied the method of 
“congruence” to Tony Blair’s beliefs from 2001 to 2006. 
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In 2004 while exploring Tony Blair’s response to the Israeli plan of disengagement, we 
have detected the incompatibility (“incongruence”) between the stated belief system and the 
observed political decision. This might suppose that there is a change in the belief system of 
Blair thus questioning the plausibility of our central hypothesis.  
But an inductive element to process tracing will help us elaborate a new hypothesis that 
Prime Minister Blair’s response is explained better not as a diagnostic change (learning 
explanation), but rather as a structural adjustment to the external environment (neorealist 
explanation). We discuss this issue in the section below. 
It is one the essential conditions of application of the process-tracing method. This 
technique involves examining the hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and its 
associated causal mechanisms predict should have taken place in a case, then determining 
whether the intervening variables along these pathways, or those predicted by alternative 
explanations, were in fact standing out in the case484. We formulate our third hypothesis: 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support of the Israeli plan was caused not by change of 
beliefs, but by the structural adjustment to the external environment. 
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DISENGAGEMENT PLAN 
 
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
was adopted by the government on June 6, 2004 and enacted in August 2005. Its objective 
was to remove all Israelis from the Gaza Strip and from four settlements in the northern West 
Bank. 
The proposal argued that the “State of Israel has reached the conclusion that there is 
currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral 
process”485. Since the Government believes that the "stalemate embodied in the current 
situation is damaging”, in order to break this stalemate it has decided to “initiate a process 
that is not dependent on cooperation with the Palestinians”486.  
By end of the 2003 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s confidant, future Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert had proposed a "formula for the parameters of a unilateral solution” which 
envisages “to maximize the number of Jews; to minimize the number of Palestinians; not to 
withdraw to the 1967 border and not to divide Jerusalem”.487 
He argued: "More and more Palestinians are uninterested in a negotiated, two-state 
solution, because they want to change the essence of the conflict from an Algerian paradigm 
to a South African one. From a struggle against `occupation,' in their parlance, to a struggle 
for one-man-one-vote. That is, of course, a much cleaner struggle, a much more popular 
struggle - and ultimately a much more powerful one. For us, it would mean the end of the 
Jewish state488.  
Another exponent of the plan Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's senior adviser Dov 
Weisglass explained that the “significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the 
peace process”489.  
His position was along the following lines: “And when you freeze that process, you 
prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, 
the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with 
all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda”490. 
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According to BBC, this top Israeli “official has claimed that Ariel Sharon's Gaza 
withdrawal plan was deliberately formulated to block peace negotiations with Yasser 
Arafat”491.  
In his interview for Haaretz, he described disengagement from Gaza in a much debated 
manner as "formaldehyde": "The disengagement is actually formaldehyde," he said. "It 
supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process 
with the Palestinians"492.  
Sussman in Middle East Report Online points our that the Israelis perceive an essential 
advantage of the plan in the sense that it “relieves the domestic pressure that demographic 
concerns place on Sharon. Israelis are obsessed with demography -- the relative percentages 
of Jews and non-Jews in the population of Israel-Palestine. Their fear of a declining Jewish 
majority has led to a dramatic paradigm shift, in which an independent Palestinian state and 
“the potential military threat from such a state” are viewed as the lesser evil. In giving up 
Gaza, Sharon readjusts the demographic balance and reduces domestic pressure for a 
comprehensive deal. Moreover, by removing Gaza from the equation he weakens the 
Palestinian hand in a later bargain493.  
Olmert has summarized his position: "There is no doubt in my mind that very soon the 
government of Israel is going to have to address the demographic issue with the utmost 
seriousness and resolve. This issue above all others will dictate the solution that we must 
adopt. In the absence of a negotiated agreement - and I do not believe in the realistic prospect 
of an agreement - we need to implement a unilateral alternative.494"   
 
Implications of the plan 
According to BBC, dhe danger is that the new arrangement will become crystallised 
without any further progress towards further Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, let alone moves 
to end the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Gaza would become a single Palestinian entity, but 
without controlling its own land or sea borders or airspace. Palestinians in the West Bank 
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might be enclosed in several cantons divided by the six settlement blocs that Mr Sharon has 
said he will hold onto495.  
But President Bush welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan for Israel to 
unilaterally disengage from some of the territories it occupied in 1967 as a "real contribution 
toward peace" and "real progress" toward accomplishing the U.S. vision of a two-state 
solution to the conflict496.  
After meeting Prime Minister Sharon in April 2004, President Bush made the following 
statement:  
“In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli 
populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will 
be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to 
negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that 
any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that 
reflect these realities”497. 
In the absence of a final peace settlement, the Palestinians primarily welcomed any 
military withdrawal from the occupied territories. But when top Israeli officials’ arguments 
were judged as implicit rejection of the international consensus on a two-state solution for 
Israel/Palestine, the Palestinian officials began opposing the plan.  
The Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat claimed: "This will be a major deviation to 
the road map and international law, and just add to the complexities and constitute a severe 
blow to the peace process"498. 
Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia criticised President Bush's stand: "He is the 
first president who has legitimised the settlements in the Palestinian territories when he said 
that there will be no return to the borders of 1967. […] We as Palestinians reject that, we 
cannot accept that, we reject it and we refuse it."  
Though the Palestinians supported the pull-out from Gaza, they argued that the 
existence of the settlements within the West Bank, linked by Israeli-controlled roads, would 
make a Palestinian state unviable499. 
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THE BRITISH RESPONSE  
Sharon’s argument was based on the assumption that there is currently no partner on the 
Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral process500. Involvement of the 
Palestinians in any way would have undercut his argument. He also preferred not to deal with 
any foreign government other than that of the United States501.   
Not only the US allies in the Arab world were kept in the dark, but so was the British 
ambassador, David Manning, who had previously served as Tony Blair’s foreign-policy 
adviser and, before that, as Britain’s ambassador to Israel502.   
 
The British Parliament 
In a Parliamentary report the members of the legislative body said:  
“We expressed our concern about such unilateral action, especially given the link with 
acceleration of Israel's construction of a security barrier in the West Bank”503.  
The report continued: “The key question regarding the plan for 'disengagement' is 
whether it is part of the Road Map process or a prelude to de facto annexation of occupied 
territory. We heard a great deal of scepticism about Prime Minister Sharon's willingness to 
implement meaningful withdrawals from the West Bank”504.   
In her written evidence to the Parliament Dr Rosemary Hollis, of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, wrote: “US President George Bush has endorsed Sharon's idea that his 
initiative involve a simultaneous consolidation of Israeli settlement blocs to the east of the 
'Green Line' that marks the pre-1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. If Sharon has 
his way, the area remaining to the Palestinians in the West Bank will not make for a viable, 
contiguous, independent Palestinian state that any Palestinian leadership could agree to”505. 
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Foreign policy adviser Dr Bar Yaacov advanced a similar prognosis in her written 
evidence:  
“Sharon and many of the Plan's supporters within his ruling Likud party view 
withdrawal from Gaza as a trade off for keeping a number of large West Bank settlement 
blocks under Israeli control and eventually Israeli sovereignty. This view was supported by 
statements made by Bush in mid-April after Sharon presented the Plan to him in 
Washington”506. 
Others expressed the opinion that Sharon’s plan could offer an opportunity for progress 
towards a peace settlement. Dr Ottolenghi suggested that in time, 'disengagement' could lead 
to the resumption of a political process: “Israel relinquishing territory, dismantling and 
evacuating settlements, removing troops from Gaza, are all steps that can help de-escalate the 
tension, reduce the pressure on the civilian populations and might create conditions for 
something to open up once the process is over”507.  
In a similar vein Dr Bar Yaacov also wrote that although “’disengagement’ is not part of 
the Roadmap, it, can be viewed as consistent with the principles of the Road Map… [and] If 
carried out intelligently, the Disengagement Plan could lead to a two State solution, as 
envisaged in the Road Map, but much will depend on what happens in Israel, Palestine, and 
on the nature and scope of the Third Party role”508.  
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
The Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated: “Gaza is of fundamental importance, if you 
were going to get what the whole of the international community seeks which is a withdrawal 
of Israel from the occupied territories which is Gaza and the West Bank”… Commenting on 
Israeli decision to withdraw Straw said: “That is a necessary but by no means sufficient step 
towards the creation of a viable Palestinian state”509. 
Jack Straw continued: “What we now have to do and the European Union Foreign 
Ministers will be discussing this later in Brussels today is to ensure that there is active support 
for the Palestinian authorities so there's not a vacuum left but opportunity, the opportunities 
that are created for the Palestinians by the Israelis' withdrawal are taken up, there's adequate 
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security, you then move to elections. And then to pick up your point about the West Bank, yes 
we have to ensure the process then continues”510.  
We sought to observe the opinion of the head of the Foreign Office in 2005 and 2006. In 
a joint press conference with the Quartet's Special Envoy to the Middle East, James 
Wolfensohn Foreign Secretary Jack Straw clarified his position about the state of the Middle 
East Roadmap:  
“[F]ar from assuming that the roadmap has been abandoned, the roadmap is alive, it is 
there and so is the Quartet which was the parent of the roadmap, and what we are all seeking 
to do is to ensure that the withdrawal from Gaza and from those four settlements in the North 
and West Bank is a first step on the way back to the roadmap which is there for one purpose 
only to make a reality out of the policy of the whole of the international community that there 
should be these two states, a secure State of Israel living alongside a separate and viable and 
secure State of Palestine511.  
A year later Jack Straw recalled:  
“As far as the withdrawal from Gaza was concerned, since there was, in a sense, a happy 
coincidence between the requirements of the Road Map (the withdrawal from Gaza) and the 
requirements of the policy then being pursued by the Israeli Government, I did not object to 
the withdrawal from Gaza because the withdrawal from Gaza has to happen if you are going 
to set up a separate and viable state of Palestine. In particular, I welcomed the decision by the 
Sharon Government to take down more settlements in the Gaza512.  
We have already discussed one of the essential documents made by officials of the 
Foreign Office calling for reconsideration and reassessment of Britain’s Middle East foreign 
policy. In a letter to Prime Minister Blair 52 former ambassadors letter criticised the prime 
minister for claiming influence over the US president, George Bush, and American policy, 
then backing the Israel policy when it was already "doomed to failure"513.  
Commenting on the British support of the disengagement plan the former ambassadors 
contended:  
                                                 
510
 Ibidem. 
511
 Transcript of a joint press conference by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the Quartet's 
Special Envoy to the Middle East, Jim Wolfensohn, London, June 23, 2005. 
512
 Oral evidence of Jack Straw to the Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, (The 
Stationery Office, 15 March 2006. 
513
 The Guardian, 26 April 2004. 
 162 
“Britain and the other sponsors of the road map merely waited on American leadership, 
but waited in vain. Worse was to come. After all those wasted months, the international 
community has now been confronted with the announcement by Ariel Sharon and President 
Bush of new policies which are one-sided and illegal and which will cost yet more Israeli and 
Palestinian blood. Our dismay at this backward step is heightened by the fact that you 
yourself seem to have endorsed it, abandoning the principles which for nearly four decades 
have guided international efforts to restore peace in the Holy Land and which have been the 
basis for such successes as those efforts have produced”514.  
 
THE POSITION OF TONY BLAIR  
To the surprise of many international and domestic actors, Prime Minister Blair gave his 
backing to the Israeli plan. Jack Straw admitted: “Tony Blair was one of the first European 
leaders to offer public support for the policy”515. 
A statement issued by Sharon's office said: "British prime minister Blair called to voice 
his support for the disengagement plan and his appreciation for the step Israel is taking. Blair 
added that he intends to work toward enlisting support for the plan among the international 
community”516. 
The following year in a message to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, regarding the Israeli 
disengagement, on 16 August 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair said: 
“As your Government carries out the historic step of 
disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, I would like to 
reiterate the British Government's full support for this historic step. I 
greatly admire the courage with which you have developed and 
implemented this policy. I believe you are right to see disengagement 
as an opportunity to pursue a better future for Israelis and Palestinians. 
I look forward to working with you to help achieve this, and to 
continuing working together towards a just and lasting peace, free 
from the scourge of terrorism”517. 
 
The support given by Tony Blair to the Israeli plan The Guardian judged as tantamount 
“to a turnaround in British Middle East policy” based on the assumption that until then the 
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country had “opposed unilateral withdrawal and remained committed to the idea of a peace 
settlement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians”518.  
This particular occasion requires for our more careful analytic approach. The British 
Prime Minister’s support of the Israeli disengagement plan can be analyzed by us either by 
means of learning theories or by the neorealist perspective. In the first case, we should be able 
to present evidence that the decision was preceded by reassessment of cognitive beliefs about 
optimal strategies applied to the peace process. This would invalidate our central hypothesis 
that Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. 
If we explain the event from the neorealist standpoint, then we can claim that the British 
response reflects the need to accept structural changes in the region and not reconsideration of 
basic principles of a negotiated solution to which the country was committed. Therefore, we 
need to provide evidence that Tony Blair’s change of policy was not accompanied or caused 
by the change in cognitive characteristics. 
Here, draw on the definition given to the concept “causal learning” and “diagnostic 
learning” by Jack Levy. "Causal learning" refers to changing beliefs about the laws 
(hypotheses) of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the optimal strategies under 
various conditions. "Diagnostic learning" refers to changes in beliefs about the definition of 
the situation or the preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others519.  
We have studied 22 speeches, interviews, press conferences of Tony Blair which were 
made in 2004 and 2005. The empirical database is complemented by such official sources as 
the position of the British Foreign Office (comments, a press conference, and oral evidence by 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw) and of the British Parliament (Foreign Policy Aspects of the 
War against Terrorism, Seventh Report of Session 2003–04 of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the House of Commons). 
Private interviews of biographer Anthony Seldon with Colin Powell and Condoleezza 
Rice provide us with outsiders’ insight into the disengagement decisions. In addition we have 
found recollections of Tony Blair’s disengagement decisions in his 2010 memoirs A Journey. 
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Below we show Tony Blair’s official position from extracts of speeches and interview 
sources dating to April 16, April 17, May 25, October 25, June 15, and July 22, 2004 (see the 
list in the Bibliography).  
Since by the time of Israeli disengagement the Roadmap was the leading international 
document, in which were summarized essential principles, we looked at Tony Blair’s new 
attitude towards the Roadmap. In his press conference on April 17, 2004 Tony Blair argued 
that the Israeli action “does not annihilate the Roadmap”520.   
In case of cognitive learning, we need to infer alterations in Blair’s beliefs about the 
definition of the situation, preferences and relative capabilities of the relevant actors. Though 
the disengagement plan was launched after Israel had concluded that the Palestinians were not 
a peace partner, we sought information whether Tony Blair shared the similar view.  
Our data did not show us that Tony Blair admitted that the Palestinian institutions were 
not regarded peace partner any more. At least, at the public level we failed to find 
reassessment of his beliefs about the Palestinian capabilities that would alter his cognitive 
vision.  
Instead the assumption behind the Israeli decision reinforced the belief of Blair to 
further strengthen and empower the Palestinian institutions. In his statement on April 17 2004 
he called to “help the Palestinians start to build […] the beginnings of a proper viable 
state”521. 
So, unable to show reassessment of cognitive beliefs about the peace process, now we 
seek to explain the phenomenon from a different viewpoint. We came to the conclusion that 
Prime Minister Blair’s response is the outcome of structural adjustment and not of cognitive 
learning.  
Hence, we re-establish our hypothesis which suggests:  
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
In addition to this central of our Case-study I, we have developed our next hypothesis: 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support of the Israeli plan was caused not by change of 
beliefs, but by the structural adjustment to the external environment. 
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Therefore, if Tony Blair’s beliefs are unaltered, this also implies, that analytically we 
can continue analyzing his behaviour by means of the cognitive dissonance theory, as we 
have been making.  
First of all, we start by recollections of US and British officials shown in the book of 
Tony Blair’s biographer Anthony Seldon. These data show that Tony Blair’s backing of the 
initiative was an unexpected step for certain member of the US administration. According to 
Seldon, “When Blair himself arrived at the White House on 16 April, his support for Sharon’s 
disengagement plan gratified some on the American side. ‘I was happy that Blair was backing 
our position, but curious. I just couldn’t understand why he would do this,’ recalled Colin 
Powell. “It seemed to me that Bush and Blair were drawn together by some force”522.  
To Condoleezza Rice, the situation was a little simpler: “The Prime Minister knew we 
were right, so he came in to help us”523. 
But British officials privately asserted that, in fact, Blair’s support for Sharon was less 
fulsome than some suggested at the time524. Nevertheless, the media played it as if he 
supported the whole Bush/Sharon line, which we did not’, recalled one senior one of Blair525. 
In addition, according to The Guardian, when Ariel Sharon announced his plan for a 
unilateral withdrawal, the Foreign Office “expressed hostility, seeing it as a potential source 
of continued instability in the region”526. 
 
Tony Blair supported the plan on the condition that it was consistent with Roadmap 
From the standpoint of cognitive dissonance theory the Israeli plan of unilateral 
disengagement constitutes dissonance. The theory posits that the existence of dissonance, 
being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance 
and achieve consonance. Thus, according to the predictions of the theory, Tony Blair will try 
to seek facts and opinions to support the view that disengagement is not harmful for the 
general peace process. 
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We have consulted 22 speeches, interviews, press conferences of Tony Blair which were 
made in 2004 and 2005 to show his efforts to reduce the cognitive dissonance which came 
into being in front of the necessity to formulate a political response to the Israeli decision. 
First of all, to avoid the consequences of persistent dissonance we saw that Tony Blair 
presented the disengagement as an opportunity to be seized:  
“I just think what is important in the situation that exists at the 
moment out in the Middle East is that we don’t do anything that now 
damages the possibility of the disengagement from Gaza and parts of 
the West Bank, the offer that has been made by Israel, having a 
beneficial effect in the Middle East, that is all I am saying. … And all I 
would say to you is that I think as to whether the Palestinians are 
prepared to take advantage of the offer that Israel has made, I can only 
say to you we will try and help to make sure that they do take 
advantage of that so that they are building the right as I say political 
and security and economic infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority, 
that they can take advantage of it and move the situation forward”527.  
 
It is noteworthy, that the US President Bush expressed the similar cognition: 
“I think this is a fantastic opportunity. The fact that Ariel Sharon said, "We're going to 
withdraw from territory," is an historic moment. And it creates a chance for the world to come 
together to help develop a Palestinian state based upon a solid foundation, a foundation where 
the institutions are bigger than the people, just like our respective Governments are founded. 
It's a chance to provide a framework for international aid that will help a Palestinian economy 
grow”. 
 
Now look at Figure 10 below.  
It is based on causal relations between concepts and phenomena extracted from 
Transcript of an interview of Prime Minister Tony Blair, BBC Radio, 17 April 2004. 
The original text says: 
“I don't understand when people say this annihilates the 
Roadmap. Of course it doesn't it actually give you an opportunity to 
get back into the Roadmap process”528.  
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This is a mixed image of the cognitive mapping of Tony Blair and another hypothetical 
actor. We remind that at its core cognitive mapping is concerned with two types of causal 
relationships: (1) positive or generating causes, and (2) negative or inhibiting causes529.  
In this figure Information 1 reflects the cognition of those actors who assert that the 
disengagement plan “annihilates” the Roadmap.  For this, reason the concepts in it are linked 
with the connector “-“.  
Tony Blair’s discourse shows that in his opinion the Israeli plan offers an opportunity to 
get back into the Roadmap process. Since in his conception disengagement has “generating 
causes” on the Roadmap, we have connected these two concepts through “+”.  
The following important cognitive step along the path of dissonance reduction is 
emphasis on the merits of the option, as predicted by Proposition 6: 
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“Now, forgive me, but I've been dealing with this for almost a 
decade. And it's been very, very difficult ever to get a situation where 
an Israeli Prime Minister is prepared to say, we're actually going to 
take these settlements away -- and make that not conditional on 
something that the Palestinians are doing, but say, we're just going to 
do that”530. 
 
Further, as was pointed out by Jervis, that the basis of dissonance theory lies in the 
postulate that people seek strong justification for their behaviour. They are not content to 
believe merely that they behaved well and chose wisely – if these were the case they only 
have to maintain the beliefs that produced their decisions. Instead people want to minimize 
their internal conflict531. (Proposition 3)   
In this regard, cognitive dissonance approach suggests that the person may also search 
out additional information supporting his decision and find new reasons for acting as he did 
and will avoid, distort, or derogate new dissonant information532.  
Later in October 2004 Tony Blair supported his decision by showing his perception that 
over time other people came to support the same policy. From the cognitive dissonance 
standpoint, this is a necessary step to reduce other actors’ earlier disagreement with his 
option. 
“There was a lot of scepticism when I think back in April at the 
press conference at the White House I said that I thought that Prime 
Minister Sharon’s proposals to disengage from the Gaza and parts of 
the West Bank were actually an important opportunity. I think people 
are beginning to understand they are an important opportunity, and 
what is necessary is to make sure from the international community 
that we have the infrastructure there on the Palestinian side to be able 
to run the parts that will be disengaged from so that we can get back 
into a proper negotiated peace process in the Middle East. And when 
that disengagement happens, […] it will allow us on the right terms to 
start building the security infrastructure of the Palestinians, their 
political, their economic structures that are necessary, so that they can 
show that the end proposition of a viable Palestinian state can actually 
come about”533. 
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Our data show that he continued his efforts to reduce dissonance by urging the 
international community to take advantage of the opportunity and to engage in supporting the 
Palestinian capability to handle the situation:  
“[A]ll I’m saying to people is if Israel does indeed disengage and 
remove the settlements on the Gaza, then that is a situation into which 
the international community should move, and then give the 
Palestinians the support in order to start the process of creating a 
viable Palestinian State without in any way, and let me emphasise this, 
prejudging the final status negotiations. Those negotiations should 
happen without any prejudging at all”534.  
 
Succeeding tracing of his speeches and interviews shoed the expression of the same 
reasoning on another occasion:   
“If the Israelis, as they've now said they will do, unilaterally and 
unconditionally disengage from the Gaza, dismantle the settlements 
there, I think there's around about seven thousand people in 
settlements there, turn over all the equipment, withdraw again 
unilaterally from parts of the West Bank. That is not a final negotiated 
solution but surely the sensible reaction is for the international 
community to say to the Palestinians right we will now help you 
economically, politically in security terms build the beginnings of a 
Palestinian Authority capable of wielding power and running a 
Palestinian state”535. 
 
The official Palestinian position considered unilateral disengagement as “a major 
deviation to the road map and international law, and just add to the complexities and 
constitute a severe blow to the peace process"536. 
According to BBC, these positions pre-empt the international peace plan known as the 
roadmap, which stipulates negotiations to decide all the so-called final status issues - refugees 
and settlements, as well as permanent borders and the status of Jerusalem537. 
Cognitive approaches suggest that in search of additional information supporting the 
taken decision, the policy-maker will find new reasons for acting as he did and will avoid, 
distort, or derogate new dissonant information. Hence, Blair is expected to counteract this 
discrepant information that the Roadmap will be violated by the Sharon plan 
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A British diplomatic official said that Blair's support was not a shift of policy, but was 
little more than "stating the obvious." The official also said Britain welcomed disengagement 
"as long as it is consistent with the road map, and contributes to a lasting two-state 
solution”538.  
According to a statement issued from Sharon's office, Blair said the disengagement plan 
needed to spur the international community to improve conditions inside the Palestinian 
Authority, and to make it clear to the Palestinians that they needed to reform and fight terror.  
In a similar vein Blair continued: 
“Now you can have a big debate about it and the Palestinians and 
a lot of the Arab world will voice their concerns. My point is rather 
different though, I don't understand when people say this annihilates 
the Roadmap. Of course it doesn't it actually give you an opportunity 
to get back into the Roadmap process. Because the thing that is 
holding us back from getting back into the Roadmap process is the 
absence of a proper security plan that allows us then to judge whether 
the first steps to be undertaken in the Roadmap are in fact being 
undertaken”539.  
 
To enhance the value of his option, as is predicted by cognitive dissonance approaches, 
he continued to present the Roadmap as the “only” internationally legitimate means of 
achieving the tow-state solution.  
“We reaffirm that this is part of a process to get us back into the 
road map, which we continue to believe offers the only realistic route 
to the two states, Israel and Palestinian, living side-by-side in 
peace”540.   
 
The British Parliamentary report also mentions that the Government wrote has stated: 
“The Prime Minister has made clear that all final status issues, including borders and 
refugees, must be agreed in negotiations between the two parties. He also reiterated the need 
to get back to the roadmap, which offers the best route to the vision of two states, Israel and 
Palestine, living side by side in peace. We have reiterated this with our EU partners and hope 
that the forthcoming Quartet meeting will do the same”541. 
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Significantly, to minimise the dissonance concerning debates about the impact of the 
Sharon plan on the pursuit of the Roadmap, Tony Blair explicitly articulated his position that 
the Disengagement is not regarded by him as a substitute for the Roadmap: 
“And therefore, no of course it's, it's not the Roadmap but it's a 
way into the Roadmap, and it's not a final negotiated settlement but it's 
at least an opportunity to get going on the business of building a 
state”542. 
 
On another occasion he also claimed:  
“I do think what is important is that we try and take the first steps 
to get back into the road map process, but that has got to be done by 
security measures and that is what we are working on now, and it has 
also got to be stressed of course that the disengagement from the Gaza 
and parts of the West Bank is not the conclusion of the final status 
negotiations”543. 
 
After all this debate on disengagement, his cognition has incorporated disengagement 
and now looks like this:  
“And we have, I know people are very down about the Middle 
East, perfectly understandably and rightly, but we have the chance to 
make progress if we have a proper security plan and if Israel then 
proceeds with the disengagement proposals, which it must do in my 
view and with the full version of those proposals”544.  
 
As was already noted, for this section we have complemented speeches and interviews 
of Prime Minsiter with the position of the British Foreign Office (through Jack Straw’s 
comments and a press conference), as well as of the British Parliament (Foreign Policy 
Aspects of the War against Terrorism Report). In addition we have found recollections of 
Tony Blair’s disengagement decisions in his 2010 memoirs A Journey. 
At the same time we acknowledge we were unable to use private interviews and earlier 
unpublished sources, as was possible in previous sections. We suppose that this may be partly 
explained by the fact that the period under our investigation is brief and the events can be 
reconstructed mainly drawing on primary public sources. 
The analysis of the available data show us, at least public sources, that Tony Blair 
assumed this event as an opportunity to be seized by the international community. He 
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believed that disengagement constituted an advantage to improve political, security and 
economic infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority. Finally, Blair accepted the plan as long 
as it was consistent with the principles of the road map. 
For our analytic purposes we assumed that Prime Minister Blair’ support of the Israeli 
disengagement could be analyzed by us either by means of learning theories or by the 
neorealist perspective.  
In the first case, we needed to have some evidence that the decision was preceded by 
reassessment of cognitive beliefs about optimal strategies applied to the peace process. In this 
case, such finding would show that our central hypothesis that Tony Blair’s Premiership has 
triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was not 
correct. 
If we explained the event from the neorealist standpoint, then we could claim that the 
British response reflected not the need to reconsider beliefs by the Prime Minister, but the 
need to accept structural changes in the region and not reconsideration of basic principles of a 
negotiated solution to which the country was committed. Therefore, we needed to provide 
evidence that Tony Blair’s change of policy was not accompanied or caused by the change in 
cognitive characteristics. 
Our data did not show that Tony Blair had reassessed the importance of the Roadmap 
(“causal learning”) or acquired a new experience that the Palestinian capacities did not match 
creation of the Palestinian state (“diagnostic learning”)   
In his memoirs A Journey he wrote: 
“Whereas the international community, in its usual purblind way, 
saw disengagement from Gaza as a ‘unilateral’ Israeli act and therefore 
wrong, I was emphatic that it could be presented as lifting the 
occupation and removing settlements”545.  
 
Further he continues: 
“For all the problems, therefore, we had no serious option but to 
go with it”546.   
 
As Levy points out, the structural adjustment model suggests that all actors with 
identical preferences and information in identical circumstances will respond in the same way 
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to environmental change, whereas the learning model posits differences in perceptions of 
environmental change and therefore in behavioral response547.  
Structural approaches call our attention to incentives in the international environment 
for particular types of policies. It is posited that governments respond in a rational manner to 
the reward and punishment contingencies of the international environment548. 
The United States has unequivocally supported the Sharon plan. The European states 
have given backing to the plan as part of the road map for peace as well. Tony Blair, as our 
data, show accepted this broadly joined initiative despite numerous and multifaceted debates. 
In this section we have dealt with the phenomenon that operational code scholarship 
calls “incongruence” between operational beliefs and behaviour. Despite this fact, we can 
argue that Tony Blair has not manifested cognitive change during his Prime Minister years, at 
least up to January 2006.   
To show the validity of this argument we needed to address several important analytical 
differences between the concepts of “learning” or change of belief, and “structural 
adjustment”.  
Levy claims that some equate learning with policy change. Others fail to differentiate 
learning from alternative sources of policy change (including structural adjustment, 
evolutionary selection, and political change) or to specify the interaction effects among these 
different variables549.  
He also pointed out that certain scholars fail to differentiate between genuine learning 
and the rhetorical or strategic use of historical lessons to advance current preferences or fail to 
construct research designs that expedite the empirical distinction between these causal 
processes550.  
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More specifically, on the one hand, neorealist scholars posit that governments respond 
in a rational (or, at least, reasonable) manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of 
the international environment551. 
On the other hand, cognitive learning scholars want to explore the psychological, 
institutional, and political processes that lead governments to define their interests in certain 
ways and to adopt certain policies in pursuit of those interests552. 
In our doctoral study we are interested in detecting through various techniques whether 
changes in political decisions of Tony Blair are due to neorealist adjustment to the 
circumstances or whether they are caused by profound cognitive changes in causal diagnosis. 
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Some people regarded that striving for a two-state outcome manifested by Tony Blair 
was a position necessitated by the political circumstances. They thought that this position is 
ephemeral and is more a bargaining than a genuine aspiration to contribute to a final 
resolution. Blair’s biographer wrote that certain members of Prime Minister Sharon’s cabinet 
“dismissed Bush’s new-found enthusiasm [publication of the Roadmap] as a mere transitory 
reward to Blair for Iraq”553.   
The Guardian wrote that the unpopularity at home and abroad of his ally's reliance on 
overwhelming firepower will make it even more essential for Tony Blair to obtain something 
in return for his support. The first test will be whether it is possible for him to engage the 
Bush administration in a serious effort to secure peace for the troubled peoples of Israel and 
Palestine554.  
Others claimed Tony Blair was pursuing the Palestinian cause simply for reasons of 
dealing with the dissonant opinion of members of his Cabinet. For instance, The Guardian 
wrote: “Tony Blair desperately needs it published to help neutralise those in his cabinet and 
party, and in the wider public, who complain that instead of concentrating on Iraq the US and 
Britain should make the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict their priority”555.  
In this section our objective is to propose one of possible answers to the question: 
Would have Tony Blair promoted creation of the Palestinian state if military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq had not occurred? Put differently, was his commitment to creation of the 
Palestinian state made for tactical reasons? 
The method which we seek to explain this phenomenon is the counterfactual analysis. 
In his study on counterfactual conditionals James Fearon points out, that these counterfactual 
propositions usually take the generic form “If it had been the case that C (or not C), it would 
have been the case that E (or not E)”556. 
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Bennett also elaborates on counterfactuals: “Counterfactual analysis inverts the standard 
mode of inference for empirical testing of assertions such as “x in a specified case was 
necessary for y.” This assertion poses a logically equivalent counterfactual, namely, “if not x 
had occurred in the case, then not-y would have occurred”557. 
Scholars dealing with this method usually ask the question whether a counterfactual 
argument a viable means of assessing causal hypotheses in non-experimental research 
settings? But our purpose is neither to advocate the use of counterfactual argument in 
preference to comparisons with other actual cases not to suggest that the counterfactual 
strategy is fundamentally implausible or has no value in principle558.  
Fearon claims that arguments in the counterfactual strategy are made credible (1) by 
invoking general principles, theories, laws or regularities distinct from the hypothesis being 
tested; and (2) by drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a counterfactual 
scenario559.  
Hence, we think that careful counterfactual research in our empirical case should make 
an explicit effort to reconstruct institutional and individual determinants of the UK position:  
a) the position of formal British foreign policy-related institutions over Israeli-
Palestinian peace process; 
 b) strategic beliefs of Tony Blair about the issue prior to and during his Premiership. 
This might allow us to speculate whether the Blair Government would give a public 
backing to creation of the Palestinian state (as it did on October 15, 2001), if September 11 
had not occurred. We consciously called it “speculation”, because counterfactual argument, as 
Odell argues, is only speculation, though quite common, often not explicit, throughout 
scholarship and political debate560.  
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INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MODES OF ANALYSIS 
There is often a divide posited between individual and institutional modes of analysis in 
political science. Individualists attribute great importance to the personal characteristics and 
motivations of prominent actors within the political process. Institutionalists, by contrast, 
argue that configurations of formal political organizations and informal norms shape and 
structure interests, behavior and political outcomes. This divide has been prevalent in most 
sub-fields of the discipline, and has certainly been influential in shaping studies of decision 
making in the British central government561.  
The “rediscovery of institutions”, which swept political science from the mid 1980s 
onward, refocused the debate from the influence of individuals and onto their relative 
insignificance when set against organizational structures, values and practices which were 
transmitted from government to government562.  
The strongest version of this argument suggests that political life can be understood as 
"a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, 
and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively 
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals”563.  
However, there have been prominent arguments which suggest taking simultaneously an 
individual micro perspective and an institutional macro perspective approach to the study of 
executives and decision making564. 
Many individualists now recognize the significance of institutional factors, and argue 
that these should be incorporated explicitly into conceptual models. Indeed, the political 
psychologist Paul Hart suggests that a consideration of factors such as institutional norms and 
structured interactions is critical to a credible account of central government decision making:  
                                                 
561
 Stephen Dyson and Brianna K. Lawrence, “Blair's War: Institutional and Individual 
Determinants of the British Choice in Iraq”, Prepared for Presentation at the 46th Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii. 1st-5th March 2005 
562
 Ibidem. 
563
 See James P. March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Political Life”. The American Political Science Review, 78 (1984): 741.)  
564
  Anthony King, “Executives” in Handbook of Political Science, Vol.5, ed. F. Greenstein 
and N. Polsby. (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975): 173-255; Pika, Joseph. “Moving 
Beyond the Oval Office: Problems in Studying the Presidency” Congress and the Presidency 
9 (1981-1982): 17-36; Edwards, George C. and Wayne, Stephen J. Studying the Presidency. 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); Rhodes, 1995 ref in Rhodes and 
Dunleavy). (Source: Stephen Dyson and Brianna K. Lawrence, “Blair's War: Institutional and 
Individual Determinants of the British Choice in Iraq) 
 178 
Social and political psychologists cannot afford to ignore the broader institutional forces 
that govern the perceptions, calculations, and behavior of real-world policy makers. They do 
so at the risk of arriving at reductionist explanations and identifying all sorts of biases, 
irrationalities, and information-processing pathologies, whereas seasoned observers of 
organizational and political behavior, who are more aware of meso-level considerations and 
constraints, and of paradigms of governance that do not accord a central place to its problem-
solving and information-processing functions, would find these conclusions to be both overly-
simplistic and normatively crude565.  
At the same time, many institutionalists are aware of the dangers of structural 
determinism, and stress that while organizational structures and informal norms constrain 
actors, these constraints are contingent and partial, and therefore provide opportunities for 
individual agency566. March and Olsen indicate a preference for a theory sensitive to “a rather 
complicated intertwining of institutions, individuals, and events”567. 
Burch and Holliday indicate the necessity to “avoid either of the extreme positions 
which state on the one hand that the individual is the key determinant of political outcomes 
and on the other that structural factors are decisively important ... Individuals occupying 
positions and having access to resources...operate in structured situations within which 
constantly shifting opportunities for significant action arise. The key task is to identify the 
conditions under which individual action can be significant”568. 
 
In institutional terms, the Prime Ministership is not a command position, and Blair’s 
policy preference does not automatically become the foreign policy of the British state. Blair 
faced unease and some outright opposition within the core executive institution regarding Iraq 
policy. He was forced to allow more open Cabinet discussion than he would have liked, and 
had to carefully manage the decision making process569. 
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The so-called core executive approach conceptualizes the British central government as 
an interactive and dynamic group of Prime Minister, Ministers, civil servants, advisers, and 
departments, each constrained by constitutional and organizational structures, and each 
possessed of certain resources and with agency to use them in varying ways570.  
From this perspective, decision making is ill explained by abstractions such as ‘Prime 
Ministerial’ or ‘Cabinet’ government, as "power is everywhere and understood through the 
language of dependence, networks, governance, and choice"571.  
For his part, Rhodes defines the core executive as the complex web of institutions, 
networks and practices surrounding the Prime Minister, Cabinet, Cabinet committees and 
their official counterparts, less formalised ministerial 'clubs' of meetings, bilateral 
negotiations and interdepartmental committees. It also includes coordinating departments, 
chiefly the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the law officers, and the security 
and intelligence services572.  
These various parts of the core executive have fluid relationships to one another. 
Crucially, each has resources, but none has the resources (information, authority, control of an 
organization, finance) to achieve their goals unilaterally. This means that the core executive is 
characterized by an irreducible mutual dependence. The dependence dynamics and wider 
operation of the executive are determined by three factors: the structure of the interaction 
between parts of the core executive; the resources possessed by each part of the core 
executive; and the manner in which the various actors exercise individual agency, both in 
using their resources and acting to increase them573.  
Core executive relations are also structured by the formal and informal rules and norms 
of the central state. These rules are a central feature of institutional analysis, and not only 
constrain in negative terms but also structure action in a positive sense, as they are 
internalized by actors through processes of socialization574.  
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As Burch and Holliday note, "like other established institutions, the British central 
executive has developed accepted modes of behaviour, which limit options available to 
individuals"575.  
 
"Diplomatic" and "Strategic" approach of the British Government  
According to the Israeli perception, the British policy towards Israeli and Palestinian 
politics is defined by two very different, often clashing approaches to the region. The first, 
which can be termed the "Diplomatic" approach, is based on maintaining the best possible 
relations with the existing regimes or those forces which seem likely to take power576. 
Advocates of this viewpoint stress the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as quickly as 
possible, regarding this conflict as the key source of regional instability. This approach is seen 
to be prevalent in the minds and discourse of officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office577.  
The second approach, termed as the "Strategic" view, puts more emphasis on dividing 
Middle Eastern regimes into moderate and hostile ones. It assumes that aggressive, anti-
Western governments and belief systems--radical Pan-Arab nationalism; revolutionary 
Islamism--are the principle threats to regional stability and to British interests. Viewing the 
Diplomatic approach as often tending toward appeasement, it is more willing to use pressure 
or even confrontation when deemed necessary”. This approach was often present in the 
discourse and calculations of the Prime Minister's Office578.  
Diplomatic and Strategic schools and produce opposing policy recommendations. The 
first view argues that a given regime's ideology or expressed anti-Western intentions are of 
less importance, as these need not be taken seriously or can be blunted by friendly 
accommodation. The second orientation, by contrast, considers that since regional tyrannies 
tend to rely on instability, adventurism, and support for terrorism and insurgency as tools for 
legitimating themselves, they will inevitably undermine stability. The Diplomatic stance 
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charges the Strategic approach with creating unnecessary conflicts; the Strategic stance 
accuses the Diplomatic approach of appeasement579.  
 
Foreign Office  
Israeli political circles and media frequently characterize the British Foreign Office as 
"unrelentingly pro-Palestinian"; Spyer suggests that “in the FCO's organizational culture, the 
norm is one of a general lack of sympathy for Israel”580. These critics also make reference to 
the famous April 2004 letter signed by 52 former senior British diplomats who have worked 
in the Middle East. Criticizing Tony Blair’s Middle East policy, former diplomats of the FCO 
claimed: “Britain and the other sponsors of the road map merely waited on American 
leadership, but waited in vain”581.  
In 2005 a confidential Foreign Office document, according to The Guardian, accused 
Israel “of illegally expanding Jewish settlements and routing the West Bank barrier to prevent 
east Jerusalem from becoming the Palestinian capital”582. 
Describing the FCO draft as "anti-Israeli", the Israeli side claimed: “Britain makes more 
formal protests to Israel over its actions in the occupied territories than any other country”583. 
The same issue of The Guardian quoted an Israeli source: "We are not in the slightest bit 
surprised that this should have come from the British. On the one hand they always say they 
understand Israel's problems and want to be an intermediary and on the other they are 
accusing us and attempting to embarrass us. They cannot be trusted”584. 
 
The British Parliament  
There is a wide assumption inside Israel that the British are more biased towards the 
Palestinians. In 2010 Israel's president, Shimon Peres accused some British MPs of 
“pandering to anti-Israel sentiment among their Muslim voters”, claiming there is a "deeply 
pro-Arab" core in the UK establishment585.  
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President Peres noted: "There are several million Muslim voters [in the UK]. And for 
many members of parliament, that's the difference between getting elected and not getting 
elected”586. 
In summary, Israeli analysts characterize these British institutions as advocates of the 
view that regards Israel as a factor--often as the main factor--preventing smooth relations 
between the West and Arab world. They place great stock in the priority that Arab states say 
they and their masses put on this issue. Israel is thus seen as the cause rather than one of the 
victims of radicalism, instability, and anti-Western feeling in the Arab world587.   
 
BRITISH POSITION IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN 
 PEACE PROCESS 
 
We have already remarked that beginning from the mid 1980s onward, much academic 
debate has been refocused from the influence of individuals onto the role of organizational 
structures, values and practices successively transmitted from government to government.   
Although the first public backing of creation of the Palestinian state internationally 
came into being when Tony Blair’s Government was in power, it was not the first British 
government which supported a comprehensive settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.  
The Blair Government was successor to the previous governments that had been 
participant and supporter of all the key processes in the European strategy towards the peace 
process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Knowledge of these facts and processes is 
essential for the analysis of policies of the Blair Government that has continued the 
agreements and understandings reached by preceding administrations.  
In their declarations, the EU and its member states have been supporting a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict through a two-state solution to its 
Israeli–Palestinian dimension based on the relevant Security Council resolutions, the 
principles of the 1991 Madrid Conference, and the Quartet’s 2003 road map (“Performance-
based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict”)588. 
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Prior to that, in June 1980 the EC decided to issue the Venice Declaration which 
formulated a clear European policy towards the Arab/Israeli conflict and set out principles for 
initiating a Middle East peace process589.  
At the time, thirteen years before Israel recognized the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization as its negotiating partner in the Declaration of Principles of 1993, the EC’s 
defence of the principle of self-determination implicitly recognised the Palestinians’ right to 
aspire to a state alongside Israel and was the basis for the EU’s support for a negotiated two-
state solution. In asserting this, the European Community was well in advance of the 
prevailing international consensus on the principles to be adopted towards resolving the 
conflict. This aroused criticism in particular from the US, opposed to recognising the PLO on 
the grounds of its role as a terrorist organisation590.  
Under the Barcelona Process, the EU has expanded economic and political contact with 
ten Mediterranean partners, including both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, signing an 
Association Agreement with Israel in 1995 and an Interim Association Agreement with the 
Palestinian Authority in 1997. In addition, as part of its European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP), the EU has developed an EU/Israel Action Plan and an EU/Palestinian Authority 
Action Plan to increase ties591. 
Great Britain is also part of the 1994 Essen Declaration, in which the EU “expressed the 
expectation that Israel would enjoy special relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity 
and common interest. This has translated into stronger relations between Israel and the EU in 
trade, exchange between peoples, culture, research, and other fields than with any other 
eastern or southern Mediterranean partner”592.  
In its 1999 Berlin Declaration the EU for the first time explicitly stated the reasoning 
behind the policies it had already been pursuing since the beginning of the Oslo process: the 
establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful, and sovereign Palestinian state next to Israel 
would be the best guarantee for the security of Israel as well as for Israel’s recognition as a 
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respected partner in the region. This would include a fair solution to the issue of Jerusalem 
and a just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee question. The position was 
complemented by the 2002 Seville Declaration, in which the EU stressed that the 1967 
borders should be the basis for a final Israeli–Palestinian settlement, if necessary with minor 
adjustments agreed to by the parties593.   
In 2002, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo Process, the Danish presidency of the EU 
drafted and gained EU-wide support for a new ‘Road Map’ approach as a framework for 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations towards the goal of a two-state solution. Since President 
Bush’s commitment to a two-state outcome in 2002, and the acceptance by the US of the 
Road Map, this position also represents the international consensus594.  
 
INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS  
As was already stated, in our counterfactual analysis we are seeking to offer one of 
possible answers to the question: Would have Tony Blair promoted creation of the Palestinian 
state if military action in Afghanistan and Iraq had not occurred? Put differently, was his 
commitment to creation of the Palestinian state made for tactical reasons? 
We draw on James Fearon’s claim that arguments in the counterfactual strategy are 
made credible (1) by invoking general principles, theories, laws or regularities distinct from 
the hypothesis being tested; and (2) by drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a 
counterfactual scenario595.  
For this reason, in our counterfactual empirical case we attempt to reconstruct individual 
and institutional determinants of the UK position:  
a) the position of formal British foreign policy-related institutions over Israeli-
Palestinian peace process; 
b) strategic beliefs of Tony Blair about the issue prior to and during his Premiership. 
In the preceding lines we have explored the perceptions of British foreign policy 
institutions about the peace process prior to and during Tony Blair’s Premiership. We have 
focused on organizational structures as determining individual behaviour. Although these 
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modes of behavior "shape and steer" core executive operations, however, a space for 
individual agency is reserved: "rules are always partial, and the process of applying them is 
always compromised. Scope for individual initiative always exists"596. 
Smith also holds that even when “faced with what are seen as irreducible structural 
forces, there is still room for maneuver, and structural forces provide opportunities as well as 
constraints”597.  
Now, we will seek to establish a historical chain of events preceding and following 
September 11, in which we can see with some degree of confidence the expression of Tony 
Blair’s beliefs about a Palestinian state irrespective of military action in Afghanistan and in 
Iraq.  
 
Data  
In order to see core beliefs of Tony Blair about the Israeli-Palestinian process before his 
election as Labour leader and from 1997 until 9/11, we use recollections of his closest aides 
that were interviewed by Anthony Seldon for his book Blair Unbound.  
Another biographer Con Coughlin (American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror) 
also provides us with important primary sources. In these books the authors have interviewed 
a number of Cabinet members, Tony Blair’s closest aides and confidants, as well as certain 
officials of the Bush administration. From these interviews we extract private recollections of 
the officials about Tony Blair’s thinking process, which turn out to be helpful in comparing 
with the public discourse.   
Similarly, Tony Blair’s Personal Envoy to the Middle East Lord Michael Levy provides 
us with ample primary materials in his memoirs “A question of honour” (2008). We found this 
source to be indispensable to reconstruct the dynamics of Tony Blair’s attitude to the peace 
process in three periods of analysis: in opposition as Labour leader; from 1997 until 
September 11, 2001; and post-911 period.   
Among secondary sources on which we draw in this section is the the book of John 
Kampfner, Blair's wars (2004). Finally, we complement the analysis by extracts from public 
speeches of Tony Blair, from oral evidence given by his Cabinet members for the Iraq Inquiry 
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in 2009-2010. This approach will help us explore the cognitive thinking of Prime Minister 
Blair revealed through the public recollections of insiders of the decision-making processes.  
 
In this part of our case study we suggest an important cautionary caveat. Imagine we 
apply the proposition: “if A had not occurred, B would not have occurred”. It means we are 
committing ourselves to saying that A was a cause of B.  
If we attribute an independent role to the context of military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, then we will have the proposition: “if A had not occurred, B would not have 
occurred”, i.e., military action was the cause of Blair’s beliefs about the Middle East peace 
process. In fact, in our counterfactual analysis we do not put “military action” as cause 
leading to Tony Blair’s support of creation of the Palestinian state (effect). The context of 
military operation is not the “cause”, but an essential “condition” which is located between 
the “cause” (structural context) and the “outcome” (belief system of the agent). 
That is why we precise that in our counterfactual analysis we focus on the structure 
which includes not only the initial condition (institutional context of premiership) and the 
outcome (belief system), but importantly an intervening variable: context of coalition 
formation around military strategy in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Our proposition is formulated 
as follows: 
A has led to B through C. 
Would A have also led to B, if C had not occurred? 
 
Fearon also posits that “accidental happenings that help lead to specific events are not 
“causes”, but only “conditions”. He also asserts that the distinction between causes and 
conditions could conceivably be a useful one for political scientists engaged in small-N work, 
and particularly for case studies598.   
For their credibility our arguments need to be historically informed and be based on the 
principles of rational actor and institutional perspective as essential mechanisms discussed in 
the preceding sections. Hence, we take into account a number of essential individual and 
institutional characteristics.  
In essence, in this section our objective is to attempt to propose one of possible answers 
to the question: Would have Tony Blair promoted creation of the Palestinian state if military 
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action in Afghanistan and Iraq had not occurred? Put differently, was his commitment to 
creation of the Palestinian state made for tactical reasons? 
In this section we follow conceptualization of international relations by Elster through 
distinction between “arguing” and “bargaining” as two different modes of communication599. 
According to Elster, arguing follows a different logic and applies different strategies 
compared to bargaining. Whereas arguing is characterized by an exchange of arguments that 
aims at consistency and makes certain validity claims in order to persuade the listener of the 
“power of the better argument”, bargaining aims at a compromise between different parties 
using coercive strategies and material incentives600.  
Although Elster himself acknowledged that arguing and bargaining are hard to 
distinguish empirically, subsequent studies that employed his concept of arguing, or 
“deliberation” as it was called later, treated it as distinct mode of communication in 
opposition to bargaining, not only in analytical but also in empirical terms601.  
Though on the one hand, one can distinguish analytically between these two 
communicative modes of arguing and bargaining, in most empirical cases both of them are 
present simultaneously. Hence, as Risse and Müller point out, pure arguing in terms of 
deliberative and truth-seeking behavior occurs as rarely as pure bargaining in terms of the 
exchange of demands, threats, and promises, and the like602.   
The analysis of our data sources show us that in our empirical case Tony Blair’s 
discourse from 9/11 satisfied both requirements of bargaining and arguing. More precisely, on 
the one hand, as our data show, he was under constant pressure from his domestic audience to 
extract sustainable commitment by the Bush administration if the UK joins the military 
coalition.  
On the other hand, even though some Cabinet members urge the Prime Minister to set 
the Middle East peace process priority as a precondition for participation, he rejected this 
option.   
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PRE-911 BELIEFS OF TONY BLAIR 
The biographer of Tony Blair Anthony Seldon quotes opinions of a number of close 
aides to Prime Minister about his conflict beliefs. One of the long serving aides recalled: “It 
was always core to him even in opposition”603. 
Lord Levy, who had been Tony Blair’s Personal Envoy to the Middle East since 1999, 
in his book recalls his visit to Israel together with the Labour leader Tony Blair on the 
occasion of Yitzhak Rabin’s funerals in 1995: 
“He was obviously despondent over the lengths to which opponents of an Israeli-
Palestinian peace seemed prepared to go to frustrate those who were brave and visionary 
enough to pursue it. But typically he was determined to begin preparing himself to do 
whatever he could if he became prime minister to place Britain actively on the side of the 
peacemakers. And he as voracious in his appetite for first-hand knowledge”604.  
He further continued: “It was a whirlwind education in the complexities of finding a 
way to end decades of hatred and violence. But I also think that Tony, with his deep religious 
faith, instinctively grasped in those emotionally charged hours just outside the Old City walls 
of Jerusalem the potentially momentous significance of a lasting peace. It made him even 
more determined to play whatever part he could in making it a reality”605.  
There are many discussions about the role of religion in Tony Blair’s life. His mentor 
John Burton writes: “Tony’s religion and politics are bound together and although people 
might question this or that or say he got it wrong, he was genuinely shocked if they 
questioned his morality because there was never a dividing line between his politics and 
Christianity… Tony’s Christian faith is part of him”606.  
In a similar vein, Blair’s aide reminded that the issue for him “was religious and moral. 
He has always been a friend of Israel, but equally he felt that the Palestinian situation was 
unfair”607.  
Blair had foreseen progress on the MEPP, leading to Israel living peacefully alongside a 
democratic, sovereign, Palestinian stare, as a moral necessity, and the key to combating 
militant Islam608.   
                                                 
603
 Anthony Seldon, Blair Unbound, (Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 64. 
604
 Michael Levy, A question of honour, (Simon and Schuster, 2008), p. 151. 
605
 Ibidem. 
606
 John Burton, Eileen McCabe, We don't do God, (Continuum, 2009), p. XV. 
607
 Anthony Seldon, Blair Unbound, p. 64. 
608
 Ibidem. 
 189 
Lord Levy recalls Tony Blair’s attitude to the issue before and after his victory at the 
1997 elections: “Blair was always eager to debrief me when I returned from a visit to Israel 
and, increasingly as the 1997 election approached, to discuss how Britain could play a useful 
part – alongside, he always, recognized, the inevitably central role of the Americans – in 
making a Middle East peace possible”609.  
He further continued: “When Blair first moved into Downing Street, he, too, saw this as 
a central foreign policy goal, and we spoke frequently about how Britain could best play its 
part”610. 
When Blair came to power, he had a partner in the White House who was not only a 
natural political ally but almost a soulmate when it came to the issue of the Middle East 
peace611.  
But Blair understood that Europe could play only a minor role. Israel looked to the US 
to lead the way. The Palestinians knew the reality. They might get reconstruction money from 
the EU, but for them too relations with the White House were all-important612.  
According to Spyer, Blair made it clear that Britain and the EU were fully behind U.S. 
efforts to break the deadlock between the parties, and reiterated that Europe had no intention 
of trying to supplant the United States in its role as broker. Rather, Blair was keen to promote 
British involvement in the peace process in cooperation with the Americans613.  
Blair, eager to embrace Barak’s government, felt frustrated throughout 1999 and 2000. 
He saw Clinton as a control freak wanting to run the whole process. ‘I would leave it to Bill if 
only he’d do something about it’, Blair confided once in Peter Mandelson. Asked why he was 
supportive of Israel, Blair would speak of its courage, of a people who bear fortitude and who 
strive for excellence. Implicit in Blair’s actions was the belief that he, as a friend, understood 
Israel’s interests better than many Israelis – that meant a secure but not enlarged country614.  
According to recollections of Sir John Sawers, the former adviser to the Prime Minister, 
Britain's special envoy in Baghdad in 2003: “He saw Israel/Palestine through the prism of 
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Northern Ireland. He had a belief in his own powers of persuasion and bringing people 
together to establish a common end”615.   
Kampfner also suggests that Ireland provided his framework – “the will of the majority 
and equality for all, translating in a Middle East context to security for Israel and a state of 
their own for Palestinians”616.  
But Lord Levy says he and Tony Blair “knew that a final peace deal, if and when it 
came, would not be negotiated by Britain”. He continues: “The Americans were the key. But 
the immediate danger was that in  the absence of any negotiating process at all, the violence 
would get even worse, possibly ending the prospects of a compromise altogether. Our role 
was to keep talks, contacts, and hope, alive”617.  
The problem for Blair was that, unlike Northern Ireland, where successive British 
governments had been working to resolve the conflict since the mid-1980s, 9/11 found the 
positions of the various protagonists more entrenched than ever. The failure of Clinton’s 
Camp David Agreement, the second Palestinian intifada, and Sharon’s brutal suppression of 
the Palestinian Authority had seen the warring factions adopt ever more intractable 
positions618.  
 
TONY BLAIR’S LINKAGE OF POST-9/11 POLICY WITH THE MEPP 
A number of primary and secondary sources tell us that Tony Blair has perceived the 
events of 911 as an opportunity to be seized and to encourage the Bush administration to 
manifest more active engagement.  
He did not believe that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “was the cause of what al-Qaeda 
were doing, but it was an injustice that was making things worse”619. Levy also shares such a 
view; according to him Prime Minister said: “The Palestinian issue is not620 the cause of 
terror, it’s an excuse”621.  
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But he had no doubt that it helped provide a bogus political ‘justification’ for terror, and 
would make it much more difficult for Britain, America and the international community to 
win the crucial, post-9/11 for hearts and minds in the Arab and Islamic world622.  
Seldon argues that the post-9/11 world gave him a chance for real progress623. Publicly 
and privately, as our data show, he presented the Israeli-Palestinian issue in linkage with 
international coalition against terrorism.  
Campbell participated in a Cabinet meeting on September 17, in which Tony Blair 
claimed that “it was important we got Arab countries as part of our coalition. The best signal 
of all would be a restart of the Middle East peace process”624.  
In a similar way, Lord Levy recollects:  “Tony [Blair] said to me a few days afterwards 
that he was convinced that the international order had changed for ever; [that] he was also 
convinced of something else as well: a new urgency in finding some way of getting the 
Palestinian-Israeli efforts back on track”625.  
Days after the terrorist attacks, on 14 September, the Prime Minister told the House that 
"now, more than ever, we have reason not to let the Middle East Peace Process slip still 
further but if at all possible reinvigorate it”626.  
 
ARGUMENTS PRO BARGAINING  
A number of primary and secondary sources show the pressure exerted on the Prime 
Minister by Cabinet members during the US-UK deliberations in 2002 about possible military 
action against Iraq. 
Biographer Coughlin writes that a “group of influential British diplomats argued that 
invading Iraq should take second place to resolving the Israel-Palestine dispute, although they 
seemed unaware that this was also Blair’s personal view”627. 
Likewise, an important private source that later became published conveys Tony Blair’s 
attitude in his discussions with his cabinet. "As the discussion went round the table, it was 
Palestine, Palestine, Palestine, all the way," a cabinet minister said. There was a consensus 
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that the Israeli-Palestinian issue had to be dealt with in tandem with Iraq, or preferably 
before”628. 
The Guardian also wrote: “Tony Blair desperately needs it published to help neutralise 
those in his cabinet and party, and in the wider public, who complain that instead of 
concentrating on Iraq the US and Britain should make the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict their priority”629. 
The similar thinking was prevalent in Israeli mindset. “Maybe Tony Blair interferes into 
our business due to domestic pressure. He needed parliamentary support for Iraq and he 
obtained it at the expense of Israel630.  
Blair’s biographer wrote that certain members of Prime Minister Sharon’s cabinet 
“dismissed Bush’s new-found enthusiasm [publication of the Roadmap] as a mere transitory 
reward to Blair for Iraq”631.   
Prime Minister Sharon in his Newsweek magazine interview even discounted a "road 
map" resolution envisaging the creation of a Palestinian state within three years632. He 
claimed: “The Quartet is nothing! Don't take it seriously”633. 
Similarly, in media many commentators saw President Bush's declaration of support for 
the twin-state "roadmap" solution - for the first time publicly backing a Palestinian state - as a 
"reward" to Tony Blair's powers of persuasion following UK backing of the US position on 
the Iraq war634.  
Tony Blair’s biographer Seldon also argues: “As in the pre-war period, conviction and 
expediency were inseparable in Blair’s mind. He took Britain to war with a promise from 
Bush to publish the ‘road map’ for the MEPP as soon as a new Palestinian Prime Minister 
took office. Extracting this commitment had been no mean feat, and owed much to him 
personally”635.  
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST BARGAINING  
Rather, pure arguing and pure bargaining represent opposite ends of a continuum 
whereby most of the actual communicative processes take place somewhere in between636.  
We have already noted that pure arguing and pure bargaining represent opposite ends of a 
continuum whereby most of the actual communicative processes take place somewhere in 
between637.  We assume that our primary and secondary data shown below disconfirm the 
thesis that the peace process was a bargaining option for Prime Minister Blair. 
The same biographer claimed that “a public commitment from Bush along these lines 
would help [Blair] significantly with the party”638. At the same time he concludes: “The road 
map was also something he believed in deeply”639. In another extract he continued: 
“Extracting this commitment had been no mean feat, and owed much to him personally. He 
was serious about wanting to see progress”640.   
The Cabinet ministers privately told The Guardian in January 2003 that Prime Minister 
Tony Blair assured his “colleagues that he was aware that the potential Achilles heel of his 
Iraq strategy was the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He said that he was clear that movement in the 
peace process had to be made in parallel with Iraq, otherwise resentment in the Arab world 
against the west could fester”641.  
Specifically, the British ambassador to Washington Christopher Meyer urged the 
government to set the peace process commitment as a precondition for joining the military 
coalition. In a counterfactual manner he recalled years later: "We could have achieved more 
by playing a tougher role ... if we had made it a condition of our participation in any military 
operation that indeed a major effort should be made with the Arab/Israel dispute and ... 
detailed planning for what would happen if and when we remove Saddam Hussein, there 
could have been a very different outcome”642. 
On the other hand, Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff and a close aide Jonathan Powell 
believes: “I think setting those sorts of conditions is actually a mistake when you are trying to 
build an alliance with someone, particularly when you are trying to influence them in the 
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direction that they move. I think you have to say, "Here is a framework. If you do it this way, 
there is a chance of being successful. If you do it this way, you can deal with the law of 
unintended consequences. If you do not, it is going to be more difficult". That's what we were 
trying to do”643. 
Similarly, he said: “I think conditions is the wrong way to look at this. We weren't going 
in there and saying, "If you do A, B and C, we will then join you in military action”644.  
Tony Blair himself rejected this sort of policy and defended his case likewise: 
“I think we should certainly, in order to understand my mindset, 
avoid this language of trading this policy for that policy. I would not 
have done Iraq, if I hadn't have thought it was right, full stop, 
irrespective of the Middle East”645. 
 
Against the information that he didn't make the Middle East peace process a pre-
condition with President Bush, Tony Blair said:  
“[I]t wouldn't be right to do that either. You should only take the 
action in respect of Iraq if you think it is intrinsically valid in its own 
terms”646.   
  
He advocated his position with his belief that both of the issues though interdependent 
required for independent attention. 
“I think the two things are perfectly consistent, there should be a 
just solution in the Middle East and we should deal with the weapons 
of mass destruction”647. 
 
In other passages, we see similar cognition of these issues: 
“And we shouldn’t be doing the Middle East peace process 
because of issues concerned with Iraq, we should be doing it because it 
is right anyway. However, it is important to emphasise our 
commitment to doing it to assuage the fear, or claims that there are, 
that we operate with double standards here”648.  
 
“But even if Iraq were not an issue at all, even if Afghanistan had 
never been an issue at all, I would still have been working as hard as I 
could to bring about a peaceful situation there, because it is absolutely 
tragic and appalling at the moment, the suffering of people is very, 
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very great indeed, and the only way of getting through it is to restart 
the peace process”649. 
 
On this occasion certain actors, including Colin Powell, have subsequently criticised 
Blair for never really facing Bush down. David Aaronovitch of The Times recalled an 
important episode: “I put Powell’s words to Blair. “It wasn’t a bargaining chip for me,” he 
replied. “I wasn’t in a position where I was negotiating with him (Bush) in order to get him to 
do something different. In my view if it wasn’t clear that the whole nature of the way Saddam 
was dealing with this issue had changed I was in favour of military action. And, I am afraid, 
in one sense it is worse than people think in so far as my position is concerned. I believed in 
it. I believed in it then, I believe in it now”650. 
At the end, even Christopher Meyer who had criticized Tony Blair not to have been 
“tough” and not to have advanced the peace process of British “pre-condition” conceded: 
“Trading support for the war in return for real progress in the Middle East was also not Blair's 
concern”651. 
So, these primary and secondary data show us that Tony Blair had made efforts to urge 
President Bush to be more closely involved in the MEPP seeing the context of Iraq and 
Afghanistan as “opportunities”. At the same time, he did not use the option of MEPP as a 
precondition for participation in military action against Iraq. He justified his decision by his 
cognitive belief that Iraq and MEPP need to be dealt with in their own terms.  
These findings support the argument of Risse and Müller that pure arguing in terms of 
deliberative and truth-seeking behavior occurs as rarely as pure bargaining in terms of the 
exchange of demands, threats, and promises, and the like652.   
 
POST-IRAQ DISCOURSE OF TONY BLAIR 
An important stage in our historically informed analysis is exploration of Tony Blair’s 
discourse in the post-war period. If Tony Blair had committed himself to the cause of the 
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Palestinian state in order to persuade domestic and international Arab audience to cooperate 
in Iraq issue, we expect him to display reduction of interest and, probably, shift of priorities 
after military operation in Iraq was completed. 
By the end of March 2003, Ariel Sharon’s advisor, former ambassador to the UN Dore 
Gold argued: “Mr Blair's determination to link the Iraq war with Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations at virtually every US-UK summit meeting only increases Israeli concerns about 
the quartet. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian prime minister, is already being praised even 
before there is any evidence that he will in fact stop terrorism against Israel. The best way to 
help the postwar peace process is to stop the diplomacy of linkage. It may answer some short-
term political needs but it undermines the credibility of its advocates and their ability to play 
any role in an eventual Arab-Israeli peace settlement”653. 
In an important extract Blair’s Middle East envoy Lord Levy recalls:  
“Tony [Blair] did keep pressing Bush on the Middle East issue, particularly after the 
Iraq invasion. He won a number of isolated victories, including the publication of the ‘road 
map’ peace plan and the first formal public commitment by an American president to the goal 
of creating a Palestinian state”654.  
Our data show that by June 2003 Tony Blair had been urging President Bush to 
participate personally in the Aqaba summit hosting the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Minister. 
According to Coughlin, President Bush had been reluctant to engage in the Middle East peace 
process, and it was to Blair’s credit that the American president finally agreed to travel to the 
region in June, when, at the Jordanian resort of Aqaba, he met with both Sharon and Abbas655. 
Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross believes that this summit in Aqaba 
represented the culmination of the effort656. 
As was put by Sharansky, President Bush “stood between an elected Israeli prime 
minister and an unelected prime minister of the Palestinian Authority and proclaimed a 
hopeful new era”657.  
But Sharansky continued: “With Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] held up as a 
“moderate” leader who would fight Palestinian terrorism and make peace with Israel, it was 
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clear to me that Oslo’s false assumptions would once again guide the peace process. Like 
their Oslo predecessors, those supporting the Road Map did not recognize that moderation is 
not a function of a leader’s disposition or promises, but rather a function of the nature of the 
society he or she governs. The Road Map had it precisely backwards. One can rely on a free 
society to create the moderate, but one cannot rely on a moderate to create the free society”658. 
The cognitive process paradigm predicts that new information becomes available, the 
cognitive process actor, rather than making major adjustments in his thinking, tends to 
integrate the information into pre-existing belief structures. Because the experience is 
construed primarily on the basis of pre-existing categories, its contribution to subsequent 
decisions is likely to reinforce rather than to conflict with prior perspectives659. 
The Aqaba summit, from the cognitive dissonance perspective, was consonant with the 
pre-existing beliefs of Blair. Biographer Seldon wrote how Blair conceived the Aqaba 
summit: “Blair believed that his labours were beginning to pay off”660. Prime Minister Blair 
made the following statement at Evian:  
“The reason why President Bush is leaving is a reason which is 
understood by everybody, that the Middle East peace process is now 
moving forward. This is of fantastic importance. A few months ago if 
you had said at these press conferences, if I had said I think that 
President Bush will be seeing Palestinian leaders and Israeli leaders 
out in the region in order to push the Middle East peace process 
forward, I think most of you would have said I was being extremely, if 
not wildly, optimistic. It is happening. And he goes there with the full 
support of the G8 members”661.  
 
 
To reinforce his position, as suggested Proposition 6, the actor is expected to emphasize 
the positive aspects, deemphasizing the negative aspects of the preferred belief. In an 
important speech to the US Congress on 18 July 2003 Blair conceptually linked his option 
(“peace process”) with the leitmotiv of the US foreign policy in the region (“struggle against 
terror”) thus insisting on the merits of his own option:   
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“I want to be very plain: this terrorism will not be defeated 
without peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine. Here it 
is that the poison is incubated. Here it is that the extremist is able to 
confuse in the mind of a frighteningly large number of people the case 
for a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel, and to translate this 
moreover into a battle between East and West, Muslim, Jew and 
Christian”662.  
 
Given new opportunities, as he believed, in the post-Iraq Tony Blair insisted on being 
more committed to the advocated agenda: 
 
 “The ending of Saddam's regime in Iraq must be the starting 
point of a new dispensation for the Middle East: Iraq, free and stable; 
Iran and Syria, who give succor to the rejectionist men of violence, 
made to realize that the world will no longer countenance it, that the 
hand of friendship can only be offered them if they resile completely 
from this malice, but that if they do, that hand will be there for them 
and their people; the whole of region helped toward democracy. And 
to symbolize it all, the creation of an independent, viable and 
democratic Palestinian state side by side with the state of Israel”663.  
 
In September 2003 the Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigned “weakened 
by a power struggle with Yasser Arafat”664. The Guardian made reference to Prime Minister 
Abbas's aides who reported that the former “had been frustrated by the constant wrangling 
with [Chairman] Arafat, the near-collapse of the US-backed "road map" plan for peace with 
Israel and his inability to improve the daily lives of Palestinians”665.  
Based on this observation the British Parliament consequently concluded: “Violence has 
repeatedly derailed progress towards a negotiated settlement between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Since the devastating cycle of terrorist attack and Israeli retaliation resumed in 
August, prospects for implementation of the Road Map —the Quartet’s plan for a two-state 
solution to the conflict—have appeared remote”666.  
On 15 September 2003, the UN’s Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 
Process, Terje Roed-Larsen told the Security Council that the peace process has stalled. The 
recent cycle of terror attacks and extrajudicial killings has broken the Palestinian ceasefire and 
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brought the process to a standstill. A combination of violence and the too slow 
implementation of the road map peace plan have brought the region to a potential turning 
point…. Unfortunately, implementation of the road map never effectively began667.  
Tony Blair failed to accept the view that the Roadmap had not met expectations. Against 
this background we see that his operational code did not change. He persistently continued to 
insist on the top-down strategy calling to resume the Roadmap:  
“I don’t think it is a question of the Road Map as such being 
finished because in the end you will come back to something like the 
Road Map, even if you get rid of the Road Map. There’s no other 
solution waiting out there other than a solution that means either the 
State of Israel ends which isn’t going to happen, or the Palestinians go 
away, which isn’t going to happen. So you will be left with a situation 
where Israelis and Palestinians have to find a way of living together, 
and the only way they are ever going to agree to live together is if they 
each have sovereign independent states, side by side. So my point is 
that in the end you will always come back to that issue”668.  
 
Further, our data of 2004 show that, in order to keep the peace process invigorated, 
Tony Blair urged President Bush to appoint a special US envoy to the region with full 
presidential authority. According to Seldon, Tony Blair believed that “the problem demanded 
a high-ranking figure who gave it his priority”669.  
We summarize key events of this section by the recollections of Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw: 
“What Tony Blair sought to do all the way through his premiership was to raise the 
Middle East up the agenda with Washington and to get some change and he was relentless in 
seeking to do that. […] It was a matter of huge frustration that we weren't able to achieve that 
[…]”670  
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We have seen that the United Kingdom has been one of the EU member states 
“supporting a comprehensive settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict through a two-state 
solution to its Israeli–Palestinian dimension based on the relevant Security Council 
resolutions, the principles of the 1991 Madrid Conference, and the Quartet’s 2003 road map 
(“Performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict”)671.  
Thirteen years before Israel recognized the PLO as its negotiating partner in the 
Declaration of Principles of 1993, the British along with its European partners had advocated 
the principle of self-determination and recognised the Palestinians’ right to aspire to a state 
alongside Israel. This became the basis for the support of the Europeans for a negotiated two-
state solution.  
Besides, our data showed that in their public and private declarations Blair’s Cabinet 
members have consistently advocated the right of the Palestinians to form an independent 
state. The above-mentioned facts and positions of British policy-makers are an important base 
for our counterfactual analysis.  
By invoking these general principles and regularities of the British political mindset and 
drawing on knowledge of historical facts, we believe that Tony Blair would at some point 
back creation of the Palestinian state. The data that we have used in this section largely testify 
that since his first days in Downing Street, Blair considered the issue “as a central foreign 
policy goal”672.  
But his actions could be constrained by the presence of the US, which was actively 
engaged at the last stages of President Clinton and disengaged under President Bush. And he 
perceived the aftermath of September 11 as a produced opportunity and “a spur to 
reinvigorate” the peace process673.  
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And apparently, he would not have gone ahead of the United States not to produce a 
foreign policy rift with his key ally. He used to avoid public criticism of the US policies. For 
instance, even when violence was raging between the Israelis and the Palestinians in April 
2002, one of Blair’s aides recalled his reasoning: “How do we get the Americans doing more 
re: [regarding] the Middle East peace process without looking like we are criticizing them for 
not doing enough?”674 
We suppose, he would obviously continue attaching himself to this well elaborated 
channel of strategic cooperation, given his profound belief that he is “the one Western leader 
the US will really listen to”675.  
This might allow us to speculate whether the Blair Government would give a public 
backing to creation of the Palestinian state (as it did on October 15, 2001), if September 11 
had not occurred. We consciously called it “speculation”, because counterfactual argument, as 
Odell argues, is only speculation, though quite common, often not explicit, throughout 
scholarship and political debate676.  
In summary, the exploration of Tony Blair’s cognitive perceptions of the conflict 
through the counterfactual analysis has enriched our understanding of how his beliefs had 
developed during his years in opposition or prior to September 11. This was essential for 
observing stability and fluctuations in his behaviour, for tracing how certain events cause 
changes and how others fail to. 
In an important study about socialization inside European institutions, Jeffrey Checkel 
has applied a combination of several techniques to multiply the observable implications of his 
approach. This allowed him to triangulate when assessing the degree to which, and through 
what mechanism(s), agent preferences change as a result of interaction677.  
He reported that the use of process tracing, as well as alternative and counterfactual 
explanations, enabled him to minimize reliance on “as if” assumptions at the national/agent 
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level678. Since counterfactual analysis sharpens the researcher’s analytic claims, we sought to 
apply it in our empirical case. 
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SECTION 1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
At this stage of regional developments Tony Blair has confronted an event that aroused 
his dissonance. In early 2006 the Islamic movement Hamas came to power as a large majority 
in the new Palestinian parliament as a result of its victory at the elections.  
For Tony Blair, the victory of Hamas at the elections was subjectively perceived as 
“cognitive dissonance”. Thus, our question is how Tony Blair has coped with this dissonant 
information.  
a) The new situation may either induce changes in the content of his beliefs about 
optimal strategic approaches to the conflict; or 
b) It may be interpreted in such a manner that his basic assumptions and cognition will 
be conserved unchanged.  
 
At the beginning of our work we have formulated the hypothesis that throughout all his 
Prime Minister years Tony Blair maintained the constancy and consistency of his core beliefs 
about the peace process.  
To assert the validity of our hypothesis against the background of Tony Blair’s policy 
after the Hamas victory we need to demonstrate that from January 2006 until his departure in 
June 2007, he still continued advocating the top-down strategy and he did not reconsider his 
position not to talk to Hamas until it transforms itself.  
 
EMPIRICAL DATA  
The empirical data for this section of 2006-2007 events come from 10 speeches, press 
conferences and interviews of Tony Blair. These ten speeches are complemented by five more 
sources in which Tony Blair has expressed his policy statements quoted in such sources as 
The Independent, The Times, Report of the House of Commons (Foreign Policy Aspects of the 
CHAPTER III: 
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ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: 2006 – 2007 
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War Against Terrorism: Fourth Report of Session 2005-06), as well as House of Commons 
debates (Hansard source, 15 March 2006). 
Tony Blair’s speech made to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on 1 August 
2006 and his foreign policy speech of 13 November 2006 are of particular interest. These 
speeches broadly deal with key assumptions of Prime Minister’s foreign policy towards the 
Middle East in general.   
We have also consulted a number of sources, in which was expressed the official 
position of the Israeli government. For example, Tzipi Livni’s address to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (20 November 2006) contains much information about the 
Israeli mindset following the election of Hamas.    
We also use such secondary sources, as analyses of the aftermath of the Hamas victory 
produced by think-tanks: the Brookings Institution, the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy and the Cato Institute679. Rosemary Hollis in her book Britain and the Middle East in 
the 9/11 Era (2010) makes thorough insight into the position of the United Kingdom over the 
issue under investigation.  
We keep on applying the theoretically informed process-tracing method to observe his 
thinking within this short period of time. Our data demonstrate that his views did not change 
with the change of the regional circumstances. We discuss below that based on the 
assumption that Hamas had not rejected violence as means of its policy, Tony Blair refused to 
talk directly to the group which formed the government.  
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF EVIDENCE  
In line with our hypothesis, we assert that the Prime Minister has conserved stability of 
his instrumental beliefs about the peace process even after the Hamas victory. In this case we 
count as evidence his implementation of the same top-down strategy across all historical 
instances under our investigation.  
According to it, we expect that under any circumstances of decision-making with regard 
to the peace process, he will scan incoming information through this assumption, not 
admitting any alternative thinking. Here an alternative to his top-down strategy is the claim 
that the strategy needs to be replaced or since Hamas is in power, the peace process will be 
interrupted. 
We suppose that it is both analytically adequate and historically justified to ask and 
verify whether Prime Minister’s views about the Palestinians have changed following the 
Hamas victory in 2006. 
At the same time, social science theories must be built around clear, specific and value-
free, and empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Falsification requires at least the possibility and 
preferably the opportunity to observe some variations in the initial conditions as well as in the 
phenomenon that we explain. 
We adopt the strategy of constructivists who in assessing evidence and arbitrating 
among interpretations use similar criteria, as other researchers. They judge an interpretation of 
evidence by comparing it with alternative explanations. They search for evidence that would 
confirm alternatives and disconfirm the explanation being assessed. They ask if an 
explanation is supported by multiple streams of data680.  
Acknowledging that hypotheses need to be formulated so as permit some form of 
falsification through empirical observation, we sought to generate our hypothesis as a 
falsifiable proposition admitting the probability that at some given historical period Tony 
Blair might reassess the content of his beliefs during his Premiership.  
The evidence which can disconfirm our hypothesis might be an argument by Tony Blair 
that the Roadmap failed to deliver results, or that the strategy of “empowering” Palestinian 
institutions is a flawed approach. 
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This means that we are empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in 
his cognitive views. But to be precise, we need to specify the following analytic distinctions. 
Certain scholars working on learning theories equate policy change with belief change. Others 
fail to differentiate learning from alternative sources of policy change, such as structural 
adjustment681.  
Therefore, if Prime Minister Blair introduces certain changes in his Middle East foreign 
policy, we do not interpret it as reconsideration of beliefs. We evaluate the pattern in light of 
analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to learning682.   
In addition, we add another cautionary note. We would like to make precision of what 
kind of learning we seek to establish and explain. Levy defines experiential learning “as a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience”683. 
For us what counts as change of belief, or learning, is reassessment of prior beliefs and their 
replacement by different understandings as a result of experiential observations.  
Why we seek to make precisions at this point? Quite often it is possible that learning 
may reinforce decision makers' current beliefs and actually inhibit policy change. This last 
point is particularly important, for a great deal of research suggests a strong tendency for 
people to interpret information in a way that conforms to their prior expectations and 
worldviews684. This increases confidence in existing beliefs and thus reinforces continuity in 
behavior685.  
For all the reasons shown above, for our analytic purposes we count as evidence only 
instances, in which policy change was preceded and, possibly, affected by reassessment of 
beliefs about optimal strategies for the conflict resolution. In our case study, this reassessment 
can be operationally imagined as a putative shift from the top-down to the bottom-up strategy. 
It can also be re-evaluation of the policy of not dealing with Hamas towards direct contacts 
with the group. 
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Our data showed an important historical instance which deserves a cautionary note. By 
early 2007, Prime Minister Blair did not preclude dealing with what he called “the more 
sensible elements of Hamas”686.  
The new discourse implies changes in our dependent variable (behaviour). Our task at 
this point is to verify whether this change in the dependent variable is brought about by the 
change in the intervening variable (belief system stability). If not, this variance is better 
explained by an alternative pathway, on which we elaborate in the following section. 
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In early 2006 the Islamic movement Hamas came to power as a large majority in the 
new Palestinian parliament as a result of its victory at the elections. These were the first 
Palestinian parliamentary elections since 1996 supposed to promote peaceful rather than 
militant organisations, according to the Israeli opinion687.  
"The elections were meant to give power and strength to dismantle the (militant) 
organisations and not create a situation where those organisations sit in the parliament and 
then become part of the executive authority”, argued Israel’s Foreign Minsiter Tzipi Livni688.  
The Bush administration sought to portray the Hamas victory as a Palestinian revolt 
against the incompetent, corrupt rule of the Fatah-led government689. From the moment 
Hamas entered the field, polls consistently indicated that it would earn at least a third of the 
vote and possibly much more in the elections. Its popularity, according to the same polls, 
stems less from widespread support for its extremist ideology than from dissatisfaction with 
the PA'S corruption and the stagnant Palestinian economy690.  
Understanding this situation well, Hamas ran on a platform stressing reform and good 
governance rather than ideological struggle. With such a practical appeal and (following its 
sweeping victory in December's municipal elections) its day-to-day responsibility for the 
living conditions of almost a third of the popu lation in the territories, Hamas clearly 
positioned itself as a plausible, and formidable, alternative to the old PA leadership691.  
One of the prevalent explanations about the victory of Hamas were claims attributing 
the result to continuous top-down strategy of strengthening Palestinian institutions without 
much reference to dealing with the preferences of the civil society. According to the Cato 
handbook for policymakers:  
“Washington’s abortive attempt to implant democracy in Palestine as a means of 
creating conditions for peace in the Middle East reveals how US policies have often worked 
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at cross-purposes. The ousting of Saddam Hussein and the coming to power of a Shiite-
controlled government in Baghdad helped tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf to Iran, 
a country that does not recognize Israel and opposes the peace process. In the Levant, in 
addition to the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections in early 2006, a series of other 
developments that were initially welcomed by the Bush administration (for example, the 
parliamentary elections in Lebanon and the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war), helped strengthen the 
power of Iran’s satellite, the Hezbollah movement”692.  
According to The Washington Post, the Bush administration has spent nearly $500 
million in the past year to bolster the Palestinian Authority and the ruling Fatah party, which 
was nonetheless crushed by Hamas at the polls. Against the advice of Israeli officials, the 
administration had pushed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to hold the elections 
without delay, believing that the voting would strengthen his hand in disarming militia 
groups693. 
The Israelis had wanted to prevent Hamas from participating and to make it difficult for 
the elections to proceed smoothly if they did. “… [W]e brought up some arguments against 
it”, recalled Danny Ayalon, Israel’s ambassador to Washington and formerly top aide to 
Sharon694. 
The former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk expressed a similar opinion: “And, by 
the way, one should say in this regard, that there was an opportunity to postpone the election. 
Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the PA wanted to do so. But this administration insisted 
that it go ahead”695.  
 Edward G. Abington Jr., a consultant to the Palestinian Authority contended that the 
Bush administration shared responsibility for the outcome “because U.S. officials did little to 
help Abbas or to push the Israeli government to end settlement expansion, limit roadblocks, 
release prisoners or stop other activities that undermined his authority in the eyes of the 
Palestinian people”696. He also believed the result was a “huge blow to Bush's advocacy of 
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democracy in the Middle East" because Arab leaders fearful of Islamic victories in their 
countries will “push back very hard”697.  
For the Blair administration it was an unexpected outcome as well. As was recalled by 
an official in the Blair Government:   
“No one had expected the result. The election had been intended as a way of 
neutralising Hamas and for it to suddenly turn around and bite us in that way was 
astonishing”698.  
The Israelis explicitly advanced arguments about the absence of a peace partner. They 
precised that when they “concluded there was no Palestinian partner for peace, they were 
thinking of Fatah and Abbas, not Hamas. The Hamas victory only reinforced this view, and 
also proved its accuracy to many foreign observers”699.  
Relying on such an assumption Foreign Minister Livni stated: “The situation is 
complicated and we are facing extremists in power ... and the moderate leaders are the weak 
ones and Abu Mazen (Abbas) is a moderate leader but unfortunately he is maybe too 
weak”700. 
This thinking of key participants of negotiations led to new cognition that following the 
victory of Hamas, the peace process ceased its existence. Indyk concluded: “But its 
consequences are quite dire tonight for the peace process as we've known it in the past. I 
would go as far as to say that the peace process is over, that Hamas will not deal with Israel 
and Israel will not deal with Hamas; and we are not going to have a negotiating process”701.  
Chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from 2002 to 2005 Moshe Yaalon 
asserted that with Hamas in government, “Palestinian moderates have even less power than 
they did previously. A peaceful solution simply is not currently possible, and it may take at 
least another generation for the Oslo paradigm to be workable, if at all. For this reason, it 
might be time to consider other paradigms for solving the conflict and promoting stability in 
the region. While examining other paradigms, Israel should also work to promote Palestinian 
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moderates, who are, thus far, politically powerless”702. Even Foreign Minister Livni was 
stressing: "I think that final-status agreement is not feasible, especially in the current 
situation”703.  
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According to Rosemary Hollis of the Chatham House, for the EU member states, 
including Britain, the Palestinian election outcome presented a profound dilemma. They had 
championed the goal of elections and yet, under their own laws, they could not continue to 
provide funding to a Palestinian Authority led by an organization that they had branded as a 
terrorist group. Under British anti-terrorist legislation of 2000, it was illegal to even provide a 
platform to members of such an organization. In the circumstances, British officials would not 
deal with the new PA leadership, restricting themselves instead to interacting only with Fatah 
leader President Mahmoud Abbas704.  
Tony Blair subjectively perceived the victory of Hamas at the elections as cognitive 
dissonance. Our question is how Tony Blair has coped with this dissonant information. The 
new situation may either induce changes in the content of his beliefs about optimal strategic 
approaches to the conflict. Or it may be interpreted in such a manner that his basic 
assumptions and cognition will be conserved unchanged.  
First of all, we remind our central hypothesis of Case-study I: 
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
According to it, our further analysis needs to fulfil the core theoretical propositions of 
the cognitive dissonance approach we have been discussing throughout our Case-study I: 
Proposition 1: The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will 
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. 
Proposition 2: When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person 
will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.  
Proposition 3: The policy-maker will seek strong justification for his beliefs and his 
political behaviour. 
Proposition 4: The policy-maker will search out additional information supporting his 
cognitive view and will actively seek new reasons for acting in the preferred manner. 
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Proposition 5: The policy-maker will reject the incoming discrepant information and 
tend to accept only the consonant information   
Proposition 6: An essential step in dissonance reduction efforts is emphasizing the 
positive aspects and deemphasizing the negative aspects of the preferred belief. 
Proposition 7: The more the person is committed to the advocated policy, the more he 
will resist to reassessing his belief and modifying his behaviour. 
Proposition 8: The policy-maker possesses sufficient and conscious liberty either to 
accept the incoming information or reject it.  
 
The process, in which Prime Minister Tony Blair was involved from January 2006 up to 
June 2007, is called from the cognitive viewpoint the period of dissonance reduction and 
consonance achievement efforts.  
We have already indicated that the empirical base for this section is made up by 10 
speeches, press conferences and interviews of Tony Blair. In addition they are complemented 
by five more sources in which Tony Blair has expressed his policy statements quoted in such 
sources as The Independent, The Times, Report of the House of Commons (Foreign Policy 
Aspects of the War Against Terrorism: Fourth Report of Session 2005-06), as well as House 
of Commons debates (Hansard source, 15 March 2006). 
From 2006 Hamas represented the Palestinian people as an elected government. As 
Livni stated: “The elections were meant to give power and strength to dismantle the (militant) 
organisations and not create a situation where those organisations sit in the parliament and 
then become part of the executive authority”705. 
Recall the recurrent argument in the Cato handbook for policymakers that Washington’s 
“abortive attempt to implant democracy in Palestine as a means of creating conditions for 
peace in the Middle East” revealed how US policies have often worked at cross-purposes”706.  
This situation represented a cognitive dissonance for Prime Minister Tony Blair. As 
suggested by cognitive perspectives, the existence of this dissonance, being psychologically 
uncomfortable, will motivate the actor to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve 
consonance.  
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An official in the Blair government recalled: “No one had expected the result. The 
election had been intended as a way of neutralising Hamas and for it to suddenly turn around 
and bite us in that way was astonishing”707.  
Senior diplomats of the Blair administration testify that Tony Blair “took a hard line on 
Hamas”708. One of these diplomats recalled the immediate aftermath when the Cabinet was 
discussing the response to the Hamas victory. “[Jack] Straw argued and there was heated 
debate. The FCO line was that Hamas was capable of changing and that Britain anyway had a 
duty to help the Palestinian people, whatever the difficulties with their elected leaders. But 
Blair’s view prevailed”709.  
In one of the earliest responses to the aftermath of the Hamas victory, his public 
discourse shows that he imposed cognitive restrictions, accepting part of the message which is 
consistent with his belief system and rejecting the part which does not fit into his pre-existing 
schemata:   
"Of course, we recognise the mandate for Hamas because the 
people have spoken in a particular way in the Palestinian Authority. 
[…] But I think it is also important for Hamas to understand that there 
comes a point - and that point is now following that strong showing, 
where they have to decide between a path of democracy or a path of 
violence”710.  
 
He further continued: 
“The only way we will ever get to a solution that is good for the 
Palestinian people is based on democracy and peaceful coexistence 
between the state of Israel and an independent Palestinian state”711. 
 
He explained and justified his decision not to hold official talks with Hamas with 
reference to Hamas policy of violence and non-recognition of Israel. At a monthly press 
conference he said: 
"It is very difficult for us to be in the position of negotiating or 
talking to Hamas unless there’s a very clear renunciation of 
terrorism"712.  
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Our primary sources show that on 15 March 2006, the Prime Minister defined the 
United Kingdom’s policy towards Hamas in the following way consistent with his prior 
belief: 
“One thing should be made very clear again: we totally respect 
the mandate that Hamas secured in the elections. We supported those 
democratic elections, we support them still. But if it wants our help—
both financially and politically—to make progress, it has to be on an 
understood basis, which means giving up violence, negotiating 
peacefully and accepting the existence of Israel”713. 
 
On 12 June 2006, the Prime Minister responded to a question whether he advocated 
talks with Hamas by saying:  
“You can only negotiate with people who accept your existence 
and stop violence. A negotiated settlement is easily, manifestly the 
best thing”714. 
 
His further position was consistent with Proposition 6 which predicted that an essential 
step in dissonance reduction efforts was emphasizing the positive aspects and deemphasizing 
the negative aspects of the preferred belief. Since the moment of Hamas victory imposed 
dissonance on his prior beliefs about the peace process, in his discourse he sought to rate his 
option higher. 
During a Downing Street press conference with the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
on 12 June 2006 Tony Blair asserted:  
"I think the thing everybody finds frustrating and difficult is that 
there is now agreement in the international community that there 
should be a two-state solution”715.  
 
But other sources show that in fact, this thinking was not prevalent in the mindset of 
most officials of the Bush and Olmert administrations. We have already noted that the first 
target of Israeli criticism following the Hamas victory was the Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas and his capacity to deliver his responsibilities. Foreign Minister Livni’s 
assessment was: “The situation is complicated and we are facing extremists in power ... and 
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the moderate leaders are the weak ones and Abu Mazen (Abbas) is a moderate leader but 
unfortunately he is maybe too weak"716. 
Certain Israeli political circles have voiced their assumptions that peace process cannot 
be continued: “With Hamas in government, Palestinian moderates have even less power than 
they did previously. A peaceful solution simply is not currently possible, and it may take at 
least another generation for the Oslo paradigm to be workable, if at all”717.  
Against a background of such thinking present in Israeli and US mindset, on 1 August 
2006 Blair made one of his key foreign policy speeches. The tracing of Tony Blair’s policy 
position in this speech shows us his efforts to cope with the above-mentioned pieces of 
dissonant information.  
As predicted by the dissonance approach, we see that Tony Blair interpreted the claim 
that President Abbas was too weak in such a manner as to attribute this weakness to the 
failures of the peace process. This will enable him to continue backing his preferred option – 
“peace process”. 
“Here a moderate leadership was squeezed between its own 
inability to control the radical elements and the political stagnation of 
the peace process”718.  
 
He underlined that the opportunity was not seized: 
“When Prime Minister Sharon took the brave step of 
disengagement from Gaza, it could have been and should have been 
the opportunity to re-start the process”. 
 
And he concluded:  
“But the squeeze was too great and as ever because these 
processes never stay still, instead of moving forward, it fell back. 
Hamas won the election”719.  
 
As was pointed out by Jervis, that the basis of dissonance theory lies in the postulate that 
people seek strong justification for their behaviour. They are not content to believe merely 
that they behaved well and chose wisely – if these were the case they only have to maintain 
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the beliefs that produced their decisions. Instead people want to minimize their internal 
conflict720.  
Based on this, we have advanced our Proposition 3, according to which the policy-
maker under investigation will seek strong justification for his beliefs and his political 
behaviour. 
Hence, in the same speech we see that Prime Minister Tony Blair justified his 
argumentation to continue the peace process by claiming that this option was beneficial for 
national interests of Israel itself. Because at that period prevalent was the thinking that the 
deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territories [option he deemphasized] would generate 
increased violence against Israel [justification for his behaviour]. The Hamas leadership that 
was failing to govern would possess little incentive or capacity to restrain militants. Another 
intifada with popular support could result if Hamas successfully blamed the developing 
calamity on Israel and the Western powers721. 
Due to the significance of argumentative reasoning of Tony Blair about the Israeli 
situation we tended to give the following extract entirely: 
 
Israeli predicament  
Yet despite all of this, which I consider virtually obvious, we 
look at the bloodshed in Iraq and say that's a reason for leaving, we 
listen to the propaganda that tells us it's all because of our suppression 
of Muslims and have parts of our opinion seriously believing that if we 
only got out of Iraq and Afghanistan, it would all stop.  
And most contemporaneously, and in some ways most 
perniciously, a very large and, I fear, growing part of our opinion 
looks at Israel, and thinks we pay too great a price for supporting it 
and sympathises with Muslim opinion that condemns it. Absent from 
so much of the coverage, is any understanding of the Israeli 
predicament.  
I, and any halfway sentient human being, regards the loss of 
civilian life in Lebanon as unacceptable, grieves for that nation, is 
sickened by its plight and wants the war to stop now. But just for a 
moment, put yourself in Israel's place. It has a crisis in Gaza, sparked 
by the kidnap of a soldier by Hamas. Suddenly, without warning, 
Hezbollah who have been continuing to operate in southern Lebanon 
for two years in defiance of UN Resolution 1559, cross the UN blue 
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line, kill eight Israeli soldiers and kidnap two more. They then fire 
rockets indiscriminately at the civilian population in northern Israel.  
Hezbollah gets their weapons from Iran. Iran are now also 
financing militant elements in Hamas. Iran's president has called for 
Israel to be "wiped off the map". And he's trying to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. Just to complete the picture, Israel's main neighbour along its 
eastern flank is Syria who support Hezbollah and house the hardline 
leaders of Hamas.  
It's not exactly a situation conducive to a feeling of security, is 
it?  
But the central point is this. In the end, even the issue of Israel is 
just part of the same, wider struggle for the soul of the region. If we 
recognised this struggle for what it truly is, we would be at least along 
the first steps of the path to winning it. But a vast part of the Western 
opinion is not remotely near this yet722.  
 
Blair sought to reduce the aroused dissonance by valuing the outcomes of the advocated 
option, consistently predicted by Propositions 4 and 6. 
According to his view,  
“It is, in other words, the total and complete rejection of the case 
of reactionary Islam. It destroys not just their most effective rallying 
call, it fatally undermines their basic ideology”723.  
 
On the same occasion he said:  
“Progress for moderate, mainstream Islam anywhere puts 
reactionary Islam on the defensive everywhere”724. 
 
He shows that his thinking was guided by the following implications  
“It is in part a struggle between what I will call reactionary Islam 
and moderate, mainstream Islam. But its implications go far wider. We 
are fighting a war, but not just against terrorism but about how the 
world should govern itself in the early 21st century, about global 
values”725. 
 
Also, the succeeding analysis of Tony Blair’s discourse shows us the operation of the 
dissonance theory’s propositions. Another important aspect in Blair’s reasoning concerns the 
implications of Hamas victory on the regional situation as a whole.   
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The prevalent international thinking was that the success of Hamas in the Palestinian 
Authority would send the wrong message to extremists in the region726. Subsequently, the 
former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk argued: “the Egyptians and Jordanians in 
particular, as neighbors of the West Bank in Gaza do not want to see a terrorist failed state on 
their borders. And therefore they are going to be working to try to moderate Hamas's position 
as well”727.  
Some international think tanks also concluded that as a branch of the international 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, the Hamas victory was likely to energize and embolden 
fellow Brotherhood organizations in neighboring Jordan and Egypt. And should Hamas’s 
experiment in Islamic governance be seen as a success, it is likely to enhance the appeal of the 
Islamic model in other Arab and Muslim countries728.  
For this reason, as predicted by Proposition 4, Blair sought out additional information 
supporting his cognition and will actively seek new reasons for acting in the preferred 
manner. He based his arguments the interdependence of regional issues: 
“From the above it is clear that from now on, we need a whole 
strategy for the Middle East. If we are faced with an arc of extremism, 
we need a corresponding arc of moderation and reconciliation. Each 
part is linked. Progress between Israel and Palestine affects Iraq. 
Progress in Iraq affects democracy in the region. Progress for 
moderate, mainstream Islam anywhere puts reactionary Islam on the 
defensive everywhere. But none of it happens unless in each individual 
part the necessary energy and commitment is displayed not fitfully, but 
continuously”729.  
 
Further, cognitive theory predicts that if contradictory evidence arouses sufficient 
discomfort to trigger dissonance reduction but is not convincing enough to change the 
person’s mind, he may end up holding his views even more strongly than before730.  
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Instead of modifying one’s actions to conform to the “obvious” conclusions of new 
evidence and experience, the actor may intensify his previous attitudes and behaviour731. 
Consequently, the Hamas victory, which Blair perceived as a result of shortcomings of the 
peace process, strengthened his belief to further continue to support the Palestinian 
Institutions of President Abbas: 
“We need relentlessly, vigorously, to put a viable Palestinian 
Government on its feet, to offer a vision of how the Roadmap to final 
status negotiation can happen and then pursue it, week in, week out, 
till it’s done. Nothing else will do. Nothing else is more important to 
the success of our foreign policy”732.  
 
To support his position, he argued that it would be in the interests of the United States 
and Israel to have a stronger peace partner: 
“I think that both the United States and Israel will want to make 
progress provided we can get a national unity government on the 
Palestinian side”733.  
 
Further, we analyzed the expression of Tony Blair’s policy beliefs at the end of 2006. 
Our theoretical guide predicts that to reduce dissonance, people emphasize the positive 
aspects and deemphasize the negative aspects of the chosen objects, while emphasizing the 
negative and deemphasizing the positive aspects of the unchosen object734. 
According to our findings, Tony Blair’s cognitive calculations suggested that if the 
Palestinian moderate leadership were not supported by the international community, the 
political situation would represent an advantage for extremist forces. With this caveat in 
mind, he deemphasized the option of not supporting political institutions of President Abbas 
(as predicted by proposition 6). This belief about the consequences of not supporting 
President Abbas is revealed in the following extract:  
“Because otherwise what we face in the region is a situation 
where the extremists always have the upper hand, so the most militant 
elements of Hamas have the upper hand in Palestine, the most militant 
elements of Hezbollah have a upper hand in Lebanon and these al-
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Qaeda-backed extremists or Iranian backed Shia militia in Iraq have 
the upper hand”735.  
 
We have already noted above, by 2007 the Prime Minister did not preclude dealing with 
what he called “the more sensible elements of Hamas”736. The new discourse implies changes 
in our dependent variable (behaviour). Our task at this point is to verify whether this change 
in the dependent variable is brought about by the change in the intervening variable (belief 
system stability). If not, this variance is better explained by an alternative pathway, on which 
we elaborate in the following section. 
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As was observed from our source data, during the last months of his staying in power 
Tony Blair admitted the possibility of dealing with “the more sensible elements of Hamas”. 
More precisely, Tony Blair in a speech before the British Parliament said: “It's far easier to 
deal with the situation in Palestine if there is a national unity government. I hope we can make 
progress, including even with the more sensible elements of Hamas”737. 
This new position was interpreted differently by different actors. The Palestinian 
ambassador to London, Manuel Hassassian said: “President Abbas wants Prime Minister Blair 
to persuade the Americans that the Mecca deal is the only way out. […] If there is any 
European country that can influence the Americans it's going to be the UK, given the fact that 
Blair is a personal friend of President [George W.] Bush”.738  
On the other hand, according to The Jerusalem Post, “Britain's policy collapsed 
completely”739.  
The new discourse implies changes in the dependent variable (behaviour) under our 
investigation. Our task at this point is to verify whether this change in the dependent variable 
is brought about by the change in the intervening variable (belief system stability). If not, this 
variance is better explained by an alternative pathway, which we call as neorealist learning.  
Theoretical research on learning differentiates “cognitive learning” as a possible source 
of policy change from “structural adjustment”, one of alternative sources of change. 
According to the neorealist conception of learning, governments respond in a rational (or, at 
least, reasonable) manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the international 
environment740.  
National leaders respond in a prudent and timely manner to shifts in the balance of 
power or they are replaced by more realistic leaders741. The scholarship on learning defines 
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our case as "simple" learning, in which new information leads to a change in means but not in 
ends, whereas in ''complex learning" a recognition of conflicts among values leads to a 
modification of goals as well as means742.  
Based on analytic distinctions between these two perspectives – “cognitive learning” 
and “neorealist learning” – we have formulated our hypothesis in the following manner:  
Hypothesis IV 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s position to talk to certain members of Hamas was caused 
not by change of beliefs, but by the structural adjustment to the external environment. 
 
See Figure 12. 
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742
 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”, 
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312. 
 
 224 
In debates about the merits of one approach vs. another for testing, it is healthy to bear 
in mind that all contain gaping methodological holes. We social scientists never prove 
anything, not even with our most sophisticated methods. Popper argued that the goal of 
science is not to prove a theory, but to disconfirm alternative hypotheses. In a strict sense, our 
goal is to disconfirm all the alternative hypotheses743.  
Based on this assumption in this section our analytic goal is to disconfirm the 
assumption that change of Tony Blair’s discourse was preceded by deep cognitive 
reassessment of his prior beliefs.  
It means that our both principal variables are causally linked not through the intervening 
mechanism of “learning” (or, change in beliefs), but through the intervening variable of 
“structural adjustment”. 
We suppose that this analytical interest is in line with our overall focus on changes and 
stability in the cognitive beliefs, identity and interests of Tony Blair that are attributable to his 
interactions with the international institution. We tend to explain not simply changes in his 
political decisions and actions. But we tend to trace whether these policy shifts are attributed 
to changes in his belief system.  
If our hypothesis is correct, we expect to observe “simple” learning in Blair’s selection 
of means but not in ends744. In contrast, if our prediction is wrong, then our findings need to 
show that from the beginning of 2007 till his departure Tony Blair underwent “'complex 
learning”, in which in addition to modification of means, he reconsiders goals. This “complex 
learning” is expected to find its reflection in his reassessment of the capabilities of the parties 
and his previous strategic approaches to the conflict resolution (namely, “top-down strategy”). 
One of the essential methodological problems is associated with temporal factors. The 
period under investigation in this section is the course of some 6 months – from January 2007 
to his departure in June 2007.  
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Moreover, among the problems confronted by the document-centered research is that 
“political leaders may often give one public reason to justify an action for which they have 
multiple private motivations”745.  
However, it is a theoretical assumption of operational code analysis that a leader’s 
public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will 
consistently match his public beliefs746.  
If a leader publicly claims to have taken an action for reason A (but has privately also 
done so for reasons B and C as well) abandonment of the goals implied in reason A may carry 
political costs. Therefore, future behavior will be constrained by present rhetoric (regardless 
of candor or authorship)747.  
Thus for us too, public statements of a leader act as an indicator of the leader’s overall 
orientation even if the other motives are concealed748. We based our argumentation and our 
conclusions broadly on his public discourse. So, we remind that if our hypothesis is plausible, 
we expect the operation of the following predictions of “simple learning”.   
a) Behavioural adaptation of Tony Blair (simple learning) will not involve redefinition 
of identity and interest (complex learning). 
b) Simple learning of Tony Blair will lead him to use new information merely to adapt 
the means, without altering his deeper goals in the ends-means chain. 
 
Since we claim that his core cognitive believes have not undergone complex changes, 
then the propositions of the cognitive dissonance theory which have guided our analysis in the 
previous sections are still in operation.  
In this section we trace back the events from January 2006 till Tony Blair’s departure 
from Downing Street in June 2007. Since this period is historically quite short, our empirical 
data incorporate only 10 speeches, press conferences and interviews of Tony Blair made in 
2006 and 2007. These ten speeches are complemented by five more sources in which Tony 
Blair has expressed his policy statements quoted in such sources as The Independent, The 
Times, Report of the House of Commons (Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against 
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Terrorism: Fourth Report of Session 2005-06), as well as House of Commons debates 
(Hansard source, 15 March 2006). 
Among these 15 sources Tony Blair’s speech made to the World Affairs Council in Los 
Angeles on 1 August 2006 and his foreign policy speech of 13 November 2006 are considered 
to be the most important policy statements. In these speeches Prime Minister analyzes the 
Israeli-Palestinian peac process in context with other regional issues. 
In previous sections we have already noted that in order our analysis to be 
comprehensive, it needs to embrace both individual and institutional determinants of the 
decision-making process. We will show that the option of talking to Hamas, thus changing the 
current foreign policy, was consistently promoted by certain political institutions in the 
United Kingdom. Their perceptions and the output in the form of advice to Tony Blair are 
considered from the cognitive standpoint as either “cognitive dissonance” or “cognitive 
consonance”.  
Since configurations of formal political organizations and informal norms shape and 
structure interests, behavior and political outcomes, as argued by institutionalists, we need to 
trace briefly their policy position with which the Prime Minister had to cope749.  
First, we begin this section by considering such factors, as institutional norms and 
structured interactions that are critical to any credible account of governmental decision 
making. We discuss the positions and arguments of key political organizations involved in the 
British foreign policy concerning the response to the implications of the Hamas victory in 
2006. Our findings manifest divergences in the perceptions and calculations of Tony Blair and 
key players of the British system. In the second part, we analyze Blair’s cognitive processes 
and his dissonance reduction efforts.  
For the EU member states, including Britain, the Palestinian election outcome presented 
a profound dilemma. They had championed the goal of elections and yet, under their own 
laws, they could not continue to provide funding to a Palestinian Authority led by an 
organization that they had branded as a terrorist group. Under British anti-terrorist legislation 
of 2000, it was illegal to even provide a platform to members of such an organization. In the 
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circumstances, British officials would not deal with the new PA leadership, restricting 
themselves instead to interacting only with Fatah leader President Mahmoud Abbas750.  
Hamas is regarded as a terrorist organisation because of its past attacks on Israeli 
civilians. The military wing of Hamas is among the organisations proscribed in the United 
Kingdom and the British Government has no dealings with it751.  
According to the statement of Kim Howells, Minister for the Middle East in the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, the British Government recognised “Hamas's democratic mandate 
as a result of free and fair elections”752. 
But at the same time he argued that “with this mandate comes responsibilities. It is 
essential that the Hamas-led Government commits to the 30 January Quartet principles: 
renunciation of violence; recognition of Israel; and acceptance of previous agreements and 
obligations, including the road map. Hamas needs to start implementing these principles and 
make clear the path they intend to take. If they do this, then we are ready to take the peace 
process forward with them”753.  
 
THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 
Our data show that the British Parliament was one of the advocates of holding contacts 
with the Palestinian group Hamas. In its Report, the International Development Committee 
concluded: “We believe that the international community is right to place pressure on Hamas 
to change those policies which militate against a peace process. However this would best be 
achieved through dialogue and engagement rather than isolation”754.  
The Parliamentary Report justified its advice based on the presumption that the current 
approach “might push Hamas into a corner which encourages violence rather than 
negotiation. The international community must also ensure it is not bolstering one faction 
against the other and thereby increasing the risk of internal strife”755. 
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It concluded: “Given the failure of the boycott to deliver results, we recommend that the 
Government should urgently consider ways of engaging politically with moderate elements 
within Hamas as a way of encouraging it to meet the three Quartet principles”756. 
In another report the British Parliament proposed to proceed to also informal contacts 
with the newly elected political force Hamas:  
“We accept that no responsible government can deal directly with groups that engage in 
acts of terror and that Hamas has been and appears still to be such a group. However, we are 
also mindful of the way in which progress was eventually made after many years of abortive 
efforts in Northern Ireland, where mechanisms for dialogue were established, and bore fruit in 
the 1998 Belfast Agreement. It is possible that such a process might be developed based on 
informal contact and channels of communication with those who now exercise authority in 
the Palestinian territories, but at present the prospects for a process leading to a negotiated 
agreement look bleak”757. 
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Development argued 
remarked that there can be no sustainable solution “without the inclusion of Hamas”. 
However, he went on to state that Hamas has “obligations” (the three Quartet principles) and 
that “we expect them to be adhered to”758.  
Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Foreign Policy Adviser on Middle Eastern affairs, came to the 
conclusion “that the international community had “tried a certain policy with Abbas and it 
failed.” She argued that the British Government “must come to terms with the fact that Hamas 
is there for the duration. Hamas is not going to go anywhere; it is part of the fabric of 
Palestinian society”759. 
In her memorandum, she argued: “Following the violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 
mid-June 2007, the question of how the international community should deal with Hamas has 
become even more complex. It would appear that the international boycott of Hamas has 
strengthened the extremes and marginalized the more moderate pragmatists, like former 
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Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, who received nothing in return for his more conciliatory and 
progressive approach. The mood in Gaza at present is extremely defiant”760. 
 
FOREIGN OFFICE  
In previous sections we have already spoken about Israeli perceptions of the British 
policy towards Israeli and Palestinian politics as defined by two different approaches. One of 
these approaches, termed as the "Strategic" view, puts more emphasis on dividing Middle 
Eastern regimes into moderate and hostile ones. It assumes that aggressive, anti-Western 
governments and belief systems--radical Pan-Arab nationalism; revolutionary Islamism--are 
the principle threats to regional stability and to British interests. This approach was often 
present in the discourse and calculations of the Prime Minister's Office761.  
The second, termed the "Diplomatic" approach, is based on maintaining the best 
possible relations with the existing regimes or those forces which seem likely to take 
power762. Advocates of this viewpoint stress the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as 
quickly as possible, regarding this conflict as the key source of regional instability. This 
approach is seen to be prevalent in the minds and discourse of officials of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office763.  
Subsequently, the FCO has developed for decades various specific organisation outputs 
among which are dealings with elected representatives. Prior to the 2006 elections Jack Straw 
admitted that “British diplomats [had had] held talks with members of militant Palestinian 
group Hamas”764.  
"The result of that is that Hamas or people associated with Hamas have been elected in a 
number of areas," Jack Straw told BBC Radio 4's Today programme. "We have a diplomatic 
job to do as others do, and our diplomats in the occupied territories - as anywhere else in the 
world - see part of their job, indeed part of their job is, to have contact with elected 
representatives”765.  
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In May 2005 The Guardian reported that “the Foreign Office is swinging behind the 
view that it would be hypocritical to encourage democracy but refuse to accept the outcome, 
even if it means working with groups it finds distasteful”.766 According to this source, “[t]he 
dominant mood in the Foreign Office has swung in favour of engagement”767. 
In February a leaked Foreign Office memo was also published revealing that the 
government was to establish ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group banned by 
the Egyptian government768. The Guardian reported: “Like other western countries, Britain is 
struggling with the dilemma posed by the electoral successes of Islamist groups either directly 
linked to terrorism or alleged to be fronts for violent organisations”769. 
The memo, written on January 17 and leaked to the New Statesman, recommended 
increased engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamist group in the 
world. The recommendation has been accepted by Jack Straw, the foreign secretary770. 
The memo said: "The presentation of any change in the way we deal with the Muslim 
Brotherhood will have to be carefully handled, in order to safeguard our bilateral relations 
with Egypt"771. 
The Guardian continued making reference to this leaked source: “Western governments 
have attracted widespread criticism within the Muslim world for advocating democracy and 
then refusing the accept the results of the democratic process by rejecting contact with elected 
representatives. The debate within the Foreign Office has been provoked by the successes of 
the Palestinian group Hamas; the political wing of the Hizbullah guerrillas; the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Sunni groups with ties to insurgents in Iraq. The British approach 
differs country by country”772. 
In April 2006 British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated: "Hamas now leads the 
government and we would like to have normal relations with them as we have had with 
previous governments," he said. "This requires movement by them as well as by us”773.  
Referring to a Hamas recognition of Israel, Straw stressed he did not expect a formal 
declaration by the group's leaders. According to Straw, Hamas must accept Israel's existence 
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as a fact, but a change in the organization's charter that calls for Israel's destruction is not a 
necessary condition for negotiations between the two sides774.   
These above mentioned empirical facts about the perceptions and calculations of the 
British Parliament and the FCO are essential for understanding the UK’s formal and informal 
relations with different political forces in the Middle East. 
These formal and informal norms are assumed to shape and structure interests, behavior 
and political outcomes and are transmitted from government to government. Social research 
cannot ignore the broader institutional forces that govern the perceptions, calculations, and 
behavior of political actors. These organizational structures and informal norms both 
constrain actors and also supply with opportunities for individual agency. 
 
TONY BLAIR’S POSITION 
An official in the Blair government recalled: “No one had expected the result. The 
election had been intended as a way of neutralising Hamas and for it to suddenly turn around 
and bite us in that way was astonishing”775.  
Senior diplomats of the Blair administration testify that Tony Blair “took a hard line on 
Hamas”776. One of these diplomats recalled the immediate aftermath when the Cabinet was 
discussing the response to the Hamas victory. “[Jack] Straw argued and there was heated 
debate. The FCO line was that Hamas was capable of changing and that Britain anyway had a 
duty to help the Palestinian people, whatever the difficulties with their elected leaders. But 
Blair’s view prevailed”777.  
This extract shows that in the immediate aftermath of Hamas victory Prime Minister 
Blair did not share the view that Hamas had transformed itself. By the end of January 2006, 
Tony Blair’s discourse shows that at least at the public level he did not believe that Hamas 
had implemented the requirements of the international community. At a monthly press 
conference he said: 
"It is very difficult for us to be in the position of negotiating or 
talking to Hamas unless there’s a very clear renunciation of 
terrorism"778.  
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The same conclusion persists in his public discourse in March 2006. Setting out the 
British foreign policy towards Hamas he noted:  
“One thing should be made very clear again: we totally respect 
the mandate that Hamas secured in the elections. We supported those 
democratic elections, we support them still. But if it wants our help—
both financially and politically—to make progress, it has to be on an 
understood basis, which means giving up violence, negotiating 
peacefully and accepting the existence of Israel”779. 
  
In another public speech Tony Blair reiterated his position about the conditions of the 
international community vis-à-vis Hamas: 
“Clear acceptance by Hamas that the two-state solution is the 
only one; a renunciation of all violence; and then a move back into the 
Road Map, with a speeded up pathway to final status negotiations”780.  
 
Further, in a specific counterfactual statement Tony Blair argues that “moderate” 
elements in Hamas were not prevalent: 
“Hamas won the election. Even then, had moderate elements in 
Hamas been able to show progress, the situation might have been 
saved. But they couldn't. So the opportunity passed to reactionary 
Islam and they seized it: first in Gaza, then in Lebanon”781.  
 
The study of Tony Blair’s speeches of the second half of 2006 and beginning of 2007 
shows us his association of two concepts – Hamas and the Iranian factor. From other sources 
we see that Tony Blair’s position clearly reflects the international perceptions of the Iranian 
factor. 
Haas and Indyk maintain that the plight of the Palestinians remains a sensitive issue 
across the Arab and Muslim worlds. The situation has been exploited by the Iranians to 
advance their otherwise implausible claim to leadership in the broader Middle East and to 
bolster their argument that violence and terrorism are the way to liberate Palestine, a position 
that undermines those Arab leaders who would work with the United States to try to resolve 
the problem by engaging with Israel782.  
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In a similar vein, according to Zweiri, “[t]he only country which hailed Hamas's victory 
was Iran. This was understandable, simply because of the special relationship between both 
sides. Iran considered the elections to be 'voting for resistance'. This support from Iran might 
be considered to be encouraging Hamas to remain a militant organisation instead of becoming 
a political movement”783.  
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, plunged into the fray, urging the movement not to bow to 
Israeli and western demands. “The only way to succeed is to continue resistance against the 
occupier regime”784, he said. Pledging Iranian help in making good any shortfall in foreign 
assistance, he argued: “Such voluntary aid will create a psychological connection between 
Muslims and the Palestinian issue and will have a great effect on the world”785. 
Martin Indyk cautioned that any sudden moves from the United States and Europe to 
reduce aid -- or a decision by Israel to withhold the tax revenue it shares with the Palestinian 
Authority -- could drive Hamas to seek funding from Iran, long one of its chief sponsors. Iran 
has tried to increase its influence in the Palestinian territories786.  
The Financial Times suggested that the international boycott of the PA should be ended. 
To do otherwise, it argued, would only serve to increase the influence of Iran in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories787.  
The Iranian factor was a recurrent one in the Israeli mindset as well. Bronner notes that 
“the three current or potential civil wars in the Middle East, then — in Lebanon, Iraq and the 
Palestinian areas — are therefore all interlinked in Israel’s logic, with Iran as the common 
denominator”788.   
The New York Times quotes a senior Israeli official who recalled: “The Saudis are 
saying to us, ‘We are afraid of Iran and want to work with you but the Palestinian issue has to 
be solved”789. 
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Under this international context of increasing perceptions of the Iranian factor, in his 
seminal foreign policy speech of August 1, 2006 Blair consistently underlined the link 
between Hamas and Iran. 
“Hezbollah gets their weapons from Iran. Iran are now also 
financing militant elements in Hamas. Iran's president has called for 
Israel to be "wiped off the map". And he's trying to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. Just to complete the picture, Israel's main neighbour along its 
eastern flank is Syria who support Hezbollah and house the hardline 
leaders of Hamas”790. 
 
By the end of the year, his vision of causal links between Hamas and Iran still persisted:  
“Instead they are using the pressure points in the region to thwart 
us. So they help the most extreme elements of Hamas in Palestine; 
Hezbollah in the Lebanon; Shia militia in Iraq”791.   
 
Based on these speeches we have constructed his cognitive map, in which we can see 
causal links between different concepts that constitute actors and phenomena in the Middle 
East. We sought to show his conceptual links between these actors and Iran. 
See Figure 11.  
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We have already noted that on 21 February 2007, Tony Blair remarked that it would be 
“far easier to deal with the situation in Palestine if there is a national unity Government,” 
adding that “I hope we can make progress, including even with the more sensible elements of 
Hamas”792. 
When the British Parliament asked Dr Howells, Minister for Middle East, to clarify the 
Prime Minister’s comments, his answer revealed that the Government, at that point, did not 
view the three principles as explicit ‘red lines’:  
“As I interpret the Prime Minister’s analysis, those elements within Hamas would have 
to be part of the national unity Government and subscribe to a general statement by that 
Government that would go some way at least towards the Quartet’s principles. If that 
happened, we could contemplate talking to Hamas”793. 
This official statement shows that the British government envisaged introducing certain 
modifications in tactical means. We continued our exploration of primary sources to see 
whether this line was complemented by redefinition of identity, interest and belief system.  
But our data failed to show that Tony Blair had developed a new belief which would fall 
under the definition of “diagnostic” belief, where he reassesses the intentions and capabilities 
of the parties. Our data also failed to show the presence of Tony Blair’s perception that 
Hamas had transformed itself into a group recognizing Israel and thus the Quartet principles.     
Instead in one of his speeches of this period we can see his perception that Israel’s 
security is not guaranteed by the current situation which implies that Hamas has not yet 
transformed itself so that Israel could feel assured in terms of its security:  
Hezbollah gets their weapons from Iran. Iran are now also 
financing militant elements in Hamas. Iran's president has called for 
Israel to be "wiped off the map". And he's trying to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. Just to complete the picture, Israel's main neighbour along its 
eastern flank is Syria who support Hezbollah and house the hardline 
leaders of Hamas. It's not exactly a situation conducive to a feeling of 
security, is it?794  
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His belief that Hamas had not transformed itself to be accepted as an official partner can 
also be traced in his specific counterfactual statement, in which he argued that “moderate” 
elements in Hamas were not prevalent: 
“Hamas won the election. Even then, had moderate elements in 
Hamas been able to show progress, the situation might have been 
saved. But they couldn't. So the opportunity passed to reactionary 
Islam and they seized it: first in Gaza, then in Lebanon”795. 
 
To disconfirm our hypothesis, we need to provide some evidence that Blair had 
undergone “complex learning”. This supposes his reassessment of the capabilities of the 
parties and his the previous strategic approaches to the conflict resolution (namely, “top-down 
strategy”). 
As we already remarked the empirical data sources embrace his speeches made in 2006 
and 2007. Of these available primary sources Tony Blair’s speech made to the World Affairs 
Council in Los Angeles on 1 August 2006 and his foreign policy speech of 13 November 
2006 are considered to be the most important policy statements. In these speeches Prime 
Minister analyzes the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in context with other regional issues. 
In the sources under study we see that he explicitly advocates the previous practices of 
strengthening Palestinian institutions through the mechanism of the Roadmap. These sources 
show he is not calling for shift of approaches towards alternatives of the top-down strategy.  
In an essential foreign policy speech he said: 
“We need relentlessly, vigorously, to put a viable Palestinian 
Government on its feet, to offer a vision of how the Roadmap to final 
status negotiation can happen and then pursue it, week in, week out, 
till it’s done. Nothing else will do. Nothing else is more important to 
the success of our foreign policy”796.  
 
Previously, he had reiterated his position about the conditions of the international 
community vis-à-vis Hamas: 
“Clear acceptance by Hamas that the two-state solution is the 
only one; a renunciation of all violence; and then a move back into the 
Road Map, with a speeded up pathway to final status negotiations”797.  
 
This shows that he remained committed to the Roadmap. We further looked for his 
attitude to the capacity of Palestinian institutions led by Abbas to deliver their obligations. If 
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Tony Blair had undergone complex changes (that would disconfirm our hypothesis), theory 
predicts he will come at reassessment of intentions, capabilities of the Palestinian Authority.   
Specifically, Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Foreign Policy Adviser on Middle Eastern affairs, had 
come to the conclusion “that the international community had “tried a certain policy with 
Abbas and it failed.798”  
Based on this assumption, she argued that the British Government “must come to terms 
with the fact that Hamas is there for the duration. Hamas is not going to go anywhere; it is 
part of the fabric of Palestinian society”799.   
But our data show Tony Blair, at least public, had not reassessed his beliefs about 
optimal approaches at the strategic level, even, as was noted above, he made certain tactical 
shifts. 
As predicted by the dissonance approach, we see that Tony Blair interpreted the claim 
that President Abbas was too weak in such a manner as to attribute this weakness to the 
failures of the peace process. This will enable him to continue backing his preferred option – 
“peace process”. He said:  
“Here a moderate leadership was squeezed between its own 
inability to control the radical elements and the political stagnation of 
the peace process”800.  
  
He underlined that the opportunity was not seized: 
“When Prime Minister Sharon took the brave step of 
disengagement from Gaza, it could have been and should have been 
the opportunity to re-start the process”. 
 
And he concluded:  
“But the squeeze was too great and as ever because these 
processes never stay still, instead of moving forward, it fell back. 
Hamas won the election”801.  
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With this caveat in mind he deemphasized the option of not supporting political 
institutions of President Abbas. This belief about the consequences of not supporting 
President Abbas is revealed in the following extract:  
“Because otherwise what we face in the region is a situation 
where the extremists always have the upper hand, so the most militant 
elements of Hamas have the upper hand in Palestine, the most militant 
elements of Hezbollah have a upper hand in Lebanon and these al-
Qaeda-backed extremists or Iranian backed Shia militia in Iraq have 
the upper hand”802.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Summarising the above-mentioned arguments, we remind that we sought some evidence 
in Tony Blair’s public discourse which would indicate the presence of an intervening 
mechanism of cognitive reassessment of his prior beliefs. Our goal was not simply to discuss 
changes in his political decisions and actions. But we tended to trace whether these policy 
shifts are attributed to changes in his belief system.  
If our hypothesis that Tony Blair’s position to talk to certain members of Hamas was 
caused not by change of beliefs, but by the structural adjustment to the external environment, 
was correct, we expect to observe “simple” learning in Blair’s selection of means but not in 
ends803.  
In contrast, if our prediction were wrong, then our findings needed to show that from the 
beginning of 2007 till his departure Tony Blair underwent “complex learning”, in which in 
addition to modification of means, he reconsidered goals. This “complex learning” also 
supposed his reassessment of the capabilities of the parties and his the previous strategic 
approaches to the conflict resolution (namely, “top-down strategy”). 
Our data consistently showed his support for the previous policies through the generally 
accepted mechanism of the Roadmap. Though he did not preclude dialogue with certain 
Hamas elements, our data did not show his reassessment of the group’s motivations and 
intentions. Even after his departure from Downing Street, in his role as Quartet 
Representative, he did not perceive signs of change in the strategies of Hamas.  
In September 2007 Reuters quoted Quartet Representative Tony Blair who said “there 
were few signs that moderates in Hamas had the upper hand since rockets were still fired into 
Israel”804. These data allow us suppose that our hypothesis about structural adjustment and not 
reassessment of beliefs about capabilities and intentions of Hamas is plausible. 
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SECTION 1. OVERVIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET 
 
It is commonly assumed that the US and EU approaches to the peace process between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians have been marked by strategic differences. This difference 
was particularly conspicuous during the Bush administration. The received wisdom in 
Washington was that Palestinians, by their failure to curb terrorism, were blocking the 
prospects of peace805.  
Consequently, the Bush and Sharon administrations have made further political 
concessions conditional on the Palestinians’ actions. The US and Israeli conception embraced 
“two halves”: in the first half, the responsibility was “placed on the Palestinians and only 
when they prove themselves in a long list of difficult demands, it will be time for the second 
half”806.  
The basic argument of the Sharon administration was that negotiations with the 
Palestinians elevated Yasser Arafat to the rank of an official negotiating partner, when his 
organization’s charter still demanded the destruction of the Jewish state807.  
For their part, European recipes for solving the Arab-Israeli problem tend to focus on 
the need for Israel to change policy and the importance of persuading Washington to make it 
do so808.  
The issue of US involvement into the peace process was one the most highly debated 
issues around military action against Iraq. The British Foreign Minister Jack Straw argued: 
“There is a real concern too that the West has been guilty of double standards - on the one 
hand saying the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iraq must be implemented; on 
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the other hand, sometimes appearing rather quixotic over the implementation of resolutions 
about Israel and Palestine”809.  
On April 10th 2002, Colin Powell announced the formation of a Madrid “Quartet”, 
reviving the agenda of the 1991 Madrid conference with the UN Secretary-General, the EU 
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (Javier Solana), and the 
Russian Foreign Minister (Igor Ivanov). The focus of this approach was on pursuing a two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the active engagement of outside actors. 
In other words, the State Department had decided to pursue a multilateral approach to the 
peace process, and co-operation with European governments was to be a key factor810.  
The Quartet has fulfilled its activities based on the principal international paper which is 
called the Roadmap for peace, which we have discussed in previous chapters. In a 
Communiqué issued in New York in September 2002, the Quartet announced that it was 
working with the parties and consulting key regional actors on a three-phase implementation 
“roadmap” that could achieve a final settlement within three years811.  
In the first case study we have spoken much about Tony Blair’s efforts to urge President 
Bush and his administration members to assume more commitment through this mechanism. 
The formation of the Quartet was assessed by Javier Solana as the most important 
achievement for many, many years, having a common position for the countries represented 
here as far the peace process is concerned812. 
The UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Alvaro de Soto in his 
famous report called the Quartet to be “a mechanism to harmonize disparate diplomatic 
efforts and to discourage potentially contradictory solo forays by important actors”813. 
Similarly, the British Parliament regarded the mere inclusion of the EU within the 
Quartet as “an acknowledgement of the growing political role of the EU in the MEPP [Middle 
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East Peace Process] and the legitimacy of the EU’s involvement as a major contributor to 
funding and institution building”814. 
According to Musu, even prior to creation of the Quartet the Europeans had played an 
increasingly important role in the peace process since the Madrid Conference, but 
participation in the Quartet arguably gave the European role a higher political relevance and 
resonance. The EU’s presence was particularly welcomed by the Palestinians, who saw it as a 
potential counterbalance to an American position they perceive as permanently biased in 
favour of Israel815.  
The Quartet’s chief Palestinian interlocutor President Abbas has recently reiterated his 
preference that Europe should increase its political engagement in the Middle East in a way 
similar to its economic role: “We are looking to Europe to carry out a bigger political role and 
we don't want it to be just financial assistant”816. 
Conversely, the creation of the Quartet met with a less enthusiastic reception in Israel, 
where multilateralism is seen as a means to impose unwelcome decisions, and the EU is 
perceived as a less than friendly actor817.  
Prime Minister Sharon in his Newsweek magazine interview even discounted a "road 
map" resolution envisaging the creation of a Palestinian state within three years818. He 
claimed: “The Quartet is nothing! Don't take it seriously”819. 
Likewise, we also noted that some commentators saw President Bush's declaration of 
support for the twin-state "roadmap" solution, the basic document of the Quartet activities, for 
the first time publicly backing a Palestinian state as a "reward" to Tony Blair's powers of 
persuasion following UK backing of the US position on the Iraq war820.  
If in appearance the Quartet opens the peace process to multilateralism, in substance it 
creates a somewhat contradictory framework: final goals and intermediate steps have been 
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approved by the Quartet and then presented to the parties to the conflict who are supposed to 
implement them821. 
Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross argues that the roadmap reflected 
agreement with parties that had no responsibility for carrying out even one of the steps for 
which they were calling. Conversely, the parties that would have to implement these steps 
were presented the roadmap after the Quartet had already agreed to it. They were each offered 
the opportunity to make comments but not to engage in a negotiation about its content or how 
it might actually be implemented. Perhaps the need to avoid negotiating with Yasir Arafat—
as well as the desire to have an international consensus that would be difficult to reject—
influenced the administration’s approach822.  
He contends that by definition, however, the roadmap could never be brought to life if it 
were based only on the understandings of outsiders. Indeed, it could only materialize with 
clear and unambiguous understandings between the “insiders” on what each side would 
actually do, when they would do it, where they would do it and how they would do it823.  
Both the Israeli and the Palestinians turn to the Quartet and to the Roadmap to the extent 
they see fit to safeguard their interest, but both do not hesitate to turn back to the traditional 
scheme of negotiations (i.e. Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the US as mediator) and 
negotiate important points that the Roadmap may address not to their satisfaction. The US 
itself, despite being a member of the Quartet, has had a mixed attitude towards it, almost 
fuelling the suspicions that it had contributed to its creation in order to respond to external 
pressures (mainly from the European allies) while at the same time aiming to maintain an 
undisputed role as the sole mediator accepted by both parties824.  
Even though the Quartet formally implied a dramatic departure from past U.S. 
peacemaking approaches, until today there has been a clear “division of labour” within it. 
Alvaro de Soto complained that “the US doesn't feel the need to consult closely with the 
Quartet except when it suits it”825.  
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This opinion was supported by a prominent insider, the former Quartet Envoy James 
Wolfensohn, predecessor of Tony Blair, admitted that there “was never a desire on the part of 
the Americans to give up control of the negotiations”826. 
In summary, in his book Chris Patten referred to his Arab colleagues who called the 
Middle East foursome of negotiators as “Quartet, sans trois”827. For others “the nature of the 
Quartet lies somewhere between a "contact group" and "group of friends"828. 
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APPOINTMENT OF TONY BLAIR AS QUARTET REPRESENTATIVE  
 
On 27 June 2007, Tony Blair was announced the Middle East Quartet Representative. 
According to Hanelt and Möller, “The Middle East Quartet was revived in the first half of 
2007 during the then German EU presidency, and Tony Blair’s appointment should be seen in 
the context of what preceded it. At the beginning of January Chancellor Angela Merkel 
travelled to Washington in order to persuade President George W. Bush to play a more active 
part in the Quartet. President Bush had outlined the vision of a two-state solution in a speech 
give in June 2002, but subsequently the U.S. government failed to come up with a new 
political initiative in the Middle East. Bush concurred with Merkel’s proposals, and as a result 
the Quartet met on five occasions between January and July 2007 on the level of principals829.  
In February and April 2007 Merkel in her capacity as the incumbent of the EU 
Presidency travelled to the Middle East in order to canvas support among moderate Arab 
states for the new activities of the Quartet. Other positive developments included the fact that 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice regularly contrived to facilitate talks between 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, that in 
February 2007 Saudi Arabia brokered a Palestinian government of National Unity consisting 
of Al-Fatah and Hamas, and that in March the Arab League meeting in Riyadh confirmed that 
it stood by its 2002 Middle East peace plan. For a short period of time it seemed as if the 
conditions for a revival of the peace process were propitious830.  
That’s why Tony Blair’s appointment was seen as most visible attempt at laying the 
groundwork for a Palestinian state since President Clinton wrangled with Yasir Arafat and 
Ehud Barak during the waning hours of his administration in 2001831.  
In a telephone conversation with us, Dr Christian-Peter Hanelt said: “I think the Quartet 
principals wanted to make their commitments and their activities on the ground more efficient 
by appointing a politician like Tony Blair”832.  
But the appointment of Tony Blair was a source of contention among the Quartet’s 
members. For a certain moment Russia had been expressing opposition to the appointment. 
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According to The Guardian, Gordon Brown was described as “angry at being presented with 
a fait accompli, making it difficult for him to formulate his own Middle East policy”833.   
On this occasion, a top British diplomat said: “This keeps Blair interminably in the 
limelight,” noting the former Prime Minister will report to the UN general assembly in 
September, just as Mr Brown makes his maiden appearance834. The Foreign Office, whose 
officials were also unaware of the appointment, was reported in an “institutional sulk”835. 
Der Spiegel also informed that “[t]he EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana was also 
surprised by the suggestion and is skeptical about Blair's nomination”836. According to the 
information obtained by Der Spiegel, the Foreign Ministry in Berlin had not been informed of 
plans to nominate Blair Tony for the post – even though German Foreign Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier was representing the EU in the Quartet837. 
Martin Schulz, chairman of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, contended: 
“I cannot imagine that Blair, as one of the main players in the Iraq war, would be able to win 
confidence in the Middle East”838. 
 
Israeli Attitude  
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told about Tony Blair: “He really invested himself 
in this effort to try and build up an infrastructure for the Palestinians. […] I don’t know how 
rapidly the Palestinians will be prepared to meet this challenge. But I think that his general 
approach is positive”839. 
Zvi Heifetz, Israel's ambassador to London, also commented: "It's an excellent idea. 
There is no better person for this job. He has been dealing with the Middle East for 10 years, 
and he has been objective and balanced”840. 
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Palestinian Attitude  
Manuel Hassassian, the London representative of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation, said: “It would be worthwhile to see what Mr Blair could do, especially at 
critical times like this with a rift between Hamas and Fatah”841.  
Manuel Hassassian, who stressed he was expressing a personal opinion, added: "I think 
Mr Blair as a prime minister to a certain degree tied in his policies to those of the United 
States. Now he could play a more independent role”842.  
According to The New York Times, the “Palestinians also did not seem to expect Blair to 
solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”843. The chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat told the 
Associated Press: “What I do with the Israelis, what the Israelis do with me, is the main 
ingredient. […] The decisions required for peace are not going to come from the envoys”844. 
 
Russian Opinion 
The former Prime Minister of Russia Eugeniy Primakov argued that Tony Blair’s 
“closeness to President George W. Bush meant that he would follow Washington and 
therefore be incapable of leading diplomatic efforts by the Middle East Quartet - the United 
Nations, America, the European Union and Russia”845. He further added: “I do not think that 
Tony Blair will become the Quartet's conductor. […] His role will consist of following the US 
line”846. 
 
European component strengthened 
At first the authors of the report we have quoted “Tony Blair Needs a Plan. Suggestions 
for the Working Agenda of the New Representative of the Middle East Quartet” (German 
Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research) believed that the appointment of Tony Blair as 
Quartet Representative can be linked with the issue of strengthening the European visibility: 
“Blair’s appointment symbolizes the need to put transatlantic cooperation on a sound 
footing. … [A]t the same time Blair might also strengthen the European component of the 
Quartet. During his time as prime minister of the UK there were often limits to what he could 
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do in Europe on account of the eurosceptic attitude of his electorate. In his new position Blair 
might well be able to act with a greater degree of freedom. The presence of a former prime 
minister of the stature of Blair could also enhance the extent to which the Europeans are 
visible and their political influence. Blair has an intimate knowledge of how the conflicts in 
the region interlock, partly because British troops are stationed in Iraq, and partly on account 
of his role in the EU3 negotiations with Iran. Furthermore, in the past he has mediated 
between pro-Israeli and pro-Arab tendencies in the EU member states. His experience in 
dealing with the conflict in Northern Ireland will no doubt stand him in good stead”847. 
Communicating with these authors we have asked them whether this expectation was 
realised, according to their current assessments. In a telephone conversation with us, Dr 
Hanelt expressed the following view: 
“I think the Quartet principals wanted to make their commitments and their activities on 
the ground more efficient by appointing a politician like Tony Blair. In principle, yes. But 
they did not clarify his mission and especially his role between the Quartet envoys and the 
Quartet principals. You know, they have appointed the Quartet special envoy but did not 
clarify to whom he will report, what he really has to do, who is working for whom, how the 
Quartet envoys are really involved and connected to his mission. So, these day-to-day 
uncertainties have weakened the appointment of Mr. Blair and fulfilment of his mission”848. 
In a private correspondence with us, another author of the same report Dr Almut Möller 
remarked: 
“We were hoping that Blair would give the Quartet a strong, high profile European 
component, even though at the time already there were a lot of critical voices. I lost much of 
that optimism rather quickly. It was never entirely clear to me what Mr Blair was actually 
doing, how his mandate was defined and how he executed it, and how he communicated, e.g., 
with the EU special Representative Otte, or how he is communicating with Catherine Ashton 
nowadays”849. 
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MANDATE OF THE QUARTET REPRESENTATIVE:  
LIMITATIONS AND CONTROVERSIES 
 
In the statement issued on 27 June 2007, the members of the Quartet gave Blair the 
following mandate. As “Quartet representative” he will 
– Mobilize international assistance to the Palestinians, working closely with donors and 
existing coordination bodies; 
– Help to identify and secure appropriate international support in addressing the 
institutional governance needs of the Palestinian State, focusing as a matter of urgency on the 
rule of law; 
– Develop plans to promote Palestinian economic development, including private sector 
partnerships, building on previously agreed frameworks, especially concerning access and 
movement; and 
– Liaise with other countries as appropriate in support of the agreed Quartet 
objectives850. 
As it is clear from this formulation of his official mandate, Tony Blair has been given 
primarily economic functions without being supported by the political ones. This has 
generated a number debates inside and outside the Quartet. The US Secretary of State Rice 
explicitly stated: “There is also a political track that for a variety of reasons the United States 
is committed to lead in co-ordination with the Quartet"851. She also added that Tony Blair's 
role “is something that is completely complementary and if we all work together, and there is 
plenty to do, perhaps we can finally deliver"852.  
Tony Blair’s predecessor James Wolfensohn claims the Quartet Representative was 
originally “never given the mandate to negotiate the peace”. He also warned: “My worry for 
Tony Blair is that if you read the mandate he has – it's exactly the same as mine. It talks about 
helping both sides, helping the Palestinians, but there's nothing there about negotiating peace. 
I would only hope that there's a greater mandate given to him, because even with the superior 
standing that he has over the standing I had, if he doesn't have a mandate”. 
Tony Blair’s predecessor as Quartet Envoy James Wolfensohn noted: “The trouble is 
that they've given the mandate in such a limited way that you cannot take part anymore in the 
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negotiations of the peace. Blair has the responsibility only of economic activity and frankly 
unless you have some political clout there's not much you can do”853. 
Drs Möller and Hanelt admit: “However, in the current situation it is questionable 
whether Blair can achieve very much with this mandate. […] Blair does not possess an 
explicitly political mandate, and it is doubtful whether the Quartet will grant him one. But 
with his experience as prime minister behind him, his great personal motivation, and the 
potential of the Quartet institution, Blair might be able to achieve more in his capacity as 
Quartet representative than his predecessor854. 
Palestinian negotiators have also called for Tony Blair to be given a broader role as the 
international community's Middle East envoy, overseeing both Israeli and Palestinian 
obligations855. 
But the Palestinian letter, obtained by the Guardian, demands that he also police Israeli 
commitments under the stalled peace process, such as freezing the building of settlements on 
the West Bank and removing checkpoints. In this letter written by Palestinian chief negotiator 
Saeb Erekat, he assures the Quartet of Palestinian support for Tony Blair but requests that "he 
place equal emphasis on the fulfilment of Israeli obligations and responsibilities under the 
'road map'"856.  
For its part, the British Parliament also recommended broadening his mandate to include 
working with Israel, the Palestinians and regional states on political issues as well. 
“The former Prime Minister appears to have a narrow mandate—the focus is on 
developing Palestinian institutions rather than promoting Palestinian reconciliation or possible 
peace negotiations between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian President”857.  
In her written submission, foreign policy advisor Nomi Bar-Yaacov argued that Toy 
Bair’s mandate should be expanded to include a serious political role if he is to stand a chance 
in succeeding in his mission. “Mr Blair is unlikely to be able to achieve progress on the 
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institution-building and economic front (his current mandate) unless his mandate is expanded 
to include a political and security role”858.   
Suggesting that there was a need for the issues of politics, economics and security to be 
considered in "tandem", Nomi Bar-Yaacov claimed that a past mistake of the Quartet was to 
let the US deal with political and security issues, whilst the UN and the EU focused on aid. 
The latter "found themselves pouring vast sums of money into a bottomless pit" due to 
continued insecurity859.  
She also remarked that the creation of a "unified and competent" security apparatus in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories will be "one of the most difficult challenges" facing Tony 
Blair, but also "the most important one", for which advancements in the political process 
would be required860.  
 
 
                                                 
858
 Ibidem. 
859
 Ibid. 
860
 Ibid. 
 252 
 
 
The so-called Oslo thinking to which Tony Blair was committed during his Prime 
Minister years advocated building a Palestinian state from the top down: create a Palestinian 
national authority, hand over territory to it, give it increasing power, arm it and finance it, 
hold elections, and a Palestinian state would emerge861.  
As was put by Moshe Yaalon, “[f]rom Oslo to Annapolis, we have consistently engaged 
in a "top-down strategy." We aimed to reach a political horizon or a final settlement 
agreement with the Palestinian leadership, hoping that political reform among Palestinians 
would follow862. 
Kriesberg suggests the Oslo Accord “was designed to set in motion a multi-step peace 
process in which higher levels of agreement would be reached as parties established mutual 
trust at earlier levels”. However, since both groups were internally divided, the result was the 
opposite863.  
Thus, while a commitment to the idea of peace, however ambiguous, remained a 
prerequisite for those vying for power in both groups, the Oslo Accord itself became a 
synonym for poor statesmanship. The widening gap between the vision of peace and 
prosperity and the grim reality of violence and suffering, that is, between interstate 
perceptions of the conflict and its intergroup manifestations, allowed the opposition to 
undermine public support for a compromise864.  
According to Avineri, Director-General of Israel’s Foreign Ministry in the first cabinet 
of Yitzhak Rabin, “[T]he consequence was a corrupt, militarized Palestinian Authority, with 
competing security services proved incapable of providing security. Nor could it conduct 
credible negotiations with Israel or deliver necessary services to ordinary Palestinians”865. 
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From the British standpoint the weakness of the Oslo approach was that it required 
“each party to reach staged objectives before moving on to the next stage, and both sides 
failed to meet their mutual obligations under an agreed timetable. This resulted in the opposite 
of what was intended: an erosion of confidence and backward-looking, mutually blocking 
recriminations about what had not been fulfilled, rather than a forward-looking process based 
on trust. The process was also designed to lead to a mutually agreed outcome at the end, 
rather than reaching the clear objective of a two-state solution posited from the outset”866. 
Coupled with this, the Israelis believe that there are two reasons for this failure: “the 
institutional weakness of Palestinian civil society, which lacks the infrastructure necessary for 
nation-building; and the impossibility of simultaneous nation-building and peace-making. 
There is no precedent anywhere in the world that suggests that such a two-tier process can 
succeed”867.  
In actual practice, there are more and more calls inside the Israeli social fabric for 
substituting the formerly prevalent “top-down strategy” for the “bottom-up strategy”. 
Suggesting that changes should begin in Palestinian political culture, Yaalon also proposed to 
“replace this approach with a "bottom-up strategy" in which the PA [Palestinian Authority] 
first proves its ability to govern. Real gains in stability and security on the road to peace can 
then be consolidated through political agreements”868.   
In a similar vein, same Avineri advocated reform and transformations from the depth of 
the Palestinian civil society: “A fundamental change of paradigm is needed: the effort should 
shift to building a Palestinian state from the bottom up, for which there are encouraging signs, 
even in the midst of the failure of the top-down process”869.  
If Tony Blair had committed himself during his Premiership to resumption of 
negotiations during each period of stagnation (“negotiations as goal”), by the moment he 
assumed his Quartet functions, a fundamental Israeli trend with which he had to deal with was 
reconceptualization of the concept of “negotiations”.  
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According to the diplomatic advisor to Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni Tal Becker: 
“Although both sides are operating in a difficult and inopportune context, peace is not 
impossible. However, rather than envisioning a utopian peace, the parties should measure 
progress in comparison to the status quo (which is rapidly degenerating). Negotiations must 
be seen as a means rather than an end in themselves. Instead of asking what it will take to 
return to the negotiating table, all sides, the United States included, must ask themselves what 
needs to be in place to produce meaningful results and create the best chance for a successful 
outcome. Negotiations must be reconceptualized as only one of a range of tools to achieve 
progress and create space and incentives for improvements on the ground, including within 
the context of the Palestinian statebuilding project in the West Bank870. 
And already by the end of George W. Bush’s presidency an increasing number of 
observers of the peace process suggested to replace the existing approaches by new ones 
adjusted to the achievements and problems of the Palestinian civil society. Diehl emphasized 
the following point of view:  
“But it is grounds for a President Obama or McCain to try a different approach to an 
intractable problem, one that focuses on building a foundation for peace from the ground up, 
rather than pushing fickle and fragile leaders to dictate a settlement from above. The timeline 
for success would be measured in years, not months. The goal would not be a document that 
Livni and Abbas could sign but the construction of a healthy and vibrant Palestinian civil 
society -- that is, independent media, courts, political parties and nongovernmental 
organizations that could stand behind a settlement with Israel”871. 
Thus one of the earliest patterns of information Tony Blair began receiving dealt with 
changing the perceptions of the parties of each other. Yaalon proposed international mediators 
involved in the Quartet to apply the principle of conditionality implying that moves towards 
the political agreement should be preceded by changes in attitudes of the Palestinians to the 
Israelis. He argued: “Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other prominent figures 
have called for more foreign aid to be directed for this purpose to the Palestinians. However, 
unless further foreign aid is directly connected to reforms within Palestinian civil society, 
there is no chance of success. Unless the Palestinians are first convinced through education to 
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give up the extremism which informs their national and religious aspirations, they cannot be 
expected to cooperate in the creation of their own prosperity”872.  
 
NEW DISCOURSE OF TONY BLAIR:  
FROM TOP-DOWN TO BOTTOM-UP STRATEGY 
 
The principal analytic goal of our study has been to establish whether and how Tony 
Blair’s strategic approaches to the conflict are evolving in the new institutional context. In the 
previous case-study we discussed the position of Tony Blair over the issue under different 
conditions – in opposition and as Labour leader. 
Our data have also shown that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians was 
the point of most divergences between the US and British conceptions. As a senior Foreign 
Office official recalled: “the Arab-Israeli issue was the most difficult, protracted issue 
between us and the Americans over the whole ten-year period of Blair premiership”873.   
Ken Adelman, who served on Rusmfeld’s Defence Policy Board, encapsulated the 
thinking of his fellow travellers: “the fact is the players weren’t there, the timing wasn’t there, 
the substance wasn’t there. Tony Blair would respond, “Yes, but you have to create all those”. 
It just wasn’t going to happen”874.  
Against a background of low-profile US engagement he consistently argued: 
“What happens when the process breaks down is that the fanatics 
and extremists use the breakdown as an excuse to engage in more 
violence, because there's a vacuum, and when there's a vacuum these 
people move in and exploit it, in exactly the same way that bin Laden 
is exploiting the Palestinian cause”875. 
  
When Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were under suspension, throughout his years in 
Downing Street he used to push for a resumption of talks, backed by an international 
conference, and even proposing time frames on his behalf: 
“And there is only one answer. By this year's end, we must have 
revived final status negotiations and they must have explicitly as their 
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aims: an Israeli state free from terror, recognised by the Arab world 
and a viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of 1967”876.  
 
The examination of the content of his speeches has revealed us essential peculiarities 
attributable to the effect of institutional interactions. In his public speeches he explicitly 
indicated the shift of his strategic approaches preceded by reassessment of his years-old 
experience. Throughout our analysis we have often discussed the so-called “top-down-
bottom-up” continuum of strategic conceptions of the conflict’s resolution. Interestingly, our 
data show new understanding of the issue by Tony Blair leading to prescription of the bottom-
up strategy. 
“[T]he central impasse does indeed remain. My view - formed 
since I came to Jerusalem and refining much of what I thought when I 
tussled intermittently with the issue for 10 years as British Prime 
Minister - is that it remains because the reality on the ground does not, 
as yet, sufficiently support the compromises necessary to secure a 
final, negotiated settlement. In other words, we have tended to proceed 
on the basis that if we could only agree the terms of the two state 
solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem - i.e. the theory, we would then 
be able to change the reality of what was happening on the ground i.e. 
the practice. In my view, it is as much the other way around. The 
political process and changing the reality have to march in lock-step. 
Until recently, they haven't”877.  
 
ISRAELI CONCERNS 
In the capacity of the Quartet Representative drawing on his experiential learning he is 
now explaining his perception of the parties’ concerns. He now believes that the Israelis are 
concerned not only on the territory of the Palestinian State, but on the nature of that State.  
“The true Israeli position is not to agree to a State for the 
Palestinians unless they are sure of how that State will function, how it 
will be governed, how viable it will be not simply in its territorial 
contiguity, but in its stability as a long term partner for peace”878. 
 
This condition is regarded by Tony Blair to be rationale for his activities in the new 
institutional position: 
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“That is why the issue I am working on most directly, namely 
Palestinian capabilities is not secondary. It is of absolutely primary 
importance. The Palestinian side has to prove that it can run a State, 
govern it well. The full disastrous significance of what has happened 
in Gaza is sometimes misunderstood by the outside world. We can all 
argue about the way disengagement happened. But Israel did 
disengage. You can argue about how unfair it is, but it is hardly 
surprising to find Israelis reluctant to withdraw from more territory as 
missiles continue to be fired from Gaza into Israel in the hope of 
killing innocent civilians. So that's the Israeli change in attitude”879. 
 
PALESTINIAN CONCERNS 
Equally, our sources show development of his new beliefs about the conditions 
constraining Palestinian performance and attitude to the overall peace process. The 
international envoy attributes these constrains to the impact of the Israeli occupation:  
“For the Palestinians too, the stumbling block is not truthfully the 
precise boundary or land swap or other related questions. Of course, 
again, do not misinterpret me. All these issues need to be resolved. But 
the Palestinian anxiety today is what is happening on the ground as a 
result of the occupation. Here is the mirror image of the Israeli concern 
over security. The reality is that due to the restrictions on access and 
movement, the lives of ordinary Palestinians are grievously 
affected…”880 
 
In contrast to his vision during his Prime Minister years, Tony Blair is currently 
proposing a new conceptual approach to dealing with the Palestinian concerns over the 
occupation:  
“[T]he key to resolving this is that you've got to try and build this 
from the bottom up. Build the Palestinian security capability to take 
account of the Israeli security concern. And ensure that, as that is 
done, the Israelis lift the weight of occupation. Start removing these 
checkpoints. Deal with these issues like settlements so that the 
Palestinians get the run of it”881. 
  
At present in the analysis of the Quartet Representative one can observe a direct 
correlation between the performance of Palestinian institutions and Israeli withdrawal from 
the occupied territories: 
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“[I]f Israelis thought a viable Palestinian state could be created 
credibly and in a way that was secure for them, they would deal with 
the settlement question. … Likewise, if you got Palestinians really 
believing that the international community was going to help to deliver 
a Palestinian state, I do not think that they would support those people 
engaged in violent resistance—on the contrary, I think that they would 
push them to the side. That is why I say to you that this is all about the 
credibility of the process”882.  
 
COMBINATION OF BOTH APPROACHES 
Assessing the Oslo process, many Israelis attribute the outcome to the Palestinian failure 
at nation-building. Thus they prescribe, as Avineri pointed out, a bottom-up strategy to cope 
with this failure: “after all the breakdowns in efforts to create a Palestinian state from the top 
down, only the old-fashioned way – from the bottom up – remains viable”883.  
For his part, the Quartet Representative considers the bottom-up approach though 
indispensable, but insufficient, if it is not reinforced by the same top-down strategy he has 
been advocating for a decade. Seeing both approaches valid in their own terms, he suggests 
that the bottom-up approach should not substitute for a political negotiation: 
“But it is only when there is an alignment between what you’re 
trying to negotiate politically, and what is actually happening on the 
ground – which for the Palestinians is about daily life, and for the 
Israelis it’s about security – that you’ve got a chance. When that’s not 
aligned, you’ve got no chance – which is why the political negotiations 
up to now haven’t worked”884.  
 
Quartet Representative continued: 
“The key, therefore, to resolving this, is not to try to put a 
negotiated Agreement on the top of a pyramid whose foundations are, 
as yet, lopsided and uncertain. The key is, simultaneous with the 
political process, to secure those foundations and build them from the 
bottom up. Then, as the reality changes, so will the context for a 
successful negotiation.”885 
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On another occasion he also argued the process will  
“only work if you build the state and its institutions bottom-up as 
well as negotiate these traditional political issues top-down”886.  
 
In the following sections we shall speak in more details about the mechanisms which 
have causally set in motion these new developments.  
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Our Case-study 2 comprises the chronological period from June 27, 2007 until October 
2010. On June 27, 2007, the day of departure from Downing Street, the former British Prime 
Minister was appointed the Middle East Envoy.  
Our analytic goal in this case-study is to observe, explore and explain how his strategic 
beliefs about optimal ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are evolving with the 
change of his institutional context. 
Before proceeding to analysis of the new dynamics of his cognition, we seek to propose 
an explicit specification about what ‘causes’ and what ‘effects’ we look for. Like in the 
previous analysis, in this case-study our independent variable is Tony Blair’s involvement in 
the institutional context, i.e., in the role of the Quartet Representative. The dependent variable 
in our analysis is his behaviour executed within his institutional context. The both principal 
variables are causally linked through the intervening mechanism on which we elaborate 
below. 
We remind that in both case-studies, the target of our analytic enterprise has not been a 
simple description of his political decisions and actions. Nor is the policy change our ultimate 
goal. The analytical interest of our study is centred on changes and stability in the cognitive 
beliefs, identity and interests of Tony Blair that are attributable to his interactions with the 
international institution.  
In addition to that, we seek to satisfy an essential theoretical requirement of Andrew 
Bennett’s research design which posits that the researcher should consider how best to 
describe variance in the independent and dependent variables, considering not only individual 
variables but also types of cases, or combinations of variables, and the sequential pathways 
that characterize each type887.  
In other words, we seek to establish whether changes in the dependent variable were 
brought about by changes in the intervening variable.  
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First, if changes in the policy are not caused by changes in beliefs, what is then the 
alternative explanation for this variance?  
Second, we cannot exclude the probability that changes in the intervening variable will 
not lead to changes in the dependent variable. If this is the case, how do we treat it? 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
OPERATIONAL CODE: THE PROCESS-TRACING METHOD 
As in the previous case-study we seek to apply more than one method to test our 
hypotheses. In the preceding sections such methods, as the process-tracing, congruence 
testing, cognitive map, as well counterfactual analysis were under our focus.  
In the current case-study we seek to apply the same process-tracing method to explore 
how the intervening variables (put differently, causal mechanisms) between a hypothesized 
cause and observed effect move as predicted by the theory under investigation. 
According to George, the process-tracing procedure assesses and may strengthen the 
link by making observations of the intervening causal sequence between stimulus and 
response888. However, as was formulated in our introductory notes about our research 
objective, we seek to explain the presence and causal impact of the intervening variable. For 
this reason, we will draw our analysis on this important method in the operational code 
research program – the process-tracing.  
The undertaken method will enrich our understanding of how Tony Blair’s beliefs are 
operating on different occasions of our exploration and how they are affecting the choice of 
his policy options. By definition, the "process-tracing" procedure traces in detail the steps in 
the process wherein the beliefs influence the process of defining the situation, identifying 
options and then evaluating them prior to choice889.  
 
Multiplication of a number of observations  
Keohane, King and Verba hold that through the practice of process tracing the 
researcher looks closely at 'the decision process by which various initial conditions are 
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translated into outcomes'". These authors interpret the advantages of process tracing, 
assimilating it to their favourite goal of increasing the number of theoretically relevant 
observations890.  
At the beginning of each case-study we set a task for ourselves to specify those 
historical instances under our investigation, in which we will explore the expression of Tony 
Blair’s beliefs.  
In the current case-study we will explore the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs in the 
following principal instances. 
- from the immediate aftermath of appointment to the Annapolis Conference (27 
November 2007); 
- from Annapolis (November 2007) to the Gaza War in winter of 2008–2009; 
- from Gaza war to election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel (March 
2009);  
- from March 2009 to resumption of direct negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians in September 2010. 
 
If accomplished rigorously, the process-tracing method will help us trace the operation 
of the uninterrupted chain of evidence from the hypothesized cause to the observed effect. By 
means of the process-tracing, we will observe and verify whether the intervening variable (in 
the first case, stability of beliefs; in the second case, cognitive learning) is moving as 
predicted by relevant theories.  
Since this part of our study concerns institutional interactions, in which Tony Blair is 
embedded, we find the process-tracing method to be particularly helpful for this analytic 
study on the role of these institutional factors. By means of this technique we will observe 
how and why certain cases have or have not influenced his perceptions and what the 
motivations behind them were. 
Process-tracing facilitates us the transition from the first case-study to the second. 
Before dealing with stability or change in cognitive beliefs of Tony Blair during his Quartet 
years, we needed to know which of the beliefs have existed during his Premiership and which 
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of them have been newly developed. Through this method in the first case-study we sought to 
show the existence of his beliefs or the absence thereof over time, before the activation of his 
Quartet behavior that we intend to explain.  
In addition to the above mentioned remarks, the process-tracing technique is helpful in 
examining the impact of the same political phenomena and processes on his cognition but 
under two different institutional contexts. Sayer also reminds that "the operation of the same 
mechanism can produce quite different results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may 
produce the same empirical results"891.  
 
Theoretically informed chain 
Practitioners of the process tracing methods posit that its application presumes 
theoretically informed historical research to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to an 
outcome892. Causal relations may be inferred from straight historical observation, but 
historical research must be informed by theory to identify the mechanisms responsible for 
producing causation between independent and dependent variables893. 
Recall our central hypothesis in Case-study I:  
Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
Based on our assumption about the consistency and constancy of his strategic beliefs we 
sought to explain the phenomenon by means of the cognitive dissonance theory. We 
reconstructed the sequence of events leading to an outcome based on predictions of the 
cognitive dissonance theory.  
Stephen Van Evera advises theory-testers to test “as many of a theory’s hypotheses as 
possible. Testing only a subset of a theory’s hypotheses is bad practice because it leaves the 
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theory partly tested”894. Further, he continues: “Infer and test as many predictions of each 
hypothesis as possible”895.  
In the second case-study we have advanced the hypothesis about changes in Tony 
Blair’s strategic beliefs: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy level. 
If our hypothesis on socialization is valid, we expect that our process-tracing and 
cognitive mapping methods will show us in each instance the operation of the propositions of 
the cognitive learning research program. 
The power of process tracing arises from the fact that it requires continuity and 
completeness in explaining a case (although there are pragmatic limits on the ability or need 
to examine the infinite “steps between steps” in a temporal process)896.  
If even a single significant step in a hypothesized process is not as predicted, the 
hypothesis must be modified, sometimes trivially and other times substantially, if it is to 
explain the case897. We keep this caveat throughout our analysis.  
 
COGNITIVE MAP 
In the previous case-study we have involved another method dealing with policy-
makers’ belief system – the cognitive map. Essentially, the analyst who is applying the 
cognitive mapping method looks for the familiar subject-verb-object construction. When the 
intent of the cognitive map is to identify causal connections, the focus is only with verb 
constructions that indicate either a positive or negative causal relationship898.  
Following one of the founders of cognitive mapping Robert Axelrod, we define this 
concept as follows: “A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions 
about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of 
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the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow from this 
structure”899.  
A cognitive map neither portrays the full range of an individual's belief system nor even 
all of his relevant political beliefs. Furthermore, it portrays only beliefs which take the form 
of causal assertions between pairs of concepts in the decision maker's belief system900.  
In cognitive maps are emphasized causal beliefs. Empirical studies have shown that 
causal inference play a large role in problem solving and decision making. When people are 
faced with a problem, they look for the cause of the problem. When contemplating action, we 
imagine what consequences are likely to result through chains of causality901.  
Young and Schafer maintain that cognitive mapping was designed to integrate and make 
explicit expressed causal relationships between concepts. If it is possible to ascertain the 
network of connections between causal statements in an individual's belief system, we can 
analyze the chain of reasoning they are likely to use in any given situation902.  
Thus, at its core, cognitive mapping is concerned with two types of causal relationships: 
(1) positive or generating causes, and (2) negative or inhibiting causes903.  
More precisely, causal beliefs are assumed to take one of the following simple forms: (i) 
an increase in A produces an increase in B (represented graphically as A → + B), or (2) an 
increase in A produces a decrease in B (A → - B)904.  
Taken together, the concepts and the causal linkages between the concepts form a 
"cognitive map" of a person's belief system. It is this cognitive map which allows a person to 
relate an event or a series of events to policy alternatives and policy objectives905. 
Throughout our case-studies we undertake this method of exploring cognitive mapping. 
It will help us establish whether in various historical instances under our investigation his 
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conception of the conflict embraces the same causal relations between concepts and 
phenomena.  
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS THROUGH PROCESS TRACING 
Process tracing involves examining the hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and 
its associated causal mechanisms predict should have taken place in a case, then determining 
whether the intervening variables along these pathways, or those predicted by alternative 
explanations, were in fact extant in the case906. It means that the researcher using the process-
tracing must verify the operation of an alternative explanation. 
Gerring reminds us the following essential point: (1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, 
or verifications, for nearly every theory— if we look for confirmations. (2) Confirmations 
should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is to say, if, unenlightened by 
the theory in question, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the 
theory— an event which would have refuted the theory. (3) Every "good" scientific theory is 
a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen”907. He concludes that the more a theory 
forbids, the better it is908. 
In this enterprise, the process-tracing is indispensable for the evaluation of ‘plausible 
rival hypotheses’. We need to examine and evaluate alternative ways of explaining a 
particular phenomenon. This applies regardless of whether the data are quantitative or 
qualitative; regardless of the particular research design (experimental, cross-sectional, 
longitudinal or case study); and regardless of the method of data collection (e.g. observation, 
questionnaire). Our mindset needs to anticipate alternative ways of interpreting findings and 
to regard any interpretation of these findings as provisional – subject to further testing909. 
In the case-study on Tony Blair as Quartet Representative we will use the same process-
tracing method to establish and to exclude the probability that Tony Blair’s participation in 
the Quartet (cause) has led to new policy (outcome) through structural adaptation to the new 
                                                 
906
 Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantage", in 
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds. Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for 
Studying International Relations, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 19-
55.  
907
 John Gerring, Case study research: principles and practices, (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 116.  
908
 Ibidem. 
909
 D. De Vaus, Research design in social research, (SAGE, 2001), p 12. 
 267 
environment (neorealist learning). In this case learning does not involve reassessment and 
redefinition of core strategic beliefs developed and sustained during his Premiership. 
 
EMPIRICAL DATA  
For the analysis of Tony Blair’s belief system during his Quartet years we have explored 
the content of 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until September 2010.  
Covering this chronological period, we have used seven media sources with reference to 
Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not published 
(mostly from Haaretz, Reuters, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
We think that in order to enhance the plausibility of our findings and comparisons we 
need to explore the views of policy-makers who have been engaged in the institutional 
activities of the Quartet. Until today the only predecessor of Tony Blair as Quartet 
Representative was the former President of the World Bnak James Wolfensohn. He had 
occupied this position from 31 May 2005 to 30 April 2006. We have studied 7 interviews 
delivered by James Wolfensohn, in which he spoke about the Quartet policies towards Gaza 
and the West Bank. These primary sources are important for comparison of two patterns of 
cognition – of Tony Blair and James Wolfensohn.  
Nevertheless, unlike our Case-study I in this part of our study we could not find and 
explore more private sources. Among these rare private sources can be a source published in 
The Independent on 13 October 2007. Specifically, the officials who accompanied Tony Blair 
during his visit to the West Bank recall certain episodes of his observational experience. 
According to this source, “He was shocked by what he was told about conditions in Hebron 
and diplomats say he was genuinely taken aback by his trip to the West Bank sector of the 
Jordan Valley …”910  
These officials also recalled that Tony Blair was “privately dismissive – rather more so 
perhaps than he was as Prime Minister – of the argument by some Israelis that security comes 
first, with economics and a political deal well behind it. “All three have to happen together” 
he has told diplomats…”911  
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The same source conveys in an important way new thinking of Tony Blair, according to 
which, he already “accepts Israel's view that Palestinians should not have a state until it can 
reasonably guarantee its neighbour's security912.  
 
Further, as was evident, throughout our work we have made reference to one of recent 
seminal studies on processes of socialization under the edition of Jeffrey Checkel. In this 
study the authors using the process-tracing method seek to triangulate across multiple data 
streams, including interviews, surveys, secondary literature (newspaper reports, scholarly 
analyses), and primary sources (archival materials or confidential meeting summaries)913.  
In a similar vein, we also sought to complement our primary and secondary sources with 
interviews with experts in the domain under our investigation. On 22 June 2010 we had a 
telephone conversation with Dr Christian-Peter Hanelt, a German expert of the Bertelsmann 
Foundation. We give the transcript of our telephone conversation in the Appendix. 
Dr Hanelt in cooperation with Dr Almut Möller was one of the first scholars who have 
analyzed current and perspective problems which Tony Blair would confront as Quartet 
Representative. They have produced recommendations under the title of “Tony Blair Needs a 
Plan. Suggestions for the Working Agenda of the New Representative of the Middle East 
Quartet”, to which we also refer in our work914.   
This year we have had an opportunity to get into correspondence with Dr Almut Möller, 
who is currently Head of Program at the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy 
Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations. Below we quote relevant extracts from the 
transcripts of communication with these authors.  
On 27 March 2009 we were in correspondence with Professor Stephen Dyson, from the 
University of Connecticut, USA. He has published a number of studies on Tony Blair’s belief 
system, his operational code and personality characteristics915.   
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HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND EVIDENCE  
 
Based on the findings from our primary and secondary sources, we now can formulate 
the principal hypothesis of Case-study 2: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
Tony Blair’s prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy 
level.   
 
See Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVIDENCE FOR CASE-STUDY II 
 
The need for research design stems from a sceptical approach to research and a view 
that scientific knowledge must always be provisional. The purpose of research design is to 
reduce the ambiguity of much research evidence. We can always find some evidence 
consistent with almost any theory916. 
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However, we should be sceptical of the evidence, and rather than seeking evidence that 
is consistent with our theory we should seek evidence that provides a compelling test of the 
theory. There are two related strategies for doing this: eliminating rival explanations of the 
evidence and deliberately seeking evidence that could disprove the theory.917  
Rather than asking `What evidence would constitute support for the theory?', ask `What 
evidence would convince me that the theory is wrong?' It is not difficult to find evidence 
consistent with a theory. It is much tougher for a theory to survive the test of people trying to 
disprove it918.  
Our analytic objective is to search out instances where Tony Blair’s change of policy 
implies simple neorealist adaptation to the current circumstances with which he confronts as 
Quartet Representative. For our analytic purposes evidence disconfirming our central 
hypothesis is his response to structural changes in Palestinian and Israeli politics, without 
reconsidering his former causal conceptions. 
We remind that, in his conception of the peace process during his Premiership, the main 
causal links were constructed in the following manner:  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”919.  
  
For us disconfirming evidence in this case-study is conservation of this worldview, but 
adapted to the new capacities of Israeli and Palestinian governments.   
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If our hypothesis is plausible, then our process-tracing and cognitive mapping methods 
are expected to show us on each occasion the operation of the following propositions of the 
cognitive learning research program. First of all, we need to make some cautionary notes 
about analytic differences between two conceptions of learning – cognitive and neorealist. 
In a seminal study on conceptions of learning, Levy defines experiential learning as a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new 
beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience920.  
Learning takes place at different levels. In "simple" learning new information leads to a 
change in means but not in ends, and in ''complex learning" a recognition of conflicts among 
values leads to a modification of goals as well as means”921.  
Philip Tetlock argues that foreign policy belief systems are organized hierarchically, 
with fundamental assumptions and policy objectives at the highest level, strategic policy 
beliefs and preferences at an intermediate level, and tactical beliefs at the bottom. He argues 
that most learning takes place at the tactical level, that political decision makers reconsider 
their basic strategic assumptions and orientation only after repeated failures to generate a 
tactical solution to their foreign policy problems, that policymakers reconsider their basic 
goals or objectives only after repeated strategic failures, and that fundamental learning is so 
psychologically difficult that it is likely to occur only in conjunction with massive personnel 
shifts922.  
In an alternative conception of learning – the so-called neorealist learning – is often 
qualified as “simple learning”, in which the actor “uses new information merely to adapt the 
means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor simply uses a 
different instrument to attain the same goal”923.  
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Consistent with these lines Wendt also argues: “Since states failing to conform to the 
logic of self-help will be driven from the system, only simple learning or behavioral 
adaptation is possible; the complex learning involved in redefinitions of identity and interest 
is not.' Questions about identity- and interest-formation are therefore not important to students 
of international relations. A rationalist problematique, which reduces process to dynamics of 
behavioral interaction among exogenously constituted actors, defines the scope of systemic 
theory”924. 
On the other hand, cognitive psychological perspectives predict learning to occur when 
the set of lenses applied by a policy-maker to view some simplified form of reality changes 
over time in some way and for some reason. In the outcome, the issue under question begins 
to be viewed differently than it appeared beforehand. 
So, if our hypothesis is plausible, then our process-tracing and cognitive mapping 
methods are expected to show us in each instance the operation of the following propositions 
of the cognitive learning research program. 
 
Proposition 1: 
Changes in the actor’s policy are induced by the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.  
Proposition 2: 
The actor does not limit the policy change to simple re-adaptation of means, but 
introduces profound changes into his perception of the ends-means chain.  
Proposition 3: 
Before making changes in his policy behaviour, the actor will justify the shift by flaws 
in the previous strategic approaches. (We contend that “flaws”, “errors”, “failures” are 
concepts subjectively perceived by the actor under given conditions) 
Proposition 4: 
The actor will downgrade the former practices, to which he was committed in the former 
institutional context.  
Proposition 5: 
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The actor will have certain liberty not to make cognitive changes, but instead remain 
attached to his former thinking 
Proposition 6: 
The actor will replace the previous analogies and schemata through which he used to 
perceive the issue by the new analogies and schemata, if he believes that the former do not 
satisfy the current conditions.   
 
For this chapter we have analyzed the content of 23 interviews and press conferences 
from June 2007 until September 2010. Covering this chronological period, we have used 
seven more media sources with reference to Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his 
interviews, whose transcript was not published (mostly from Haaretz, Reuters, The 
Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
Our data sources show us that as a result of institutional interactions Tony Blair has 
developed new beliefs. These new beliefs appeared to be dissonant with some of the pre-
existing beliefs on which we elaborated in the previous case-study. Further our data show that 
Tony Blair has reconsidered some of his principal views, namely his strategic approach to the 
peace process. In the following extract he eloquently described the content of his new belief: 
“My view - formed since I came to Jerusalem and refining much 
of what I thought when I tussled intermittently with the issue for 10 
years as British Prime Minister - is that it remains because the reality 
on the ground does not, as yet, sufficiently support the compromises 
necessary to secure a final, negotiated settlement. In other words, we 
have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only agree the 
terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem - i.e. the 
theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what was 
happening on the ground i.e. the practice. In my view, it is as much the 
other way around. The political process and changing the reality have 
to march in lock-step. Until recently, they haven't”925.  
 
In the current case-study we will explore the expression of Tony Blair’s beliefs in the 
following principal instances. 
- from the immediate aftermath of appointment to the Annapolis Conference (27 
November 2007); 
- from Annapolis (November 2007) to the Gaza War in winter of 2008–2009; 
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- from Gaza war to election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel (March 
2009);  
- from March 2009 to resumption of direct negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians in September 2010. 
   
From appointment to the Annapolis Conference  
During one of his earliest interviews with Al-Jazeera in his new institutional capacity, 
Tony Blair expressed the view that a  
“Middle East political pact will work only if Palestinians first 
build proper institutions and living conditions are improved in the 
West Bank and Gaza”926. 
 
Our data show that in this essential statement the Quartet Representative has 
downgraded the continuous practices of the international community in which he formerly 
took part:   
“I think part of the mistake in the past is to say, 'OK, we deal 
with the politics here, we deal with the capabilities there.' It's not like 
that. "These three things go together the whole time. It's not one first 
and then the other two"927. 
 
Since we formulated our hypothesis that socialization within the Middle East Quartet is 
leading to the cognitive reassessment of his prior beliefs, then we assume that the above 
mentioned statement supports this proposition. 
According to Tony Blair’s perceptions, the Israeli government is worried about  
"being rushed into final status negotiations before they are ready 
to do it and when there are so many security and other problems”928. 
 
Compare this view with his position in October 2002, when he was pushing for a 
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks, backed by an international conference, and even 
proposing time frames: 
“And there is only one answer. By this year's end, we must have 
revived final status negotiations and they must have explicitly as their 
aims: an Israeli state free from terror, recognised by the Arab world 
and a viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of 1967”929.  
  
                                                 
926
 Tony Blair quoted in Haaretz, 30 November 2007. 
927
 Tony Blair quoted in Reuters, 24 September 2007.  
928
 Ibidem. 
929
 Speech of Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Labour party conference, 1 October 2002. 
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Further, in an interview to the Israeli daily Yedhiot Ahronot Quartet Representative Blair 
expressed his new experience: 
"I have learnt the depth of Israel's concern for security, and I 
have learnt the depth of the Palestinians' distress caused by the 
occupation”930.  
 
When a policy-maker defines the situation with a new reference to intentions and 
relative capabilities of other actors, this satisfies the definition of “diagnostic learning"931. 
Given this point, according to The Independent, Tony Blair “accepts Israel's view that 
Palestinians should not have a state until it can reasonably guarantee its neighbour's 
security932.  
Privately, the officials who accompanied him during his visit to the West Bank report 
observational experience of Tony Blair. According to the same The Independent, “He was 
shocked by what he was told about conditions in Hebron and diplomats say he was genuinely 
taken aback by his trip to the West Bank sector of the Jordan Valley – where Palestinians are 
allowed to dig wells only a third as deep as Israelis – at the exploitation of resources by the 
rich Jewish agricultural settlements at the expense of closed in Palestinian farmers”933.  
These officials recalled that Tony Blair during his visit to the West Bank was “privately 
dismissive – rather more so perhaps than he was as Prime Minister – of the argument by some 
Israelis that security comes first, with economics and a political deal well behind it. “All three 
have to happen together” he has told diplomats – which is what he sees Annapolis as being 
about. This week he has been concentrating on the economics and is pressing Israel to permit 
job growth in the West Bank's Area C, where it has direct as well as total control – including a 
Japanese government plan for an "agro-industrial" park in the Jordan Valley”934  
Main causal hierarchies in Tony Blair’s conception by the end of 2007 are summarized 
in the following Figure 13. 
The true Israeli anxiety is focused not only on the territory of the 
Palestinian State, but on the nature of that State. The true Israeli 
position is not to agree to a State for the Palestinians unless they are 
sure of how that State will function, how it will be governed, how 
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viable it will be not simply in its territorial contiguity, but in its 
stability as a long term partner for peace”935. 
 
From the cognitive standpoint, this speech shows development of new beliefs and views 
as a result of the observation of the current experience. He puts under question the former 
views when “territorial contiguity” was the main objective. 
On the base of the following extract one can see important concepts in the cognitive 
map of Tony Blair:   
“That is why the issue I am working on most directly, namely 
Palestinian capabilities is not secondary. It is of absolutely primary 
importance. The Palestinian side has to prove that it can run a State, 
govern it well. The full disastrous significance of what has happened 
in Gaza is sometimes misunderstood by the outside world. We can all 
argue about the way disengagement happened. But Israel did 
disengage. You can argue about how unfair it is, but it is hardly 
surprising to find Israelis reluctant to withdraw from more territory as 
missiles continue to be fired from Gaza into Israel in the hope of 
killing innocent civilians. So that's the Israeli change in attitude”936. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
935
 Speech of Quartet Representative Tony Blair to Saban Forum, 3 November, 2007. 
936
 Ibidem. 
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According to the neorealist account, the actor does not need to transform his basic 
beliefs about former causal links between these key concepts of the peace process, but simply 
to adjust his discourse to the new milieu.  
But we see in Figure 14 some patterns of reconsideration of his prior beliefs. Based on 
his discourse of November 3, 2007, we drew his conceptual understanding of key causal 
links. In this map he invokes his perception about the impact of Gaza experience on the Israeli 
mindset.  
The idea in this map is that concept A “Palestinian capabilities” will lead Israel to accept 
concept B independent “State”. This pattern manifests redefinition of strategic means by Blair 
based on his diagnostic perception of concepts D and C “Israeli Gaza experience” and “Israeli 
change in attitude”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further examination of his speeches shows us consistency in his experience about the 
impact of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinians. One of signs of change in his 
understanding is that now he perceives that “precise boundary or land swap” are not the 
stumbling block. The main concern, according to him, is the ground reality.  
“For the Palestinians too, the stumbling block is not truthfully the 
precise boundary or land swap or other related questions. Of course, 
again, do not misinterpret me. All these issues need to be resolved. But 
the Palestinian anxiety today is what is happening on the ground as a 
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result of the occupation. Here is the mirror image of the Israeli concern 
over security. The reality is that due to the restrictions on access and 
movement, the lives of ordinary Palestinians are grievously affected; 
the settlements expand, the outposts continue; the IDF protect Israeli 
citizens, the restrictions remain and so on. The private sector has 
declined 40% over the past couple of years. The Palestinians worry is 
that the "facts on the ground" will in time render a State 
impossible”937.  
 
If we look at the content of Quartet Representative’s plan of action suggested in a press 
conference in Jerusalem on November 19, 2007, we see that Propositions 1 and 2 are held. 
Tony Blair claimed:  
To create lasting peace, three things must happen: 
- a clear political vision of a two-state solution; 
- the building of Palestinian capacity and institutions of 
governance, because statehood is about more than geography and 
territory; 
- and the facts on the ground must not contradict the process of 
state building, but enhance it and support it economically938. 
 
In this extract we see the prediction of our Proposition 2, that is the actor does not limit 
the policy change to simple re-adaptation of means, but introduces profound changes into his 
perception of the ends-means chain. In the above mentioned extract he explicitly argues about 
the precedence of the “facts on the ground” over the “process of state building”. 
Compare this precedence with one of the patterns of his attitude during his Premiership. 
Rusmfeld’s advisor Ken Adelman, who served on Defence Policy Board, recalled the thinking 
of his colleagues: “the fact is the players weren’t there, the timing wasn’t there, the substance 
wasn’t there”. Against this background Tony Blair would respond, “Yes, but you have to 
create all those”. It just wasn’t going to happen”939.  
Further, according to Haaretz, Tony Blair relates that he is now telling people that  
“diplomatic negotiations are important, but that the discussions 
are not only about territory; the problem is not only land, but also the 
profile of the state: how it is to be governed, its ability to be a stable 
neighbor, effectively governed”940.  
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Tony Blair argues now that there are three parallel tracks that have to be engaged 
simultaneously, otherwise things will not move ahead: political negotiations, creation of a 
Palestinian capacity for governing, and the taking of steps on the ground. If there is progress 
in all three areas, it will be possible to find a solution. But anyone who thinks that 
negotiations are a substitute for creating capabilities, or, similarly, that actions on the ground 
are of no importance, will never reach a solution. All three are crucial. Accordingly, the 
solution to the problem is for the capabilities of the PA to be developed gradually, enabling 
the Palestinians to assume security responsibility and Israel to reduce its military presence941.  
Blair notes that the conventional wisdom heretofore has been that, if the political 
confrontation finds its resolution, the situation on the ground will change. He thinks this is 
correct up to a point, but believes that the reverse is also true942.  
The rival neorealist account does not necessitate rethinking of former practices. It 
requires simply adjusting means to satisfy the context in which the actor is embedded. The 
rival neorealist account does not necessitate rethinking of former practices. It requires simply 
adjusting means to satisfy the context in which the actor is embedded. But the public 
discourse made on 19 and 30 November 2007 indicates the new belief that changes on the 
ground need to precede creation of the State.   
Thus, we assume that our hypothesis until this point of process-tracing has been valid. 
We remind our hypothesis that socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered 
cognitive reassessment of prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the 
strategic policy level. We also remind that for our analytic purposes evidence disconfirming 
our central hypothesis is his response to structural changes in Palestinian and Israeli politics, 
without reconsidering his former causal conceptions. 
 
According to Haaretz, Tony Blair said:  
“If he were in Israel's place, […] he would not conduct 
negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian state unless he were 
certain that it would be properly run. He agrees that Hamas is a major 
problem, but he also believes that if progress is made on all three of 
the necessary fronts, a point will come when the Palestinian leadership 
will be able to make the population in Gaza a very clear offer”943.  
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Equally Haaretz claims that Tony Blair “no longer believes that "land for peace," in and 
of itself, is sufficient. He made this point emphatically in a speech he delivered a few weeks 
ago at the Saban Forum in Jerusalem. What is no less important, in his view, is the character 
of the Palestinian state. He wants to see a state with stable institutions that are properly run, 
particularly from the security point of view. He constantly reiterates that in talks with senior 
PA officials, and baldly warns them: "There won't be a Palestinian state unless it is coherently 
governed and run, and anyone who tells you different is misleading you”944. 
Based on his speech to the Saban Forum, on November 3, 2007, we have drawn his 
conceptual map. In it we see essential changes along the following lines (see Figure 15 
below): 
a) Tony Blair asserts that the concept B “nature of the Palestinian state” will lead to 
concept A “political agreement”. Compare with his Prime Minister assertions (Figure 7) in 
which “political agreement” will lead to “peaceful settlement”. In the current discourse he 
states concept B should precede concept A.   
b) In this map he invokes the concept of “Land for peace”. But what is interesting is that 
this concept does not have any causal linkage with other concepts in the cognitive map. 
Compare it with the following pattern in his previous thinking:   
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”945.  
  
The shift in the causal linkages in this conceptual map is regarded by us as indicators of 
change in beliefs.  
In the following passage, he points out the influence of his new institutional activities 
that permit him adopt novel experience. Subsequently, he holds:  
“When I was British prime minister I was able to come in and 
out of the region but for a couple of days at a time. And it's only since 
I have been the special representative [that] I have been able to come 
in and spend significant... I mean I've been spending a lot of my time 
out here now and you get a far deeper understanding of what the issue 
is and what the problem is”946.  
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 Ibid. 
945
 Transcript of a conversation with Quartet Representative Tony Blair, Council on Foreign 
Relations, December 3, 2008. 
946
 Transcript of interview with Quartet Representative Tony Blair with Al-Jazeera, 17 
December 2007.  
 
 281 
We believe that Tony Blair’s new discourse in which he does not advocate the “land for 
peace” conception (or, “Oslo thinking”) constitutes an important analytic interest. The above-
mentioned data indicate that Blair not only implements new strategies, but questions the 
validity of former practices, as predicted by Proposition 4.  
Specifically, in accordance with Proposition 3, Tony Blair justifies his new discourse on 
the “bottom-up strategy” with reference to deficiencies of the former “land for peace” vision. 
Until this point (end of 2007) his discourses did not disconfirm our hypothesis about cognitive 
changes in Blair’s thinking. This allows us assert that changes in the dependent variable were 
marked by changes in the intervening mechanism – content of beliefs about the issue – and 
not by an alternative one. 
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From Annapolis to the Gaza War  
In previous chapters, the public discourse of Tony Blair showed us his frequent 
comparison of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the context of his peacemaking in Northern 
Ireland. As was supposed by Robert Jervis, “leaders' firsthand experiences early in life which 
have consequences are particularly important. He also notes the power of analogies and 
overgeneralization when leaders do not have the experience of alternative explanation947. 
But, in Proposition 6 we have already noted that confronted with the new situation the 
actor may even replace the previous analogies and schemata through which he used to 
perceive the issue by the new ones. In this case, this would be one of important arguments 
indicating changes not at the tactical level, but reassessment and reconsideration of old 
beliefs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Times reported that Tony Blair’s argument that he had tried to adapt his experiences 
from Northern Ireland peacemaking to the Middle East but he had learnt that the character of 
the two conflicts was very different. In particular, he believes that unless confidence can be 
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returned to the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians the chances of reaching a deal 
are slim948. 
Tony Blair has been consistently arguing about the bottom-up strategy:  
“Without that confidence about the state of the situation on the 
ground the negotiation becomes more difficult. Sometimes people 
have looked at this process as one in which if you cut the deal the facts 
on the ground will alter. In my view it is as much the other way 
around. Unless you can change the facts on the ground the deal 
becomes difficult to cut”949.  
 
These data from his speeches disconfirm the proposition that Quartet Representative is 
merely adjusting the means (achieve the statehood through the bottom-up approach) without 
questioning the previous schemata. 
In October 2008, he has made a statement which we consider to be contrasting with his 
Prime Minister discourse in terms of priorities leading to creation of the Palestinian state:  
“A state is not something that is simply negotiated from the top 
down, it must be built from the ground up. […] Which means having a 
properly functioning economy and people here in Palestine having 
control over their own lives”950.  
 
Recall in this context Figure 13 (shown above) 
The study of his public discourse shows us how Quartet Representative attributes, on 
numerous occasions, the sources of belief changes to his institutional interactions. Tony Blair 
explicitly indicated that his experience in Jerusalem and the occupied territories since he left 
Downing Street had made him aware of the constraints of political intervention by foreign 
leaders951.  
"I do think what's very interesting about these international 
situations — and I found this quite shocking in a way — is how much 
more comprehensive my understanding of the Israel-Palestine situation 
is now than when I was in office"952. 
 
Significantly, he regards previous approaches, which are interchangeably called “Oslo 
thinking” or “top-down strategy” to be flawed: 
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"The error in international policy, in a way, up to now on this 
dispute, is to think that if you get a political agreement you can then 
change the reality on the ground. Whereas in fact unless you are 
evolving the reality on the ground in a positive way you will never 
create the context in which a political agreement is possible, because 
the Israelis will never think that a Palestinian state is permissible in 
terms of their security and the Palestinians will never think that a state 
is possible because of the occupation”953. 
 
This extract shown above disconfirms the assumption that Quartet Representative is 
merely altering his tactical steps towards creation of the Palestinian state. In Proposition 3 we 
have assumed that before making changes in his policy behaviour, Tony Blair is expected to 
justify the shift by flaws in the previous strategic approaches. In the above cited speech he is 
downgrading his former practice by calling it “error in international policy” 
In addition, cognitive psychological perspectives predict learning to occur when the set 
of lenses applied by a policy-maker to view some simplified form of reality changes over time 
in some way and for some reason. In the outcome, the issue under question begins to be 
viewed differently than it appeared beforehand.  
Our data consistently show that his new institutional policy is preceded by the 
reassessment of former practicing of achieving a political agreement before improving the 
conditions of Palestinian people. 
At present, according to The Guardian, Tony Blair “leans toward the Israeli view”, 
saying that what has become clear to him is that it is a mistake to pursue peace agreements on 
paper without the painstaking work of gradually changing the reality on the ground954.  
Commenting on his institutional experience Tony Blair claimed that had he known 
when he was prime minister what he knows now, it would not so much have led him to 
change policy as to recognise the limitations of what he could achieve as prime minister955. 
"More what I've learned is this: it's rather than I could have done 
something as British prime minister, I realised I probably couldn't 
because I was busy being British prime minister"956.  
 
Tony Blair suggests that what is required is a shift away from perpetual initiatives by 
foreign leaders to devolving real power to international envoys committed full time.  
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"The interesting thing is how the international community 
delegates authority to make up for the limited knowledge that these 
leaders can have nowadays when they're dealing with a multiplicity of 
problems in their own domestic situation” 957. 
 
He continued: 
"I think, for example, there's no way the Middle East is going to 
be resolved unless there are empowered senior people from the 
international community able to do it. Because, as I say, I now have a 
far better understanding of what needs to happen than I did when I was 
British prime minister. And yet in one sense when I was British prime 
minister I obviously had greater power over the situation”958.  
 
Recall that this thinking is in line with his efforts to urge President Bush to envoy high-
level envoys to the region on a permanent base. For instance, during this November 2004 visit 
to Washington he made efforts but failed to win President Bush’s support for the appointment 
of a special US envoy to the region with full presidential authority given his belief that the 
problem demanded a high-ranking figure who gave it his priority959.  
 Cognitive approaches posit that in case of complex learning we need to see 
manifestation of changing beliefs about the laws (hypotheses) of cause and effect, the 
consequences of actions, and the optimal strategies under various conditions960.  
It describes a deep change in an actor’s understanding of the workings of the political 
context. In the following extract the former Prime Minister explicitly indicates his transition 
from one thinking to another: 
“But the central impasse does indeed remain. My view - formed 
since I came to Jerusalem and refining much of what I thought when I 
tussled intermittently with the issue for 10 years as British Prime 
Minister - is that it remains because the reality on the ground does not, 
as yet, sufficiently support the compromises necessary to secure a 
final, negotiated settlement. In other words, we have tended to proceed 
on the basis that if we could only agree the terms of the two state 
solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem - i.e. the theory, we would then 
be able to change the reality of what was happening on the ground i.e. 
the practice. In my view, it is as much the other way around. The 
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political process and changing the reality have to march in lock-step. 
Until recently, they haven't961.  
 
Compare this thinking with Figure 16. 
 
 
In extracts from his public course we see the operation of our cognitive propositions 
2,3,4. Namely, Tony Blair has consistently downgraded the former practices, to which he was 
committed in the former institutional context. This reassessment allows us to suppose that in 
our empirical case, the actor is not limiting the policy change to simple re-adaptation of 
means, but rather explicitly introducing profound changes into his perception of the ends-
means chain.  
In the following speech, he reasoned in such a way: 
“[T]he problem is that until now, the reality on the ground for 
Israelis and Palestinians has not passed the minimum threshold of 
credibility for such a negotiation to succeed: not for the Israelis on 
security, not for the Palestinians on lifting the occupation. 
The key, therefore, to resolving this, is not to try to put a 
negotiated Agreement on the top of a pyramid whose foundations are, 
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as yet, lopsided and uncertain. The key is, simultaneous with the 
political process, to secure those foundations and build them from the 
bottom up. Then, as the reality changes, so will the context for a 
successful negotiation”962. 
 
We remind that in this section we are applying the process-method to examining the 
content of Tony Blair’s public discourse. It is a historically and theoretically oriented analysis 
of his new experience and causal links in his conceptual understanding of the conflict. We 
were open to confront in some historical instance of observation with evidence of mere 
adjustment of tactical approaches to the issue.  
In this case, we would have expected that the Quartet Representative does not need to 
transform his basic beliefs about former causal links between these key concepts of the peace 
process. We would not have expected replacement of the fundamental basis of previous 
analogies and schemata through which he used to perceive the issue either. But our empirical 
data, extracted mainly from his public speeches and interviews, disconfirms the thesis about 
“simple learning” or adjustment, instead showing us his rethinking of former practices.   
 
2009 – 2010   
In one of important sources by the end of 2009, Quartet representative Tony Blair 
expressed the same opinion: 
“[L]et us acknowledge what has changed since the failure to 
reach agreement in the year 2000. Until the year 2000, and with the 
heroic attempts of President Clinton, we attempted to achieve an 
agreement first and then shape reality around it. But it was not to be. 
After that came the Intifada. Thousands died. Then came the 
withdrawal from Gaza. Israel got out. It took 7000 settlers with it. In 
Israeli eyes, it received violence and terror in return . 
The occupation deepened. Gaza was isolated. Faith in peace 
collapsed. Ten years on, that faith has to be restored. It can’t be done 
in a summit. It has to be done patiently, and over time on the ground. It 
can’t only be negotiated top-down. It has also to be built bottom up. 
Peace now will not come simply through an agreement negotiated; it 
must come through a reality created and sustained”963.  
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In the current environment, Tony Blair supposes that only if the ground reality 
conditions match the requirements of a political agreement, can negotiations bring about he 
desired outcome. He said: 
“That’s why I’ve always said the bottom-up approach is the right 
approach. Which is not to say that substitutes for a political 
negotiation. But it is only when there is an alignment between what 
you’re trying to negotiate politically, and what is actually happening 
on the ground – which for the Palestinians is about daily life, and for 
the Israelis it’s about security – that you’ve got a chance. When that’s 
not aligned, you’ve got no chance – which is why the political 
negotiations up to now haven’t worked”964.  
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 Transcript of interview with Quartet Representative Tony Blair with The Jerusalem Post, 
25 June 2010. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our analytic goal in this case-study has been to observe, explore and explain how his 
strategic beliefs about optimal ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are evolving 
with the change of his institutional context. In particular, we sought to observe and explain 
the operation of an intervening variable with causal power – his learning at the strategic level. 
The mere fact that Tony Blair has shifted his policy position in the new institutional 
context did not satisfy us to think this implied also change of beliefs. In our empirical case, 
this policy change might be affected at least by two causal sources – experiential learning or 
acknowledgement and adjustment to the requirements of the environment. In the latter case, 
our empirical case should not show redefinition of identity and interests. Hence, the analytical 
interest of our study has been centred on changes and stability in the cognitive beliefs of Tony 
Blair that are attributable to his interactions with the international institution.  
If our hypothesis on effects of Tony Blair’s socialization were plausible, we expected 
that our process-tracing and cognitive mapping methods would show us in all observations 
the operation of the propositions of the cognitive learning research program. If even a single 
significant step in a hypothesized process were not as predicted, we had to modify our 
hypothesis. 
Our theoretical expectations were around such cognitive propositions that change of 
Blair’s policy position will be preceded by profound changes in his perception of the ends-
means chain; that prior to making changes in his policy behaviour, he would justify the shift 
by the “flaws” or “failures” in his previous strategic approaches; and, finally, that the previous 
analogies and schemata through which he used to perceive the issue would be replaced by 
new analogies and schemata. 
For this purpose, in Chapter III of our study Tony Blair’s belief system was established 
and consistently explored through 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until 
September 2010. These primary data were reinforced with seven more media sources with 
reference to Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not 
published (mostly from Haaretz, Reuters, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
Second, to improve the validity of our findings we have explored the views of other 
policy-makers who have been engaged in the institutional activities of the Quartet. In this 
regard, we have referred to the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 
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Alvaro de Soto’s famous report (End of Mission Report) presents critical insight into the 
behind-the-scenes deliberations of the United States with its Quartet counterparts.   
Coupled with this, we have studied 7 interviews delivered by James Wolfensohn, the 
only predecessor of Tony Blair as Quartet Representative.  He had occupied this position 
from 31 May 2005 to 30 April 2006.  
These primary data, as well as a number of secondary data we have treated in this 
chapter, have allowed us to establish that as a result of his institutional interactions within the 
Quartet, Tony Blair had reconsidered his core beliefs that were developed during his 
Premiership.  
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This Case-study 2 embraces the chronological period from June 27, 2007 until October 
2010. On June 27, 2007, the day of departure from Downing Street, the former British Prime 
Minister was appointed the Middle East envoy.  
Our analytic goal in this case-study is to observe, explore and explain how his strategic 
beliefs about optimal ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolving with the 
change of his institutional context. 
We recall that in this case-study our independent variable is Tony Blair’s involvement in 
the institutional context, i.e., in the role of the Quartet Representative. The dependent variable 
in our analysis is his behaviour executed within his institutional context. In the previous 
section we showed that these both principal variables are causally linked through the 
intervening mechanism of learning (or, change in beliefs).  
The analytical interest of our study is centred on changes and stability in the cognitive 
beliefs, identity and interests of Tony Blair that are attributable to his interactions with the 
international institution.  
It means that we tended to explain not simply changes in his political decisions and 
actions. But we tended to trace whether these policy shifts are attributed to changes in his 
belief system.  
The research program which uses the process-tracing method requires also showing that 
the “CAUSE” and “EFFECT” are mutually linked by the intervening variable under 
investigation and not the alternative pathway. In addition, Gerring reminds us every "good" 
scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen965. He claims that the 
more a theory forbids, the better it is966. 
So, our analytic goal in this section is to exclude the probability that Tony Blair’s 
participation in the Quartet (cause) has led to new policy (outcome) through structural 
adaptation to the new environment (neorealist learning). In this case learning does not involve 
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 John Gerring, Case study research: principles and practices, (Cambridge University Press, 
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 Ibidem. 
SECTION 5. CHANGES OF STRATEGIC BELIEFS OF TONY 
BLAIR: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
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reassessment and redefinition of core strategic beliefs developed and sustained during his 
Premiership. 
 
This section seeks to test the following alternative hypothesis:  
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has caused policy change through 
structural adjustment without reassessing previously held beliefs about the about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
If this hypothesis is shown to be true, then our central hypothesis of this case-study is 
not correct. We remind our central hypothesis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVIDENCE FOR CASE-STUDY II 
What do we count as evidence for this section? Since we intend to exclude the 
probability of mere structural adjustment at the expense of cognitive change, for us the 
evidence of the former case and counter-evidence of the latter may be operation of the 
following propositions: 
Proposition 1: 
The actor qualifies the new environment which is perceived by him as qualitatively 
different from the previous one. 
Proposition 2: 
The actor proposes new efficient strategic and tactical means of coping with the 
environment. 
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Proposition 3: 
The actor does not need to question the validity of his previous beliefs (for example, 
such concepts as “land for peace”, “top-down strategy”), to which he was attached in his 
previous institutional context. 
Proposition 4: 
The actor does not need to transform his basic beliefs about former causal links between 
these key concepts of the peace process. 
Proposition 5: 
The actor will react to changes in Israeli and Palestinian politics based on previous 
norms, without their reconsideration. 
Proposition 6: 
Under new structural conditions the actor does not need to replace the fundamental basis 
of previous analogies and schemata through which he used to perceive the issue. 
 
We remind that in his conception of the peace process during his Premiership the main 
causal links were constructed in the following manner:  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”967.  
  
In this section we show many extracts from his public discourse that have already been 
treated in the following section. We apply the same process-tracing method as well as 
cognitive mapping to observe constancy and stability in strategic approaches of Quartet 
Representative Tony Blair.  
We recall the hypothesis of this section: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has caused policy change through 
structural adjustment without reassessing previously held beliefs about the about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
If our hypothesis is valid, then our process-tracing and cognitive mapping methods 
expect orientation of Blair’s discourse to responses to the changes in the new environment. 
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 Transcript of a conversation with Quartet Representative Tony Blair, Council on Foreign 
Relations, December 3, 2008. 
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We do not expect him to challenge basic international conceptual guides and approaches to 
the peace process.  
 
For the analysis of Tony Blair’s belief system during his Quartet years we have explored 
the content of 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until September 2010. 
Covering this chronological period, we have used seven media sources with reference to Tony 
Blair’s official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not published (mostly 
from Haaretz, Reuters, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
Our data show that during the first months of performing the functions of the Quartet 
Representative he called for responding to the new conditions by adopting a new bottom-up 
strategy, which implies preparing the ground before signing a political agreement.  
During his interview with Al-Jazeera, Tony Blair expressed the following view: 
“I think part of the mistake in the past is to say, 'OK, we deal 
with the politics here, we deal with the capabilities there.' It's not like 
that. "These three things go together the whole time. It's not one first 
and then the other two"968. 
  
From the standpoint of learning perspectives, in this extract the former Prime Minister is 
speaking about the limits of the previous approaches to which he was committed. As a result, 
according to The Independent, Tony Blair “accepts Israel's view that Palestinians should not 
have a state until it can reasonably guarantee its neighbour's security”969. 
Tony Blair further concluded that  
The true Israeli anxiety is focused not only on the territory of the 
Palestinian State, but on the nature of that State. The true Israeli 
position is not to agree to a State for the Palestinians unless they are 
sure of how that State will function, how it will be governed, how 
viable it will be not simply in its territorial contiguity, but in its 
stability as a long term partner for peace”970. 
  
From the cognitive standpoint, this speech shows development of new beliefs and views 
as a result of the observation of the current experience. He puts under question the former 
views when “territorial contiguity” was the main objective. This implies that Proposition 3 
does not hold in this instance of historical explanation. 
                                                 
968
 Tony Blair quoted in Reuters, 24 September 2007.  
969
 The Independent, 13 October 2007. 
970
 Speech of Quartet Representative Tony Blair to Saban Forum, 3 November, 2007. 
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In another important passage, we see similar thinking of Tony Blair. According to 
Haaretz, Blair notes that the conventional wisdom heretofore has been that, if the political 
confrontation finds its resolution, the situation on the ground will change. He thinks this is 
correct up to a point, but believes that the reverse is also true971.  
Haaretz also reported Tony Blair was warning his interlocutors that “diplomatic 
negotiations are important, but that the discussions are not only about territory; the problem is 
not only land, but also the profile of the state: how it is to be governed, its ability to be a 
stable neighbor, effectively governed”972.  
In this important pattern of information Tony Blair is reversing previous approaches 
when “negotiations” were often the “objective” in contrast to “means” of achieving the 
Palestinian state.   
“[A]nyone who thinks that negotiations are a substitute for 
creating capabilities, or, similarly, that actions on the ground are of no 
importance, will never reach a solution. All three are crucial. 
Accordingly, the solution to the problem is for the capabilities of the 
PA to be developed gradually, enabling the Palestinians to assume 
security responsibility and Israel to reduce its military presence”973.  
 
As this overview shows, we see that Propositions 1 and 2 are satisfied, namely Tony 
Blair is qualifying the new environment different from the previous one, he used to work in, 
and he is proposing new efficient strategic and tactical means of coping with the environment. 
Nevertheless, Proposition 4 that Tony Blair does not need to transform his basic beliefs about 
former causal links between these key concepts of the peace process is not working. 
By asserting that “discussions are not only about territory; the problem is not only land, 
but also the profile of the state” and refuting the idea “that negotiations are a substitute for 
creating capabilities” he is shifting cognitively from one way of thinking to another view 
prevalent in Israeli mindset.  
Namely, the Israelis have been arguing that rather than “envisioning a “utopian peace”, 
the parties should measure progress in comparison to the status quo (which is rapidly 
degenerating). Negotiations must be seen as a means rather than an end in themselves. Instead 
of asking what it will take to return to the negotiating table, all sides, the United States 
included, must ask themselves what needs to be in place to produce meaningful results and 
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 Barak Ravid et al., “Blair: There won't be Palestinian state unless it is coherently run”, 
Haaretz, 30 November 2007. 
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 Haaretz, 30 November 2007. 
973
 Ibidem. 
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create the best chance for a successful outcome. Negotiations must be reconceptualized as 
only one of a range of tools to achieve progress and create space and incentives for 
improvements on the ground, including within the context of the Palestinian state-building 
project in the West Bank”974. 
The neorealist account does not necessitate rethinking of former practices. It requires 
simply adjusting means to satisfy the context in which the actor is embedded. But by the end 
of 2007, our data show, that Tony Blair “no longer believes that "land for peace," in and of 
itself, is sufficient. He underlined this cognition in his speech delivered at the Saban Forum in 
Jerusalem. Tony Blair currently argues that what is no less important is the character of the 
Palestinian state975. 
According to the same sources, he constantly reiterates that in talks with senior PA 
officials, and baldly warns them:  
"There won't be a Palestinian state unless it is coherently 
governed and run, and anyone who tells you different is misleading 
you”976. 
 
His new position as expressed in the above-mentioned text refutes our Propositions 3 
and 4, instead implying that the Quartet Representative is already transforming his basic 
beliefs about former causal links between key concepts of the peace process. 
In previous chapters, the public discourse of Tony Blair showed us his frequent 
comparison of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the context of his peacemaking in Northern 
Ireland. As was supposed by Robert Jervis, “leaders' firsthand experiences early in life which 
have consequences are particularly important. He also notes the power of analogies and 
overgeneralization when leaders do not have the experience of alternative explanation977. 
Hence, in Proposition 6 we have noted that under new structural conditions the actor 
does not need to replace the fundamental basis of previous analogies and schemata through 
which he used to perceive the issue. 
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One of our data sources shows us disconfirmation of this proposition. On 2 February 
2008, Tony Mr Blair said that he had tried “to adapt his experiences from Northern Ireland 
peacemaking to the Middle East but he had learnt that the character of the two conflicts was 
very different. In particular, he believes that unless confidence can be returned to the 
relationship between Israelis and Palestinians the chances of reaching a deal are slim”978.  
“Without that confidence about the state of the situation on the 
ground the negotiation becomes more difficult. Sometimes people 
have looked at this process as one in which if you cut the deal the facts 
on the ground will alter. In my view it is as much the other way 
around. Unless you can change the facts on the ground the deal 
becomes difficult to cut”979.  
 
In October 2008, he made a statement which we consider to be contrasting with his 
Prime Minister discourse in terms of priorities leading to creation of the Palestinian state:  
“A state is not something that is simply negotiated from the top 
down, it must be built from the ground up”980. 
 
Recall Figure 16 about his conceptual understanding of causal relations between 
phenomena under investigation by November 2008.  
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 Tony Blair quoted in The Times, 2 February 2008.  
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In the following text Propositions 3 and 4 are not supported either. The former Prime 
Minister is challenging the basis of former international thinking he was committed to. The 
following discourse is explained more satisfactorily by cognitive learning, than by structural 
perspectives. 
"The error in international policy, in a way, up to now on this 
dispute, is to think that if you get a political agreement you can then 
change the reality on the ground. Whereas in fact unless you are 
evolving the reality on the ground in a positive way you will never 
create the context in which a political agreement is possible, because 
the Israelis will never think that a Palestinian state is permissible in 
terms of their security and the Palestinians will never think that a state 
is possible because of the occupation”981. 
 
Significantly, in the above-mentioned extract Tony Blair regards previous approaches, 
which are interchangeably called “Oslo thinking” or “top-down strategy” to be flawed.  
“So until the Palestinians see that lifting the occupation is a 
genuine possibility and the Israelis see Palestinian security capability 
under one authority is a genuine possibility they're not actually going 
to make the compromises to agree”982. 
 
In a given situation, when the set of lenses applied by a policy-maker to view some 
simplified form of reality changes over time in some way and for some reason and when the 
issue under question begins to be viewed differently than it appeared beforehand, we see 
limits of explanatory power of the neorealist conception.  
At present, according to The Guardian, Tony Blair “leans toward the Israeli view”, 
saying that what has become clear to him is that it is a mistake to pursue peace agreements on 
paper without the painstaking work of gradually changing the reality on the ground983.  
Commenting on his institutional experience Tony Blair claimed that had he known 
when he was prime minister what he knows now, it would not so much have led him to 
change policy as to recognise the limitations of what he could achieve as prime minister984. 
Further disconfirmation of our neorealist hypothesis we found in his speech in 
December 2008. In it the former Prime Minister explicitly indicates his transition from one 
thinking to another: 
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“But the central impasse does indeed remain. My view - formed 
since I came to Jerusalem and refining much of what I thought when I 
tussled intermittently with the issue for 10 years as British Prime 
Minister - is that it remains because the reality on the ground does not, 
as yet, sufficiently support the compromises necessary to secure a 
final, negotiated settlement. In other words, we have tended to proceed 
on the basis that if we could only agree the terms of the two state 
solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem - i.e. the theory, we would then 
be able to change the reality of what was happening on the ground i.e. 
the practice. In my view, it is as much the other way around. The 
political process and changing the reality have to march in lock-step. 
Until recently, they haven't985.  
 
He further continued:  
“[T]he key, therefore, to resolving this, is not to try to put a 
negotiated Agreement on the top of a pyramid whose foundations are, 
as yet, lopsided and uncertain. The key is, simultaneous with the 
political process, to secure those foundations and build them from the 
bottom up. Then, as the reality changes, so will the context for a 
successful negotiation”986. 
 
We tend to believe that the way with which Tony Blair is justifying his new policy is 
more adequately explained by rival cognitive learning theoretical background. In our 
empirical case, our public data show that before making changes in his policy behaviour, 
Tony Blair is justifying this shift by flaws in the previous strategic approaches (Proposition 3 
of the previous section on cognitive learning). Recall that he explicitly claimed:  
“The error in international policy, in a way, up to now on this 
dispute, is to think that if you get a political agreement you can then 
change the reality on the ground”987. 
 
Guided by propositions of the neorealist standpoint, we expected that Tony Blair would 
pursue the Quartet strategy without explicitly or implicitly rethinking and modifying his 
cognitive attitude to the norms. The structural point of view predicted he would not need to 
transform his basic beliefs about former causal links between these key concepts of the peace 
process, but simply to adjust his discourse to the new milieu.  
By early 2009, according to The Times, Tony Blair argued: 
                                                 
985
 Transcript of a conversation with Quartet Representative Tony Blair, Council on Foreign 
Relations, December 3, 2008. 
986
 Ibidem. 
987
 Transcript of interview with Quartet Representative Tony Blair with The Guardian during 
a visit to Rwanda, 13 November 2008.  
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“Hamas must somehow be brought into the Middle East peace 
process because the policy of isolating Gaza in the quest for a 
settlement will not work”988.  
 
If our neorealist hypothesis is plausible, then the new position of Tony Blair (dependent 
variable) needs to be preceded and caused by structural considerations (intervening variable). 
To cover the period of 2009 and 2010 we have studied 15 transcripts of Tony Blair’s speeches 
and interviews.  
Among them of particular importance is Tony Blair’s oral evidence given for the Fifth 
report of session 2008-2009 of the British House of Commons (1 June 2009)989. Another 
essential source for our analytic purposes is Tony Blair’s oral evidence to the Iraq Inquiry (29 
January 2010)990. These data sources show us the following findings: 
According to The Times, “The former prime minister implicitly criticises the strategy 
followed by the Bush Administration and Israel of focusing all peace and reconstruction 
efforts on the West Bank. “It was half of what we needed”991, he said.  
In an interview with Ginny Dougary in the Saturday Magazine, Blair says that the 
strategy of “pushing Gaza aside” and trying to create a Palestinian state on the West Bank 
“was never going to work and will never work”992.  
In June 2010, Tony Blair also criticized the former policy of “pushing Gaza aside”:    
“[It’s] precisely the limitations of that policy that are now 
apparent. [It’s] always been a mistaken belief that you push ahead in 
the West Bank and leave Gaza completely isolated. In the end, what 
you have to do is, even with the problems there with Hamas, you have 
to bring people in Gaza to understand that there is an alternative, it is a 
better way forward. But if they become completely isolated, the danger 
is not that they turn then towards a more sensible, more moderate path. 
The danger is then that extremism grows”993.  
 
But in our empirical case, all our public data consistently show that before making 
changes in his policy behaviour, Tony Blair is justifying this shift by flaws in the previous 
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strategic approaches (Proposition 3 of the previous section on cognitive learning). This 
enables us to conclude that our empirical case is more adequately explained not by neorealist 
conceptions (structural adjustment of means), but by rival cognitive learning (profound 
reassessment and reconsideration of prior beliefs and experiences). 
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In this doctoral analysis our objective was to explore the socializing role of international 
institutions. Whereas most mainstream international relations theories contend that actors 
respond to positive and negative sanctions provided exogenously by the institution, 
constructivists assume that actors may alter their behavior due to endogenous change in their 
normative characteristics and identities. Put differently, change in the behavior of the 
participants in a social interaction may have little to do with exogenous constraints on the 
individual and the group and a lot to do with socialization994. 
Throughout our work we sought to examine Tony Blair’s strategic approach to the 
Middle East peace process within two institutional contexts: as Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom and, currently as the Quartet’s Envoy. 
From the very onset we have formulated our research question in the following way:  
How is Tony Blair’s strategic conception of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
evolving with the change of his institutional context? 
In general, our work consists of two constitutive parts, each of which makes us a 
separate case study. In the first case study we have explored Tony Blair’s strategic approach 
to the peace process as British Prime Minister. In the second, we have dealt with Tony Blair’s 
strategic views about the conflict as Quartet Representative.   
We need some cautionary notes about the division of the first case-study into two parts, 
in its turn. In Chapter I we have elaborated on Prime Minister Blair’s thinking process from 
September 11, 2001 to January 2006, which makes us more than four years. On the other 
hand, Chapter II is chronologically shorter comprising his cognitive dynamics from January 
2006 until his departure from Downing Street in June 2007. Our goal from the start has not 
been observation of equal chronological division.  
Rather, we focused on tracing his cognitive processes under those events that are much 
likely to cause changes. When in January 2006 Hamas gained victory at national elections, 
one could expect certain changes in the content and structure of Blair’s cognitive beliefs. For 
this reason, we have devoted a whole chapter to this issue. 
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CASE-STUDY I 
In the first case-study we have argued that Prime Minister Tony Blair has conserved his 
strategic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
A large mosaic of primary and secondary source we have used have consistently shown 
us that under all historical instances the British Prime Minister remained committed to the 
“top-down strategy”.  
Our independent variable (the institutional context of the Premiership) was linked with 
the dependent variable (foreign policy) through the intervening variable, or causal mechanism 
(“stability of beliefs”). This intervening variable was the chief parameter which we tended to 
explain through theoretical methods in our work.  
The target of our study was not a simple examination of foreign policy outputs and 
decisions. Nor was the policy change our ultimate goal. We have been rather focusing our 
attention on the analysis of changes and stability in the cognitive beliefs, identity and interests 
of Prime Minister Blair that are attributable to interaction with the international institution. 
We sought to establish whether changes in the dependent variable were brought about by 
changes in the intervening variable.  
Since we have hypothesized that from 2001 to 2007 Tony Blair conserved stability of 
his beliefs about the peace process, then we counted as evidence his commitment to and 
continuation of the top-down strategy across all historical instances under our investigation. 
Similarly, we expected that under any circumstances of decision-making with regard to the 
peace process, he would scan incoming information through this assumption, not admitting 
any alternative thinking and that any external events or complex decision-making contexts 
should strengthen his top-down position. 
Nevertheless, we were empirically open to see at some point certain modifications in his 
cognitive views. At the same time, we have specified the analytic distinctions between 
“policy change” and “belief change” (or learning). Hence, if Prime Minister Blair had 
introduced certain changes in his Middle East foreign policy, we would not have interpreted it 
as reconsideration of his core beliefs. In other words, we would evaluate the pattern in light of 
analytic differences between cognitive and neorealist approaches to learning995.   
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If we sought to explain change in beliefs (or learning), we counted as evidence only 
those instances, in which policy change was preceded and, possibly, affected by reassessment 
of beliefs about optimal strategies for the conflict resolution. In our case study, this 
reassessment can be operationally imagined as a putative shift from the top-down to the 
bottom-up strategy. Since our goal was to explain the cognitive consistency of Tony Blair’s 
beliefs, then the most adequate theoretical construct accounting for cognitive stability was the 
cognitive dissonance theory.  
In this case-study we have reconstructed the sequence of events leading to an outcome 
based on predictions of this theory. Our objective was to test as many of a theory’s 
hypotheses as possible. We could reduce theory testing only to a subset of its propositions 
because it might leave the theory partly tested996.  
Further, scholars working on the concept of “learning” acknowledge that is difficult “to 
define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically”997 this concept. And one of the most 
frequently applied indicators of change in goals, beliefs, attitudes and other social-cognitive 
processes of policy-makers are “operational code” and “cognitive mapping”. We have applied 
both of them to our study.  
Drawing on a seminal study of Henry Kissinger’s operational code998, we analyzed 
Tony Blair’s strategic beliefs through the congruence method and process-tracing. The utility 
of the congruence method was in establishing whether on each historical occasion under our 
investigation Prime Minister Tony Blair’s beliefs were operating in consistency with each 
previous stage of decision-making. If from September 2001 until his departure from Downing 
Street we observed consistency between his beliefs and his political behaviour, we would 
assume they were expressed in a stable manner.  
In order to analyze Tony Blair’s thinking about the Middle East peace process during 
his Prime Ministership, we have studied 48 speeches, interviews, press conferences, in which 
was highlighted his position on the issue.  
Given the analytic need to diversify data sources to explore Tony Blair’s perceptions 
over time and to provide different perspectives, we have also used memoirs of key Cabinet 
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members and Tony Blair’s closest aides, such as of Alastair Campbell, Christopher Meyer, 
Clare Short, Michael Levy, as well as his own memoirs A Journey published in September 
2010. 
Similarly, cognitive process analysts apply the qualitative technique to documents in the 
public and private domains which might contain expressions of philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs999. Thus we have used a number of private sources which were published 
some years after the period of the decision-making under investigation.  
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s biographers Anthony Seldon (Blair Unbound) and Con 
Coughlin (American ally: Tony Blair and the war on terror) provide us with important 
primary sources through their interviews with a number of Cabinet members, closest aides 
and confidants of the Prime Minister. From these interviews we extract private recollections 
of the officials about Tony Blair’s thinking process, which turn out to be helpful in comparing 
with the public discourse.   
Last, but not least we sought to reconstruct Prime Minister Blair’s thinking processes 
about the Middle East peace process in the course of Iraqi decision-making discussions from 
public evidence before the 2009-2010 Iraq Inquiry of such officials, as Jack Straw (Foreign 
Secretary), Lord Prescott (First Secretary of State and Deputy Prime Minister), David 
Manning (Foreign Policy Advisor), Jonathan Powell (Chief of Staff to Prime Minister), 
Christopher Meyer (British ambassador to Washington), as well as public evidence of Tony 
Blair himself in the capacity of Quartet Representative on 29 January 2010.  
 
First of all, in our empirical case, the congruence method helped us find that there were 
certain deviations, or incongruence, in Tony Blair’s foreign policy from his stated operational 
code in 2004. Namely, Tony Blair has supported Ariel Sharon’s plan of unilateral 
disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. This position of Tony Blair was 
judged by The Guardian as tantamount “to a turnaround in British Middle East policy” based 
on the assumption that until then the country had “opposed unilateral withdrawal and 
remained committed to the idea of a peace settlement negotiated between Israel and the 
Palestinians”1000.  
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The British Prime Minister’s support of the Israeli disengagement plan could be 
analyzed by us either by means of either learning theories or the neorealist perspective. In the 
first case, we needed to present evidence that the decision had been preceded by reassessment 
of cognitive beliefs about optimal strategies applied to the peace process. This would 
invalidate our central hypothesis that Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his 
strategic beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
On the other hand, if we explained the event from the neorealist standpoint, then we 
could claim that the British response reflected the need to accept structural changes in the 
region and not reconsideration of basic principles of a negotiated solution to which the 
country was committed. Therefore, we need to provide evidence that Tony Blair’s change of 
policy was not accompanied or caused by the change in cognitive characteristics. 
But an inductive element to process-tracing has helped us elaborate a new hypothesis 
that Prime Minister Blair’s response was explained better not as a diagnostic change (learning 
explanation), but rather as a structural adjustment to the external environment (neorealist 
explanation). In this context the process-tracing method is indispensable. It is normally 
applied to examine the hypothesized causal sequences that a theory and its associated causal 
mechanisms predict should have taken place in a case, then determining whether the 
intervening variables along these pathways, or those predicted by alternative explanations, 
were in fact standing out in the case1001. 
The process-tracing method enabled us to test our third hypothesis that Tony Blair’s 
support of the Israeli plan was caused not by change of beliefs, but by the structural 
adjustment to the external environment. Our data findings did not show that Tony Blair 
undergone cognitive learning: i.e., he had not reassessed the importance of the Roadmap 
(“causal learning”) or acquired a new experience that the Palestinian capacities did not match 
creation of the Palestinian state (“diagnostic learning”). As a result our central hypothesis   
that Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process has maintained its validity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1001
 Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantage", in 
Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds. Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for 
Studying International Relations, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 19-
55. 
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COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS  
Certain officials and observers considered that Tony Blair’s striving for a two-state 
outcome was a position necessitated by the political circumstances. They thought that this 
position is ephemeral and is more a bargaining than a genuine aspiration to contribute to a 
final resolution. For instance, Blair’s biographer wrote that certain members of Prime 
Minister Sharon’s cabinet “dismissed Bush’s new-found enthusiasm [publication of the 
Roadmap] as a mere transitory reward to Blair for Iraq”1002.   
In our work we have undertaken an effort to propose one of possible answers to the 
question: Would have Tony Blair promoted creation of the Palestinian state if military action 
in Afghanistan and Iraq had not occurred? In other words, we have applied the method of 
counterfactual analysis.  
James Fearon claims that arguments in the counterfactual strategy are made credible (1) 
by invoking general principles, theories, laws or regularities distinct from the hypothesis 
being tested; and (2) by drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a counterfactual 
scenario1003. Therefore, our counterfactual research sought to reconstruct institutional and 
individual determinants of the UK position:  
a) the position of formal British foreign policy-related institutions over Israeli-
Palestinian peace process; 
b) strategic beliefs of Tony Blair about the issue prior to and during his Premiership. 
 
Invoking these general principles and regularities of the British political mindset and 
drawing on knowledge of historical facts, we assumed that Tony Blair would at some point 
back creation of the Palestinian state, even without military action in Iraq. The data that we 
used for our analysis testified that since his first days in Downing Street, Blair considered the 
issue “as a central foreign policy goal”1004.  
We also supposed that his actions could be constrained by the presence of the US, which 
was actively engaged at the last stages of President Clinton and disengaged under President 
Bush. And he perceived the aftermath of September 11 as a produced opportunity and “a spur 
to reinvigorate” the peace process1005.  
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Further we assumed that Prime Minister Blair would not have gone ahead of the United 
States not to produce a foreign policy rift with his key ally. He would obviously continue 
attaching himself to his well elaborated channel of strategic cooperation by avoiding public 
criticism of the US policies. The counterfactual method allowed us to speculate whether the 
Blair Government would give a public backing to creation of the Palestinian state (as it did on 
October 15, 2001), if September 11 had not occurred. We consciously called it “speculation”, 
because counterfactual argument, as Odell argues, is only speculation, though quite common, 
often not explicit, throughout scholarship and political debate1006.  
Tracing Tony Blair’s cognitive perceptions of the conflict through the counterfactual 
analysis has improved our understanding of how his beliefs had developed during his years in 
opposition or prior to September 11. This was essential for observing stability and 
fluctuations in his behaviour, for tracing how certain events cause changes and how others fail 
to. 
In an important study about socialization inside European institutions, Jeffrey Checkel 
has applied a combination of several techniques to multiply the observable implications of his 
approach. This allowed him to triangulate when assessing the degree to which, and through 
what mechanism(s), agent preferences change as a result of interaction1007. Checkel also 
argued that the use of process tracing, as well as alternative and counterfactual explanations, 
helped him minimize reliance on “as if” assumptions at the national/agent level1008.  
 
AFTERMATH OF THE HAMAS VICTORY  
Early in 2006 Tony Blair confronted an event that aroused his dissonance: victory of 
Hamas at the national elections. For Tony Blair, this event subjectively constituted “cognitive 
dissonance”. Thus, our question was how Tony Blair has coped with this dissonant 
information: a) The new situation may either induce changes in the content of his beliefs 
about optimal strategic approaches to the conflict; or b) It may be interpreted in such a 
manner that his basic assumptions and cognition will be conserved unchanged.  
Recall our central hypothesis of case-study I: 
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Tony Blair’s Premiership has triggered stability of his strategic beliefs about the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
To show that this hypothesis remains plausible even after the victory of Hamas, when 
Tony Blair had to undertake certain changes in his policy, we continued our analysis by 
fulfilling the core theoretical propositions of the same cognitive dissonance approach. The 
process, in which Prime Minister Tony Blair was involved from January 2006 up to June 
2007, is called from the cognitive viewpoint the period of dissonance reduction and 
consonance achievement efforts.  
The empirical base for this section comprising the period from January 2006 to June 
2007 was made up by 10 speeches, press conferences and interviews of Tony Blair. In 
addition they are complemented by five more sources in which Tony Blair has expressed his 
policy statements quoted in such sources as The Independent, The Times, Report of the House 
of Commons (Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism: Fourth Report of 
Session 2005-06), as well as House of Commons debates (Hansard source, 15 March 2006). 
Of these available primary sources Tony Blair’s speech made to the World Affairs 
Council in Los Angeles on 1 August 2006 and his foreign policy speech of 13 November 
2006 are considered to be the most important policy statements. In these speeches Prime 
Minister analyzes the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in context with other regional issues. 
Coupled with this, we have also used such secondary sources, as analyses of the 
aftermath of the Hamas victory produced by US think-tanks: the Brookings Institution, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Cato Institute1009. Rosemary Hollis in her 
book Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 Era (2010) makes thorough insight into the 
position of the United Kingdom over the issue under investigation.  
These data showed us that throughout 2006-2007, Tony Blair’s core strategic beliefs 
remained unchanged. Our data consistently showed his support for the previous policies 
through the generally accepted mechanism of the Roadmap. 
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At the same time, during the last months of his staying in power Tony Blair admitted the 
possibility of dealing with “the more sensible elements of Hamas”1010. More precisely, Tony 
Blair in a speech before the British Parliament said: “It's far easier to deal with the situation in 
Palestine if there is a national unity government. I hope we can make progress, including even 
with the more sensible elements of Hamas”1011. According to the assessment of The 
Jerusalem Post, “Britain's policy collapsed completely”1012.  
And when the British Parliament asked Dr Howells, Minister for Middle East, to clarify 
the Prime Minister’s comments, his answer revealed that the Government, at that point, did 
not view the three principles as explicit ‘red lines’:  
“As I interpret the Prime Minister’s analysis, those elements within Hamas would have 
to be part of the national unity Government and subscribe to a general statement by that 
Government that would go some way at least towards the Quartet’s principles. If that 
happened, we could contemplate talking to Hamas”1013. 
This official statement shows that the British government envisaged introducing certain 
modifications in tactical means.  
The new discourse implied changes in the dependent variable (behaviour) under our 
investigation. Our task at that point was to verify whether the change in the dependent 
variable had been brought about by the change in the intervening variable (belief system 
stability). If not, this variance would better explained by an alternative pathway, which we 
called as neorealist learning. We continued our exploration of primary sources to see whether 
the new position of Tony Blair was complemented by redefinition of identity, interest and 
belief system.  
Theoretical research on learning differentiates “cognitive learning” as a possible source 
of policy change from “structural adjustment”, one of alternative sources of change. 
According to the neorealist conception of learning, governments respond in a rational (or, at 
least, reasonable) manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the international 
environment1014.  
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Drawing on this essential analytic distinction between these two perspectives – 
“cognitive learning” and “neorealist learning” – we formulated our hypothesis:  
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s position to talk to certain members of Hamas was caused 
not by change of beliefs, but by the structural adjustment to the external environment. 
If our hypothesis we correct, we expected to observe “simple” learning in Blair’s 
selection of means but not in ends1015. In contrast, if our prediction were wrong, then our 
findings needed to show that from the beginning of 2007 till his departure Tony Blair 
underwent “complex learning”, in which in addition to modification of means, he 
reconsidered his basic goals. This “complex learning” is expected to find its reflection in his 
reassessment of the capabilities of the parties and his previous strategic approaches to the 
conflict resolution (namely, “top-down strategy”).  
Our results have shown that in the immediate aftermath of Hamas victory Prime 
Minister Blair did not share the view that Hamas had transformed itself. By the end of 
January 2006, Tony Blair’s discourse also showed that at least at the public level he did not 
believe that Hamas had implemented the requirements of the international community. Even 
after his departure from Downing Street, in his role as Quartet Representative, he did not 
perceive signs of change in the strategies of Hamas. In September 2007 Reuters quoted 
Quartet Representative Tony Blair who said “there were few signs that moderates in Hamas 
had the upper hand since rockets were still fired into Israel”1016. These data allowed us 
suppose that our hypothesis about structural adjustment and not reassessment of beliefs about 
capabilities and intentions of Hamas was valid. 
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CASE-STUDY II 
The principal analytic goal of our study has been to establish whether and how Tony 
Blair’s strategic approaches to the conflict are evolving in the new institutional context. In the 
previous case-study our data consistently showed us that in al historical instances Prime 
Minister Tony Blair was advocate of the so-called “top-down strategy”. Tony Blair explicitly 
summarized his dominant beliefs in the following extract:  
“[W]e have tended to proceed on the basis that if we could only 
agree the terms of the two state solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem 
- i.e. the theory, we would then be able to change the reality of what 
was happening on the ground i.e. the practice”1017.  
 
Nevertheless, the examination of the content of his speeches from June 2007 has 
revealed us essential peculiarities attributable to the effect of institutional interactions. In his 
public discourse we explicitly observe the shift of his strategic approaches preceded by 
reassessment of his years-old experience. Throughout our analysis we have often discussed 
the so-called “top-down-bottom-up” continuum of strategic conceptions of the conflict’s 
resolution. Interestingly, our data show new understanding of the issue by Tony Blair leading 
to prescription of the bottom-up strategy: 
“[T]he central impasse does indeed remain. My view - formed 
since I came to Jerusalem and refining much of what I thought when I 
tussled intermittently with the issue for 10 years as British Prime 
Minister - is that it remains because the reality on the ground does not, 
as yet, sufficiently support the compromises necessary to secure a 
final, negotiated settlement. In other words, we have tended to proceed 
on the basis that if we could only agree the terms of the two state 
solution - territory, refugees, Jerusalem - i.e. the theory, we would then 
be able to change the reality of what was happening on the ground i.e. 
the practice. In my view, it is as much the other way around. The 
political process and changing the reality have to march in lock-step. 
Until recently, they haven't”1018.  
 
Our analytic goal in Case-study II was to observe, explore and explain how his strategic 
beliefs about optimal ways of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were evolving with the 
change of his institutional context. As in the previous case-study the target of our analytic 
enterprise was not a simple description of his political decisions and actions. Nor was the 
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policy change our ultimate goal. In both cases the analytical interest of our study has been 
centred on changes and stability in the cognitive beliefs, identity and interests of Tony Blair 
that were attributable to his interactions with the international institution.  
For the analysis of Tony Blair’s belief system during his Quartet years we have explored 
the content of 23 interviews and press conferences from June 2007 until September 2010. 
Covering this chronological period, we have used 7 more media sources with reference to 
Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not published 
(mostly from Haaretz, Reuters, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Times) 
We think that in order to enhance the plausibility of our findings and comparisons we 
need to explore the views of policy-makers who have been engaged in the institutional 
activities of the Quartet. Until today the only predecessor of Tony Blair as Quartet 
Representative was the former President of the World Bnak James Wolfensohn. He had 
occupied this position from 31 May 2005 to 30 April 2006. We have studied 7 interviews 
delivered by James Wolfensohn, in which he spoke about the Quartet policies towards Gaza 
and the West Bank. These primary sources are important for comparison of two patterns of 
cognition – of Tony Blair and James Wolfensohn.  
Drawing on these data, we could formulate the principal hypothesis of Case-study II: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has triggered cognitive reassessment of 
Tony Blair’s prior beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at the strategic policy 
level.   
 Reassessment of beliefs and prior experiences by policy-makers are most adequately 
explained by the cognitive learning research program. So, if our hypothesis were valid, then 
our process-tracing and cognitive mapping methods were expected to show us on each 
occasion the operation of the propositions of the cognitive learning research program, on 
which we elaborated in the corps of our doctoral study. Cognitive psychological perspectives 
predict learning to occur when the set of lenses applied by a policy-maker to view some 
simplified form of reality changes over time in some way and for some reason. In the 
outcome, the issue under question begins to be viewed differently than it appeared 
beforehand. 
Our data sources show us that as a result of institutional interactions Tony Blair has 
developed new beliefs. These new beliefs appeared to be dissonant with some of the pre-
existing beliefs we discussed in Case-study I. The findings of our study explicitly tell that 
Tony Blair has reconsidered some of his principal views, namely his strategic approach to the 
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peace process. Our data also show that in essential policy statements the Quartet 
Representative downgrades the continuous practices of the international community in which 
he formerly took part, as predicted by cognitive perspectives. 
 
RIVAL EXPLANATION 
The research program which uses the process-tracing method requires also showing that 
the “CAUSE” and “EFFECT” are mutually linked by the intervening variable under 
investigation and not the alternative pathway. In addition, Gerring reminds us every "good" 
scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen1019. He claims that the 
more a theory forbids, the better it is1020. 
So, our next analytic goal was to exclude the probability that Tony Blair’s participation 
in the Quartet (cause) has led to new policy (outcome) through structural adaptation to the 
new environment (neorealist learning) and not reassessment of his prior beliefs (cognitive 
learning). In the case of neorealist adaptation; learning does not involve reassessment and 
redefinition of core strategic beliefs developed and sustained during his Premiership. 
Subsequently, we have advanced a rival hypothesis: 
Socialization within the Middle East Quartet has caused policy change through 
structural adjustment without reassessing previously held beliefs about the about the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. 
If this rival hypothesis were plausible, then our process-tracing and cognitive mapping 
methods expected orientation of Blair’s discourse to responses to the changes in the new 
environment. We would not expect him to challenge basic international conceptual guides and 
approaches to the peace process and even exclude this probability (as predicted by the 
neorealist standpoint).  
The rival neorealist account does not necessitate rethinking of former practices. It 
requires simply adjusting means to satisfy the context in which the actor is embedded. The 
rival neorealist account does not necessitate rethinking of former practices. It requires simply 
adjusting means to satisfy the context in which the actor is embedded.  
The same primary empirical data indicate us development of new beliefs: in contrast to 
the previous institutional context, at present Tony Blair argues changes on the ground need to 
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precede creation of the Palestinian State. All our data consistently showed that his new 
institutional policy was preceded by the reassessment of former practicing of achieving a 
political agreement before improving the conditions of Palestinian people. 
Extracts from 23 speeches and interviews and 7 more media sources with reference to 
Tony Blair’s official position revealed in his interviews, whose transcript was not published, 
disconfirmed the assumption that Quartet Representative was merely altering his tactical steps 
towards creation of the Palestinian state (as predicted by the neorealist approach).  
According to our findings, cognitive perspectives (in contrast to neorealist ones) are 
more successful in explaining that and how before making changes in his policy behaviour, 
Tony Blair is justifying this shift by flaws in the previous strategic approaches.  
We further tested the rival neorealist proposition against our empirical findings of 2009 
and 2010. We assumed that if our neorealist hypothesis were plausible, then the new position 
of Tony Blair (dependent variable) needed to be preceded and caused by structural 
considerations (intervening variable). To cover the period of 2009 and 2010 we have studied 
15 transcripts of Tony Blair’s speeches and interviews.  
Among these sources of particular importance is Tony Blair’s oral evidence given for 
the Fifth report of session 2008-2009 of the British House of Commons (1 June 2009)1021. 
Another essential source for our analytic purposes is Tony Blair’s oral evidence to the Iraq 
Inquiry (29 January 2010)1022.  
But in our empirical case, all our public data consistently show that before making 
changes in his policy behaviour, Tony Blair is justifying this shift by flaws in the previous 
strategic approaches (Proposition 3 of the previous section on cognitive learning). This 
enables us to conclude that our empirical case is more adequately explained not by neorealist 
conceptions (structural adjustment of means), but by rival cognitive learning (profound 
reassessment and reconsideration of prior beliefs and experiences).  
 
In summary, this doctoral study was conducted in line with analyses of social 
constructivists for whom socialization is a central concept. In accord with constructivists, we 
have treated institutions in which Tony Blair has been embedded (first as British Prime 
Minister and, currently, as Quartet Representative) as “social environments”.  
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The focus of our study of the Quartet was on the non-material (psychological, affective, 
ideological) effects of this institution on relevant actors. Consistent with the constructivist 
proposition, we have seen that the behavior of Tony Blair changes due to endogenous change 
in his normative characteristics and identities. More broadly, change in the behavior of the 
participants in a social interaction may have little to do with exogenous constraints on the 
individual and the group and a lot to do with socialization1023. 
As a result, Tony Blair looks at the Middle East peace process in a different way in 
contrast to how he used to throughout his Premiership. Tony Blair’s socialization involves 
changing his perceptions, opinions, and attitudes about causal links between key concepts and 
processes of the conflict resolution.  
Our empirical findings have shown that the British Prime Minister who had been 
consistently committed to the “top-down strategy” was exposed to institutional interactions 
and, subsequently, has reconsidered his prior approaches in favour of the combination of 
“top-down” strategy with the “bottom-up”. The data available to us have manifested that the 
new position is not characterized by mere structural adjustment to the new environment, but, 
more significantly, by profound reassessment of previous practices and experiences. This 
shows us the socializing power of international institutions. 
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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH  
MR. CHRISTIAN-PETER HANELT, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
By SARDOR USMANOV, PhD Candidate, 
Institute of Political Studies of Bordeaux 
 
22 June 2010 
 
Question 1 
Can we consider that the appointment of Tony Blair as Quartet Envoy 
is a sign of high commitment of the international community to the peace 
process? 
 
That’s a good question. I think the Quartet principals wanted to make their 
commitments and their activities on the ground more efficient by appointing a 
politician like Tony Blair. In principle, yes. But they did not clarify his mission and 
especially his role between the Quartet envoys and the Quartet principals. You 
know, they have appointed the Quartet special envoy but did not clarify to whom 
he will report, what he really has to do, who is working for whom, how the Quartet 
envoys are really involved and connected to his mission. So, these day-to-day 
uncertainties have weakened the appointment of Mr. Blair and fulfilment of his 
mission.  
 
Question 2 
In his interview for The Times (31.01.09) Tony Blair said: “Hamas must 
somehow be brought into the Middle East peace process because the policy 
of isolating Gaza in the quest for a settlement will not work”. Do you 
consider it as change of his views or do you find it be a tactical step? 
 
How to deal with Hamas is a complex issue. The Gaza issue has three angles. 
The first one is the question how to deal politically with Hamas that is ruling the 
Gaza Strip since 3 years? Secondly, how you are able to try socio-economically to 
fight poverty in the Gaza Strip. And thirdly, the question of how you get security to 
the Gaza Strip, that means not only for the Palestinians living there, but also for the 
Israelis in neighbouring Israeli villages, who have been suffering from Katyusha 
rockets attacks that have been fired on them from the Gaza Strip.  
The Quartet immediately after the elections of 2006 submitted to Hamas three 
principles which they have to fulfil before the Quartet will talk to them or even 
negotiate with them. From that time on or even before the mistake was that the 
international community and the Palestinian Authority have allowed Hamas to 
participate in the elections knowing that they have the Charter that does not accept 
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Israel`s the right to existence. They speculated that Hamas can participate in the 
elections but will not gain enough votes to win Parliamentary elections - but 
suddenly Hamas won - and the question how to deal with Hamas came on the 
agenda - nobody was prepared for such a case.  
Beyond the three conditions the Quartet set towards Hamas, inside the 
Quartet a room of manoeuvre opened. As the Americans and the Europeans 
refused to talk to Hamas, the Russians wanted to try to explain to them the Quartet 
conditions directly. The United Nations is the only institution present in Gaza. The 
different qualities of the four partners in the Quartet allow certain flexibility in 
order to achieve the same goal. 
Blair tried from an economic and social point of view to deal with the 
circumstances in Gaza within these different limits. With only few results.  Now, 
Blair is in the centre of the negotiations regarding passage etc for / with the Gaza 
strip – on behalf of the whole Quartet.   
 
Question 3 
For many years Israel has had reservations and certain suspicions 
towards the EU and the UN. In a series of candid statements in January 
2003 Ariel Sharon’s spokesman Raanan Gissin said that Sharon believed that 
the road map was “not realistic”: “There is nothing in that program that can 
be implemented." Sharon himself declared: "Quartet is nothing! Don't take 
it seriously! I don't think the United States takes it seriously” He also told 
the EU: “Your attitude toward Israel and the Arabs and the Palestinians 
should be balanced.... When it will be balanced, you are mostly welcome to 
participate” in the peace process. What do you think, how could Tony Blair 
attempt to influence this situation to raise the credentials of the UN and EU 
in the eyes of the Israeli government? 
 
Look, Mr. Usmanov, the Quartet is unfortunately only a coordination 
mechanism. It has been kept as a coordination mechanism whereas the envoys 
meet from time to time, mostly abroad, and the principals meet at the margins and 
on the sidelines of the General Assembly of the United Nations. And they finish 
meetings with declarations.  
The potential of the Quartet is much more. It includes all the main negotiation 
bodies – the Americans, the Europeans, the United Nations, and the Russians. So 
the idea of putting them into one format was an excellent idea because also the 
four partners in the Quartet agreed that the US is the driving force. They know that 
in the end the question of security can only be implemented by American guidance. 
So, all the partners expect the US to be the driving force within the Quartet.  
And even the symbolism of the Quartet holds more potential. Just image: the 
Quartet principals – the US Secretary of State, the EU Foreign Minister, the 
Russian Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of the UN – would sit together 
on the green line between West and East Jerusalem and would openly say: here we 
 333 
are the Quartet principals, institutions of mediation, we will not move from here 
until you have signed a peace agreement, dear Israeli and Palestinian friends. 
That the Quartet is not (yet) a strong mediation body can be observed during 
these weeks. The Israeli-Palestinian indirect proxy talks are organized and let by the 
United States. The main negotiations are even running between the US and Israel 
when you think about the settlement issue.  
 
Question 4 
In your report with “Suggestions for the Working Agenda” of Tony 
Blair you noted that “Blair might also strengthen the European component 
of the Quartet”. What practical actions could Tony Blair undertake, or has 
already undertaken to strengthen the European component of the Quartet? 
 
Mr Usmanov, from the perspective of looking back to our report three years 
ago this is still correct because the idea to nominate a European with a strong 
transatlantic confidence was a good idea. But the problem was / is his standing, let 
me say, his reputation which due to the Iraq war was viewed different in Israel and 
the Arab World. And the other problem was / is his unclear mandate. Blair 
expected a political role and received a not that clear economic role. 
The European foreign and security policy documents do not define his role 
either to best of my knowledge. Europe has excellent documents regarding the 
Middle East conflict and its resolution. And the EU has invested a lot, however our 
common EU-role is still limited. Reasons: Within the EU you have a pro-Israeli 
and you have also a pro-Arab group. Then you have a group that says: we have to 
have our own political role in the Middle East, the other group says: we do not 
have tools to replace the US so we should limit our ambitions to a junior partner 
role of the US and coordinate with them more. These differences mirror the EU in 
the Quartet as well as vis-à-vis Mr. Blair, too.  
These are shortcomings of the Quartet that could become more than just a 
coordination mechanism, shortcomings affecting the development of the potential 
of a special envoy like Tony Blair.  
When you see, finally, the idea of bringing all the mediation parties with 
different qualities and potentials – the US as a driving force that deliver security, 
the EU with its soft security skills and economic and social potential and its 
multilateral approach, the Russians with their good relations towards difficult 
parties in the region, for example Hamas or the Syrians, the United Nations with 
their multilateral expertise – when you see all these parties in one body, this could 
be something.  
And then you have the Road map that has been endorsed by the United 
Nations resolution.  
And we can hope that the US as the main interlocutor is able to place the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace forward. The Netanyahu-Abbas proxy talks are not run by 
the Quartet but singly by the US. If this triangle – US-Israel-Palestine – can bring a 
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better outcome than Quartet-Israel-Palestine negotiations, for example, then the 
US-Israel-Palestine format is much more promising , because in the end, even we 
Europeans wish a mediator who can best solve the conflict – hopefully Mitchell 
can close the Israeli-Palestinian file with a peace contract....informing his other 
Quartet members regularly and asking them for assistance. 
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 “DOOMED TO FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST” 
A letter from 52 former senior British diplomats to Tony Blair 
Source: The Guardian, 27 April 2004. 
 
“Dear Prime Minister,  
We the undersigned former British ambassadors, high commissioners, 
governors and senior international officials, including some who have long 
experience of the Middle East and others whose experience is elsewhere, have 
watched with deepening concern the policies which you have followed on the 
Arab-Israel problem and Iraq, in close cooperation with the United States. 
Following the press conference in Washington at which you and President Bush 
restated these policies, we feel the time has come to make our anxieties public, 
in the hope that they will be addressed in parliament and will lead to a 
fundamental reassessment.  
The decision by the US, the EU, Russia and the UN to launch a "road map" 
for the settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict raised hopes that the major 
powers would at last make a determined and collective effort to resolve a 
problem which, more than any other, has for decades poisoned relations between 
the west and the Islamic and Arab worlds. The legal and political principles on 
which such a settlement would be based were well established: President 
Clinton had grappled with the problem during his presidency; the ingredients 
needed for a settlement were well understood and informal agreements on 
several of them had already been achieved. But the hopes were ill-founded. 
Nothing effective has been done either to move the negotiations forward or to 
curb the violence. Britain and the other sponsors of the road map merely waited 
on American leadership, but waited in vain.  
Worse was to come. After all those wasted months, the international 
community has now been confronted with the announcement by Ariel Sharon 
and President Bush of new policies which are one-sided and illegal and which 
will cost yet more Israeli and Palestinian blood. Our dismay at this backward 
step is heightened by the fact that you yourself seem to have endorsed it, 
abandoning the principles which for nearly four decades have guided 
international efforts to restore peace in the Holy Land and which have been the 
basis for such successes as those efforts have produced.  
This abandonment of principle comes at a time when rightly or wrongly we 
are portrayed throughout the Arab and Muslim world as partners in an illegal 
and brutal occupation in Iraq.  
The conduct of the war in Iraq has made it clear that there was no effective 
plan for the post-Saddam settlement. All those with experience of the area 
predicted that the occupation of Iraq by the coalition forces would meet serious 
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and stubborn resistance, as has proved to be the case. To describe the resistance 
as led by terrorists, fanatics and foreigners is neither convincing nor helpful. 
Policy must take account of the nature and history of Iraq, the most complex 
country in the region. However much Iraqis may yearn for a democratic society, 
the belief that one could now be created by the coalition is naive. This is the 
view of virtually all independent specialists on the region, both in Britain and in 
America. We are glad to note that you and the president have welcomed the 
proposals outlined by Lakhdar Brahimi. We must be ready to provide what 
support he requests, and to give authority to the UN to work with the Iraqis 
themselves, including those who are now actively resisting the occupation, to 
clear up the mess.  
The military actions of the coalition forces must be guided by political 
objectives and by the requirements of the Iraq theatre itself, not by criteria 
remote from them. It is not good enough to say that the use of force is a matter 
for local commanders. Heavy weapons unsuited to the task in hand, 
inflammatory language, the current confrontations in Najaf and Falluja, all these 
have built up rather than isolated the opposition. The Iraqis killed by coalition 
forces probably total 10-15,000 (it is a disgrace that the coalition forces 
themselves appear to have no estimate), and the number killed in the last month 
in Falluja alone is apparently several hundred including many civilian men, 
women and children. Phrases such as "We mourn each loss of life. We salute 
them, and their families for their bravery and their sacrifice," apparently 
referring only to those who have died on the coalition side, are not well judged 
to moderate the passions these killings arouse.  
We share your view that the British government has an interest in working 
as closely as possible with the US on both these related issues, and in exerting 
real influence as a loyal ally. We believe that the need for such influence is now 
a matter of the highest urgency. If that is unacceptable or unwelcome there is no 
case for supporting policies which are doomed to failure.  
 
Yours faithfully”,  
 
Sir Graham Boyce (ambassador to Egypt 1999-2001); Sir Terence Clark 
(ambassador to Iraq 1985-89); Francis Cornish (ambassador to Israel 1998-
2001); Sir James Craig (ambassador to Saudi Arabia 1979-84); Ivor Lucas 
(ambassador to Syria 1982-84); Richard Muir (ambassador to Kuwait 1999-
2002); Sir Crispin Tickell (British permanent representative to the UN 1987-90); 
Sir Harold (Hooky) Walker (ambassador to Iraq 1990-91), and 44 others  
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APPENDIX III  
 
CABINET OFFICE PAPER:  
CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION 
(July 21, 2002) 
 
PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY  
 
IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note by Officials)  
 
Summary  
 
Ministers are invited to:  
 
(1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for 
possible action.  
 
(2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and 
law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international 
community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or international security, 
and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.  
 
(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a 
realistic political strategy, which includes identifying the succession to Saddam 
Hussein and creating the conditions necessary to justify government military 
action, which might include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons 
inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to 
President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 
August.  
 
(4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed 
Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD 
should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational 
Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and the 
outcome of SR2002.  
 
(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet 
Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to 
be agreed with the US.  
 
Introduction  
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1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is 
proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little 
thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or 
the aftermath and how to shape it.  
 
2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford 
in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime 
change, provided that certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to 
construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was 
quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN 
weapons inspectors had been exhausted.  
 
3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US 
Government to place its military planning within a political framework, partly to 
forestall the risk that military action is precipitated in an unplanned way by, for 
example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is particularly important for the 
UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally 
support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will 
commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to 
support.  
 
4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK 
support for military action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, 
and other considerations taken into account. This note sets them out in a form 
which can be adapted for use with the US Government. Depending on US 
intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on whether and in what 
form the UK takes part in military action.  
 
The Goal  
 
5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present 
borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a 
threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its 
international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could be achieved 
while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning 
unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, 
followed by elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in 
the view of UK officials, that one would necessarily follow from the other. Even 
if regime change is a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is 
certainly not a sufficient one.  
 
US Military Planning  
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6. Although no political decisions have been taken, US military planners 
have drafted options for the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In 
a 'Running Start', military action could begin as early as November of this year, 
with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support for opposition groups in 
Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land forces 
deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the 
collapse of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up 
before any military action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military 
plans include no specifics on the strategic context either before or after the 
campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for the 'Running Start'. CDS 
will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail.  
 
7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and 
Diego Garcia. This means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever 
option Ministers choose with regard to UK participation.  
 
The Viability of the Plans  
 
8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. 
Their initial view is that there are a number of questions which would have to be 
answered before they could assess whether the plans are sound. Notably these 
include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which the plans are proof 
against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons and the 
robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to 
fight.  
 
UK Military Contribution  
 
9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US 
military planning and the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD 
is examining how the UK might contribute to US-led action. The options range 
from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized contribution plus naval and 
air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK could not 
generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly 
visible decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be 
deployed in time, provided adequate basing arrangements could be made. The 
lead times involved in preparing for UK military involvement include the 
procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which there is no 
financial provision.  
 
The Conditions Necessary for Military Action  
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10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the 
following conditions necessary for military action and UK participation: 
justification/legal base; an international coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a 
positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of domestic opinion.  
 
Justification  
 
11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the 
international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military 
action under international law. But regime change could result from action that 
is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or any other 
state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective self-defence, if 
carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by 
the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared 
earlier this year, is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise 
circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle 
conceivable in both the first two instances but would be difficult to establish 
because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality. Further 
legal advice would be needed on this point.  
 
12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons 
inspectors. Kofi Annan has held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt 
to persuade them to admit the UN weapons inspectors. These have made no 
substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating. Annan has 
downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to 
persuade the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be 
allowed to continue ad infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an 
ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR for any 
ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi Annan and 
the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this.  
 
13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit 
weapons inspectors as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would 
not allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will 
take at least six months after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and 
verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess whether Iraq is 
meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by 
January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible 
that they will encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely 
when they are fully operational.  
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14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which 
Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and 
which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community. 
However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a 
legal base for military action by January 2003.  
 
An International Coalition  
 
15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform 
and desirable for political purposes.  
 
16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use 
bases in Kuwait (air and ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval 
forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our bases in Cyprus). The plans 
assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except granting military 
over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in 
the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be 
necessary.  
 
17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing 
the support of NATO and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate 
on the same basis as the UK. France might be prepared to take part if she saw 
military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to improve their US 
relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to 
their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the 
region would be neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in 
military action. In practice, much of the international community would find it 
difficult to stand in the way of the determined course of the US hegemon. 
However, the greater the international support, the greater the prospects of 
success.  
 
A Quiescent Israel-Palestine  
18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian 
violence for the time being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking 
more trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at best a half step forward. We 
are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make progress, including a 
resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a ministerial 
conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian 
state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab 
antipathy to military action against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge 
of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly likely. The co-incidence of such an 
upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq cannot be ruled 
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out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories 
to bolster popular Arab support for his regime.  
 
Benefits/Risks  
 
19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to 
ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be 
sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective as set out 
in paragraph 5 above. A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted 
and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military 
plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a 
disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more 
precisely the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in 
particular what form of Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime 
and the timescale within which it would be possible to identify a successor. We 
must also consider in greater detail the impact of military action on other UK 
interests in the region.  
 
Domestic Opinion  
 
20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is 
necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also 
need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An 
information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an 
overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the 
Islamic World and the wider international community. This will need to give 
full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and 
the legal justification for action.  
 
Timescales  
 
21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, 
we judge that a military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only 
because of the time it will take to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we 
judge that for climactic reasons, military action would need to start by January 
2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn.  
 
22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. 
This means that:  
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(a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before 
President Bush is briefed on 4 August, through contacts betweens 
the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels; 
 
Source: The Sunday Times, June 12, 2005 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
TEXT OF THE DAVID MANNING MEMO 
 
March 14, 2002 memo from David Manning (UK Foreign Policy Advisor) 
to Tony Blair recounting Manning’s meetings with his US counterpart 
Condoleeza Rice (National Security Advisor), and advising Blair for his 
upcoming visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch. 
 
(to print in large text reliably, increase the text size view in your browser, 
the text will then print larger as well) 
 
SECRET - STRICTLY PERSONAL 
 
FROM : DAVID MANNING 
DATE: 14 MARCH 2002 
 
CC: JONATHAN POWELL 
 
PRIME MINISTER 
 
YOUR TRIP TO THE US  
 
I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with her an NSC 
team on Wednesday (to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good 
exchanges, and particularly frank when we were one-on-one at dinner. I attach 
the records in case you want to glance. 
 
IRAQ 
 
We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for 
your support and has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would 
not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a 
Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the 
States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued 
regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. 
Failure was not an option. 
 
Condi’s enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. But there were some 
signs, since we last spoke, of greater awareness of the practical difficulties and 
political risks. (See the attached piece by Seymour Hersh which Christopher 
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Meyer says gives a pretty accurate picture of the uncertain state of the debate in 
Washington.) 
 
From what she said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions: 
- how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is 
necessary and justified; 
- what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition; 
- how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition 
(assuming there is any); 
- what happens on the morning after? 
 
Bush will want to pick your brains. He will also want to hear whether he 
can expect coalition support. I told Condi that we realiised that the 
Administration could go it alone if it chose. But if it wanted company, it would 
have to take account of the concerns of its potential coalition partners. In 
particular: 
- the Un [sic] dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be 
handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US 
was conscious of the international framework, and the insistence of many 
countries on the need for a legal base. Renwed refused [sic] by Saddam to 
accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument’ 
- the paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did, we 
could find ourselves bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf. 
 
YOUR VISIT TO THE RANCH 
 
No doubt we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with Condi 
convinced me that Bush wants to hear you [sic] views on Iraq before taking 
decisions. He also wants your support. He is still smarting from the comments 
by other European leaders on his Iraq policy. 
 
This gives you real influence: on the public relations strategy; on the UN 
and weapons inspections; and on US planning for any military campaign. This 
could be critically important. I think there is a real risk that the Administration 
underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn’t an option, but 
this does not mean that they will avoid it. 
 
Will the Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by Kurds and 
Shias? Will Americans really put in enough ground troops to do the job if the 
Kurdish/Shi’ite stratagem fails? Even if they do will they be willing to take the 
sort of casualties that the Republican Guard may inflict on them if it turns out to 
be an urban war, and Iraqi troops don’t conveniently collapse in a heap as 
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Richard Perle and others confidently predict? They need to answer there and 
other tough questions, in a more convincing way than they have so far before 
concluding that they can do the business. 
 
The talks at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the 
Middle East. The Iraq factor means that there may never be a better opportunity 
to get this Administration to give sustained attention to reviving the MEPP. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
TEXT OF THE JACK STRAW MEMO 
 
March 25, 2002 memo from Jack Straw (UK Foreign Secretary) to Tony 
Blair in preparation for Blair’s visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch, covering Iraq-al 
Qaida linkage, legality of invasion, weapons inspectors and post-war 
considerations. 
 
(to print in large text reliably, increase the text size view in your browser, 
the text will then print larger as well) 
 
[beginning of transcription] 
 
SECRET AND PERSONAL 
 
PM/02/019 
 
CRAWFORD/IRAQ 
 
1   The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few.  The risks are 
high, both for you and for the Government.  I judge that there is at present no 
majority inside the PLP for any military action against Iraq, (alongside a greater 
readiness in the PLP to surface their concerns).  Colleagues know that Saddam 
and the Iraqi regime are bad.  Making that case is easy.  But we have a long way  
to  go to convince them as to: 
 
(a)  the scale of the threat from Iraq and why this has got worse recently: 
 
(b)  what distinguishes the Iraqi threat from that of eg Iran and North Korea 
so as to justify military action; 
 
(c)  the justification for any military action in terms of international law: 
and 
 
(d)  whether the consequence of military action really  would be a 
compliant, law abiding replacement government. 
 
2  The whole exercise is made much more difficult to handle as long as 
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is so acute. 
 
THE SCALE OF THE THREAT 
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3    The Iraqi regime plainly poses a most serious threat to its neighbours, 
and therefore to international security.  However, in the documents so far 
presented it has been hard to glean whether the threat from Iraq is so 
significantly  differently from that of Iran and North Korea as to justify military 
action (see below). 
 
WHAT IS WORSE NOW? 
4  If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now 
be considering military action against Iraq.  In addition, there has been no 
credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida.  Objectively, the threat 
from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September.  What has however 
changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of the 
US), the world having witnesses on September 11 just what determined evil 
people can these days perpetuate. 
 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAQ, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA 
5  By linking these countries together in this "axis of evil" speech, President 
Bush implied an identity betwen them not only in terms of their threat, but also 
in terms of the action necessary to deal with the threat, but also in terms of the 
action necessary to deal with the threat.  A lot of work will now need to be to 
delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so much more 
justified than against Iran and North Korea.  The heart of this case" that Iraq 
poses a unique and present danger - rests on the facts that it: 
*     invaded a neighbour; 
*     has used WMD and would use them again; 
*     is in breach of nine UNSCRS. 
 
THE POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
6   That Iraq is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed 
on it by the UNSC provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is 
based on international law.  Indeed' if the argument is to be won, the whol case 
against Iraq and in favour (if necessary) of military action, needs to be narrated 
with reference to the international rule of law. 
 
7   We also have better to sequence the explanation of what we are doing 
and why.  Specifically, we need to concentrate in the early stages on: 
*     making operational the sanctions regime foreshadowed by UNSCR 
1382; 
*     demanding the readmission of weapons inspectors, but this time to 
operate in a free and unfettered way (a similar formula to that which Cheney 
used at your joint press conference, as I recall). 
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8    I know there are those who say that an attack on Iraq would be justified 
whether or not weapons inspectors were readmitted.   But I believe that a 
demand for the unfettered readmission of weapons inspectors in essential, in 
terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal sanction for any subsequent 
military action. 
 
9    Legally there are two potential elephant traps: 
(i)  regime change per se is no justification for military action; it could form 
part of the method of any strategy, but not a goal.   Of course, we may want 
credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part of the strategy by which 
we have to achieve our ends - that of the elimination of Iraq's WMD capacity; 
but the latter has to be the goal; 
(ii)  on whether any military action would require a fresh UNSC mandate 
(Desert Fox did not).  The US are likely to oppose any idea of a fresh mandate.  
On the other side, the weight of legal advice here is that a fresh mandate may 
well be required.   There is no doubt that a new UNSCR would transform the 
climate in the PLP.  Whilst that (anew mandate) is very unlikely, given the US's 
position, a draft resolution against military action with 13 in favour (or 
handsitting) and two vetoes against could play very badly here. 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY MILITARY ACTION 
10   A legal justification is a necessary but far from sufficient pre-condition 
for military action.  We have also to answer the big question - what will this 
action achieve?  There seems to be a larger hole in this than on anything.  Most 
of the assessments from the US have assumed regime change as a means of 
eliminating Iraq's WMD threat.   But none has satisfactorily  answered how that 
regime change is to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the 
replacement regime will be better. 
11   Iraq has had NO history of democracy so no-one has this habit or 
experience. 
 
(JACK STRAW) 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
25 March 2002 
 
Source: The Sunday Times, January 17, 2010 
